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Preface
With the publication of ‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’ in the New 
York Review of Books in February 1967, Noam Chomsky burst onto the 
US political scene as a leading critic of the war in Vietnam. The essay was 
then republished many times, starting with its inclusion in Chomsky’s 
first political book, American Power and the New Mandarins, in 1969. 
‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’ has aptly been described as ‘the single 
most influential piece of anti-war literature’ of the Vietnam period.1
By the late 1960s, Chomsky had been involved in the nascent 
anti-war movement for some time. But until the essay appeared he was 
known to the wider public, if at all, only for his ground-breaking work in 
linguistics. Since then, Chomsky has been a leading public intellectual, 
publishing hundreds of essays and dozens of books and giving thousands 
of talks and interviews. By 2004, even the New York Times – not the 
greatest fan of Chomsky’s political writings – had to admit that ‘if book 
sales are any standard to go by, he may be the most widely read American 
voice on foreign policy on the planet today’.2
Chomsky’s political commentary has ranged from US wars in 
Indochina, Latin America and the Middle East to analyses of western 
political and economic policy more broadly. He is also known for his 
work on the special role of the media in modern democracies, how they 
‘manufacture consent’ by keeping certain views and topics off the agenda. 
All of this political activity has taken place in parallel with Chomsky’s 
work as a linguist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where 
he revolutionised the study of language and the mind, rehabilitating the 
study of mental structure with a profound impact not only on linguistics 
but also on psychology and philosophy.
This book revisits ‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’ half a century 
on and celebrates Chomsky’s life of activism. It includes six new essays 
written to celebrate Chomsky’s famous intervention. The authors were 
all inspired by the theme of the responsibility of intellectuals but their 
contributions are very varied. Some have been studying Chomsky’s 
thought for years, others write about their own personal experiences of 
the price paid for speaking out.
The book has three contributions from Chomsky. He briefly 
explains the background to the original publication of ‘The Responsibility 
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of Intellectuals’. He also provides replies to the other contributors, with 
extensive commentary on issues that they raise. Finally, there is wide-
ranging discussion from a question-and-answer session he conducted in 
February 2017 on the 50th anniversary of the publication of his essay.3
The preparation of this book has taken longer than we had 
anticipated and has led us to incur a number of debts of gratitude. The 
most important of these is obviously to Noam Chomsky himself and to his 
wife Valéria Wasserman Chomsky. Despite the considerable pressures of 
the various strands of his life, he made time to join us for a lengthy ques-
tion-and-answer session via video link in UCL, and then reacted to the 
issues raised in the papers; he and Valéria replied to questions and dealt 
with many problems, always with grace and patience at a time when they 
were relocating to Arizona.
For financial support we are grateful to the British Academy, 
especially to its past president Nick Stern (Baron Stern of Brentford), and 
to UCL, whose Department of Anthropology and Division of Psychology 
and Language Sciences gave generous subventions. We are similarly 
indebted to UCL’s audiovisual unit for organising with flawless efficiency 
the video link with Arizona.
We also want to express our appreciation to UCL Press for their 
positive reaction to our often importunate questions and requests. Lara 
Speicher in particular has been helpful beyond the call of duty, and Laura 
Morley and Jaimee Biggins have done wonderful jobs as copy editor and 
Managing Editor respectively.
A number of other individuals should be mentioned for their 
contribution to one or other aspect of the enterprise. They include all 
the contributors but also Jui Chu Hsu Allott, Elliot Murphy and Kriszta 
Szendro˝i.
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Introduction
‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’: 
what it does and does not say
Nicholas Allott
Chomsky’s classic essay is an attack on experts, technocrats and intel-
lectuals of all kinds who serve the interests of the powerful by lying, 
by producing propaganda or by providing ‘pseudo-scientific justifica-
tions for the crimes of the state’ (as Jay Parini recently put it).1 Of 
course, unlike certain recently prominent politicians on both sides of the 
Atlantic, Chomsky has nothing against experts as such. What he argues is 
that they are not morally exceptional.
He wrote in the essay: ‘It is the responsibility of intellectuals to 
speak the truth and to expose lies.’ As he said, this is, or should be, 
truistic. It’s just obvious that intellectuals should tell the truth. It is 
equally obvious that it is not only intellectuals who have this responsi-
bility. But Chomsky argues that intellectuals have responsibilities that 
go beyond the responsibilities of others because they have a particularly 
privileged position. He wrote:
For a privileged minority, Western democracy provides the leisure, 
the facilities, and the training to seek the truth lying hidden behind 
the veil of distortion and misrepresentation, ideology and class 
interest, through which the events of current history are presented 
to us.2
As Chomsky has pointed out many times since, those of us living 
in relatively free societies have considerable advantages. We can 
express  our opinions in public without the fear of being put in prison 
or tortured for doing so. It follows that we have the responsibility 
to speak out about injustice. But within our society there are some 
people  who have further advantages and privileges: training in 
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reading texts critically, looking up sources and so on, and the time 
and job security to be able to do so in  the sustained way that it 
takes to expose the lies of the state and other  powerful agents. These 
are the people to whom Chomsky referred  as intellectuals. The now 
unfashionable label shouldn’t distract us from his point: because of 
their advantages and privileges they have a correspondingly weightier 
responsibility.
It is also worth pointing out that Chomsky did not say – and 
did not mean to imply – that this is their only responsibility or that 
it always  outweighs all others. We all have a lot of responsibilities! 
As he  explained in response to criticism of the essay, it is easy to 
imagine  more or less extreme situations in which the responsibility 
to tell the truth is outweighed by other obligations. But still, it is an 
important, central responsibility. As he said at the time in a reply to 
critics:
Surely everyone understands that there are no simple formulas that 
determine proper behavior in all conceivable situations. But from 
this it does not follow, surely, that one must abandon all concern 
for standards and general values.3
All this may seem perfectly obvious. Why was it worth saying? Why 
is it worth saying again now? One reason is that so many public 
figures are happy to lie and propagandise, now, as back then, and the 
reaction, or rather the lack of it, suggests that we do not always take 
seriously the responsibility to tell the truth. Chomsky provides numerous 
examples in his essay, across the US party political spectrum, from Henry 
Kissinger (a Republican and foreign policy ‘hawk’) to Arthur Schlesinger 
(a Democratic activist known as a ‘dove’).
Schlesinger was a famous academic historian who, while working 
as an adviser to President Kennedy in 1961, lied to the press about the 
attempted US ‘Bay of Pigs’ invasion of Cuba, as he later blandly admitted. 
As Chomsky said, what is interesting about this isn’t so much ‘that one 
man is quite happy to lie in behalf of a cause which he knows to be unjust; 
but … that such events provoke so little response in the  intellectual 
community.’
In the essay Chomsky sets out one of the enduring themes of 
his political critique of US foreign policy, scepticism about American 
exceptionalism: the idea that the US, unlike other powerful states, is 
essentially benevolent. As he shows, there are close historical parallels 
for US rhetoric:
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In 1784, the British Parliament announced: ‘To pursue schemes 
of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures 
repugnant to the wish, honour, and policy of this nation.’ Shortly 
after this, the conquest of India was in full swing.4
This – which is incidentally a good example of one of the other hallmarks 
of Chomsky’s political writing, biting sarcasm about injustice – should 
bring to mind John Stuart Mill,5 surely one of the most important 
and  wide-ranging philosophers, described by a leading modern 
expert as  ‘a “public moralist” and public intellectual  par excellence’.6 
He worked  for the East India Company for most of his adult life – a 
criminal enterprise if ever there was one – and argued in favour of 
what he  regarded as benevolent (British) ‘despotism’ in India and 
elsewhere as
a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians [sic] 
provided the end is their improvement and the means justified by 
actually effecting that end.7
That attitude would be bad enough if the goal really were the 
‘improvement’ of those subjugated, as Mill may have piously hoped, 
but history suggests that the goals of the powerful are consistently 
more  self-serving, and the effects of their actions less pleasant for 
those under  their power, from the Athenian invasion of Melos to the 
US wars  in  Asia in the 1960s and today. As Chomsky has repeatedly 
shown,  if you want to know the overriding aims of the powerful you 
have to look at their actions – as well as internal memos and other 
documents not intended for public consumption – and not be taken in 
by rhetoric.
There is another reason that we need reminding of the truisms 
in Chomsky’s essay. In the face of the temptation not to make a 
fuss, not to  rock the boat and not to endanger one’s livelihood, it is 
almost always  easier to serve the interests of the powerful, or to say 
and do nothing, than it is to stand up for what is right by speaking 
out.
Chomsky has been speaking out now for more than 50 years, and 
his work has been an unparalleled resource and inspiration for those of 
us who want to see through lies and propaganda and understand the 
world, so that we can change it for the better. His work and the example 
he sets should continue to inspire us.
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Notes
1  Noam Chomsky, ‘The responsibility of intellectuals,’ New York Review of Books, 23 February 
1967; Jay Parini, ‘Noam Chomsky’s “Responsibility of Intellectuals” after 50 years: It’s an even 
heavier responsibility now,’ Salon, 11 February 2017.
2  Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 
323.
3  Noam Chomsky, ‘Reply to critics,’ New York Review of Books, 20 April 1967.
4  Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 
356–7.
5  This short essay started as a talk introducing Chomsky and other speakers at UCL. J.S. Mill 
attended lectures at UCL, which was founded by (among others) his father James Mill, also a 
utilitarian philosopher, as a secular, liberal alternative to Oxbridge.
6  Georgios Varouxakis, quoted in UCL, ‘UCL marks a place in British intellectual history for John 
Stuart Mill,’ press release, 23 March 2006, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/media/library/mill
7  For the quotation from Mill, and discussion of his career at the East India Company, see: 
Abram L. Harris, ‘John Stuart Mill: Servant of the East India Company,’ The Canadian Journal 
of Economics and Political Science/ Revue Canadienne d’Economique et de Science Politique 30, 
no. 2 (1964), 191. For a recent overview of the British Empire’s attitude towards and effects on 
India, see Jon Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire (London: Simon & 
Schuster, 2016).
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Remarks on the historical context 
of the essay ‘The Responsibility of 
Intellectuals’
Noam Chomsky
These remarks are from a conference held at UCL on 25 February 
2017.  The event commemorated the 50th anniversary of the 
publication of ‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’.
Let me give a little bit of the background. The essay itself was really a talk 
given in early 1966, about a year before it appeared, to a student group at 
Harvard University, which published a student journal. The journal was 
Mosaic, the periodical – believe it or not – of the Harvard Hillel Society. 
This was pre-1967, and things were very different. This was one of a 
constant stream of talks, often many a day, to all kinds of audiences. It 
began pretty much when John F. Kennedy escalated the war in Vietnam 
in 1961–62.
Since this talk happened to be at Harvard, it was particularly 
important to focus on intellectual elites and their relation to government. 
The reason was that the Harvard faculty was quite prominent in the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The National Security Advisor, 
McGeorge Bundy, was a former dean at Harvard; many other faculty were 
either in the administration or travelled back regularly from Cambridge 
to Washington. And the spirit of Camelot reigned at Harvard  – as in 
fact it still does. That was the reason for the particular focus of the talk, 
different from other talks at the time.
I should perhaps say something about the general context. This 
was Cambridge, in the Boston area, probably the most liberal city in the 
United States, and you can get a picture of what things were like by two 
events that had just taken place: one about the time of the talk, one a 
couple of months earlier. October 1965 was the first planned interna-
tional day of protest against the Vietnam War, and of course the anti-war 
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activists in Boston wanted to participate in it. So we arranged a demon-
stration at the Boston Common – essentially the equivalent of Hyde Park, 
the standard place for public meetings. I was supposed to be one of the 
speakers. The crowd gathered, but the event never really took place. It 
was broken up violently by counter-demonstrators. You couldn’t hear 
the speakers. Real violence was prevented by a big police appearance. 
The demonstrations – not just in Boston – were bitterly condemned by 
congressional liberals. The demonstrators were regarded as traitors. 
How dare they ask these questions! The Boston Globe, probably the most 
liberal paper in the country, devoted almost the entire front page to 
condemning the demonstrators. That was the general mood.
The next international day of protest was in March 1966, about the 
time when this talk was given at Harvard. We realised we couldn’t have 
a public demonstration, it would be broken up violently. So we decided 
to have a meeting instead at the Arlington Street Church in downtown 
Boston. The church was attacked – tomatoes, tin cans, and so on. Again, 
a police presence prevented greater violence. That was the context at the 
time that this was being given.
Well, despite quite overwhelming opposition, the small number 
of anti-war activists were proceeding at that time well beyond talks 
and organising efforts. In March 1965, a year earlier, we had tried to 
organise a national tax resistance campaign. It was mostly based at MIT, 
in fact, at the laboratory where I was working, the Research Laboratory 
of Electronics. By 1966, there were the beginnings of efforts to organise 
a national resistance organisation, called ‘Resist’. It became public in 
October 1967, and by 1968 it was the target of the first government trials 
of the resistance. And again, MIT was pretty much the academic centre, 
the same lab for the most part.
In February 1967, the New York Review of Books did publish the 
article that had appeared in the Harvard student journal, edited with 
expanded footnotes and so on. And that was followed, once in the 
journal, by interchanges and discussions on moving from protest to 
direct resistance, which by then was pretty much underway. By late 
1967, there was a large-scale, popular anti-war movement finally taking 
shape – much too late, but quite significant in scale and with long-term 
consequences. That’s the general context in which the article appeared in 
the New York Review.
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1
Reflections on Chomsky’s ‘The 
Responsibility of Intellectuals’
Neil Smith and Amahl Smith
Introduction
Chomsky set out three responsibilities of intellectuals in his classic paper: 
to speak the truth and expose lies; to provide historical context; and to 
lift the veil of ideology, the underlying framework of ideas that limits the 
boundaries of debate.1
As documented extensively in the press, there is ample evidence 
from Trump’s tweets in the US and the disinformation put about in the UK 
Brexit referendum that the incidence of lying on the part of the powerful 
has not decreased and the need to speak truth has not gone away. These 
examples might give the impression that there’s no need for intellectuals 
in general ‘to speak the truth and to expose lies’, as mainstream journalists 
will do it anyway. But in these cases there are powerful (indeed elite) 
forces on both sides, and it is generally only by the actions of individual 
intellectuals that the facts are revealed and discussed.
The archetypal example is Edward Snowden, an employee of the 
NSA (National Security Agency) who leaked vast numbers of classified 
documents to journalists, revealing the massive surveillance of its own 
citizens perpetrated by the US government. His action was condemned 
as treachery by some, lauded as heroic patriotism by others. Explaining 
what drove him to act as he did, Snowden said that ‘the breaking 
point was seeing the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, 
directly lie under oath to Congress’.2 Chomsky commended Snowden’s 
behaviour, saying ‘he should be welcomed as a person who carried out 
the obligations of a citizen. He informed American citizens of what their 
government is doing to them. That’s exactly what a person who has real 
patriotism … would do.’3
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Clearly, the veil of ideology still hangs heavy and historical context 
is often lacking, as is evident from the current debate on what to do 
about North Korea or the ongoing problems in the Middle East. Sadly, 
Chomsky’s paper ‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’ (hereafter RoI) is 
as relevant today as it was 50 years ago. Much, however, has changed in 
the intervening period, and it is worth exploring how these changes have 
affected – and perhaps subtly changed – the responsibilities of intellectuals.
At a minimum, there have been changes in the number, nature and 
status of intellectuals; the people to whom truth needs to be spoken; 
and what else is required if speaking truth and exposing lies is to have 
any impact. One is responsible for the foreseeable consequences of 
one’s actions; if there are no consequences, when should one persevere 
and when should one stop wasting one’s time and do something 
more effective? Moreover, technological advances have complicated the 
landscape. We explore each of these issues.
The number, nature and status of intellectuals
As Dwight Macdonald made clear in the articles from which Chomsky 
drew his inspiration,4 all people have a moral and political duty to 
speak truth to power but – as Chomsky emphasises – the combination of 
training, facilities, political liberty, access to information and freedom 
of expression enjoyed by some intellectuals imposes deeper responsi-
bilities on them. While it may not always be obvious who counts as an 
intellectual for these purposes, what is clear is that the number of intel-
lectuals has increased dramatically over the last 50 years, as exemplified 
in the UK by the huge expansion of university education over that 
period: from less than 10 per cent of the population to nearly 50 per 
cent. Disappointingly, only a minority of these new intellectuals see 
themselves as ‘value-oriented’ (in Chomsky’s more recent terminology). 
The contrast is between ‘technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals’ 
(the ‘good guys’, in the eyes of the establishment, who merely serve 
external power) and the ‘value-oriented intellectuals’ (the ‘bad guys’, 
from an establishment perspective, who engage in critical analysis and 
‘delegitimation’).5 This sardonic description characterises those who 
have a ‘moral responsibility as decent human beings … to advance the 
causes of freedom, justice, mercy, peace … [as opposed to] … the role 
they are expected to play, serving … leadership and established insti-
tutions’.6 Why the pernicious persistence of this distinction? There are 
many factors at play.
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Intellectual courage
A significant factor in determining the preparedness of intellectuals 
to adopt a dissident stance is obviously fear of the consequences. As 
Craig Murray argues in his contribution to this book, the scope of 
academic freedom has declined significantly in the last few decades; 
universities are now expected to function as corporations, tenure 
is shrinking and funding has become short-term and dependent on 
continual measurement of research outputs, putting the funders in de 
facto academic and intellectual control.7
One concrete effect of this development can be seen in the casu-
alisation of labour in academic life. The situation is worst for post-docs, 
who tend to get a sequence of short-term contracts with no career 
structure and little prospect of tenure.8 The attendant insecurity is a 
powerful disincentive to say or do anything that might rock the boat – or 
irritate the representatives of big business that increasingly populate 
university governing bodies.
The increasing emphasis by a dominant bureaucracy on ‘paper 
trails’ (in some institutions faculty are enjoined to keep a written record 
of every interaction with any student, as a defence against possible 
later litigation) may also remove time and inclination to engage, as 
well as having a stultifying effect on intellectual development – perhaps 
accounting in part for the unprecedented discontent among staff, 
as demonstrated in the February to April 2018 widespread strike action 
involving some 65 universities.
For one prominent class of intellectuals (viz. academics), these 
developments have undoubtedly led to changes in their status and their 
ability – or courage – to undertake the analysis required to ‘seek  the 
truth  lying hidden behind the veil of distortion and misrepresenta-
tion’. When one considers the situation of black intellectuals, then the 
issues, as Jackie Walker points out in her contribution, are all the more 
marked.9 When historical injustices against black people remain barely 
acknowledged, let alone commemorated, it is with trepidation that 
people of colour raise their heads above the parapet to speak truth to 
power on any issue, even those that relate to their own history and 
experience.
Intellectual confidence
Even among those willing to face the consequences, lack of confidence, 
combined with the sneaking suspicion that what they do is ineffectual, 
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discourages many from activism. It is interesting in this regard to contrast 
the paucity of ‘intellectuals’ in Chomsky’s recent sense with the rise in the 
number of academics willing to step into the public eye to popularise 
their own subject, or just their own work. Alan Lightman draws contrasts 
between three levels of intellectual: those who speak and write for the 
public exclusively about their own discipline; those who speak and 
write about their discipline and how it relates to the social, cultural and 
political world; and those who contribute ‘by invitation only’: intellec-
tuals who have become elevated to symbols and are asked to write and 
speak about public issues not necessarily connected to their original field 
of expertise at all.10 The stock example is Einstein. Lightman then lists 
other people he would place in this category, beginning with Chomsky. 
Lightman’s taxonomy cross-cuts Chomsky’s, but his perception that a 
certain status should arise ‘by invitation only’ suggests that he has been 
seduced by the thought that speaking out on matters of public concern 
requires special authority. As Chomsky was at pains to point out, no 
special expertise or authority is required, and the responsibility to speak 
out rests with every one of us. It is not a matter of waiting to be invited, as 
this attitude encourages a kind of defeatism: if I’m not in the select group 
of ‘invitees’ what I do is irrelevant.
We have no easy solutions to the problems of intellectual courage 
and confidence, but the practical question of what can be done to 
encourage more people to do something – anything – on the kinds of 
issue featured in RoI is pressing.
The people to whom truth needs to be spoken
The responsibility of intellectuals is often summarised as ‘speaking truth 
to power’. But it needs emphasising that speaking truth to power may not 
be the highest priority. Even where it is, the powers to which truth needs 
to be spoken are perhaps more disparate than before.
Speaking truth to the powerless
Those in power are often fully aware of what they are doing and why 
they are doing it. This is a point Chomsky has made forcefully about 
people like Churchill, who is cited in RoI as saying ‘The government 
of the world must be entrusted to satisfied nations’. More generally, 
the elite need an accurate idea of what is going on in order to govern. 
Some of course may be (wilfully) ignorant, and it is necessary to speak 
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truth to such people so that they cannot claim not to know the truth. But 
arguably the most important priority is to speak truth to the powerless, 
and to make apparently powerless people aware that, in conjunction 
with others, they need not remain powerless. David Hume recognised 
this in his 1741 maxim that ‘power is in the hands of the governed’.11 
The first requirement, then, is to make such people aware of the true 
situation and hence of the possibility of their helping to bring about 
change.
Filling the gaps
Equally important is the fact that the responsibility to speak the truth 
has many facets: it is frequently not merely about exposing lies but 
about filling the gaps left, through calculation or inadvertence, by the 
mainstream media and the government agencies that feed them.12 After 
the surprise result of the Brexit referendum it was striking that in her 
letter triggering the UK’s actual departure the Prime Minister Theresa 
May made no mention of vexatious problems such as the status of 
Gibraltar, the fate of the fishing industry, the future of farmers and so 
on. It is impossible to cover every difficulty, but omissions give as clear 
an indication of policy priorities as do commitments. Similarly, in the 
77-page government white paper (Cm 9417 – The United Kingdom’s exit 
from and new partnership with the European Union) there is no mention 
of equalities or ‘inequalities’, such as the status of women. The problem 
of validity that these omissions raise is summed up in Sophie Chappell’s 
aptly entitled paper ‘Political deliberation under conditions of deception: 
The case of Brexit’.13
There are nonetheless some powers to whom it is necessary to 
speak the truth and, just as there have been changes in the nature of 
intellectuals, there have been changes in the powers to which truth 
needs to be spoken and the lies of which need to be exposed. RoI dealt 
almost exclusively with governments, but one needs now increasingly to 
look at companies and other non-state actors such as the public relations 
industry and the business community more generally, the National Rifle 
Association (NRA)14 or Breitbart News.
With non-state actors, it is worth asking whether the nature of the 
responsibilities of intellectuals changes slightly. A significant omission 
from RoI is the contrary of exposing lies: applauding truth-telling or 
the defence of human rights. The effectiveness of speaking truth to 
governments is dubious, and praising them is generally irrelevant. Is 
either activity more efficacious when confronting corporate power?
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Speaking truth to business
Despite the rise of fair trade initiatives, the single motivating factor 
for most companies remains  profit, and companies are increasingly 
exploiting ‘Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation’ (SLAPPs)15 
to inhibit intellectuals and organisations from campaigning against 
them. As a result, confronting business requires some changes in tactics. 
The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC)16 provides 
useful examples and evidence, and there are some clear indicators of the 
effectiveness of both positive praise and negative criticism. Consider two 
examples: Uber and Penzeys Spices.
Both cases concerned the association of companies with (or against) 
the policies of US President Trump. In his campaign for the American 
presidency, Trump exhibited systematic Islamophobia, on one typical 
occasion issuing a statement demanding ‘a total and complete shutdown 
of Muslims entering the United States’.17 Soon after taking office he 
issued an executive order banning all refugees and people arriving from 
seven Muslim-majority countries (Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria 
and Yemen). The order was challenged in the courts, a revised version 
was issued (with Iraq omitted), and further modifications were made 
until the Supreme Court ruled in the President’s favour. The (attempted) 
ban polarised the nation, with one significant side-effect being a strike by 
New York taxi drivers (many of whom are Muslims). An advertisement 
by Uber (a peer-to-peer ride-sharing company) that they were still ‘open 
for business’ was widely interpreted as an attempt to undermine the taxi 
drivers’ strike action, and led to the social media campaign #DeleteUber, 
resulting in 200,000 people deleting their Uber accounts within days.18 
This is a good example of negative criticism of a business for its human 
rights stance having a significant (even if temporary) effect.
The converse situation is illustrated by the case of Penzeys Spice 
Company. The CEO attacked Trump’s racist position on immigration 
in the company newsletter. This provoked a storm of heated reactions 
but, overall, had a huge (positive) impact on business.19 Even if this 
was mainly rewarding ‘anti-Trump’ behaviour rather than pro-human 
rights behaviour, the strategy clearly influenced consumers, as witness 
headlines in the press such as ‘CEO Bill Penzey Jr. is learning firsthand 
how blasting President Donald Trump is good for his bottom line’. 
Here admiration for a company’s stance had a positive impact on its 
commercial performance.20
It is significant that hostility to Trump was crucial in determining 
the outcome of both examples and it would be foolish to draw too strong 
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a conclusion; nevertheless, it is worth considering whether, at least in 
the case of businesses, there is a responsibility not just to expose lies but 
publicly to applaud those who take a positive stand.
Evidence for the effectiveness of activism?
There is a more general lesson about potential change to be learned 
from such examples. Chomsky has frequently spoken of improvements 
over time in the civic situation. In a conversation with Harry Belafonte 
he reports ‘tremendous progress’, saying that ‘the country has become 
much more civilized in the last 50 or 60 years’, citing women’s rights, civil 
rights more generally, gay rights, environmental concerns, opposition 
to aggression, and so on.21 If such historical evaluation is accurate 
it suggests that activist pressure can lead to change, providing some 
minimal grounds for optimism. Chomsky’s own optimism is part of a 
deliberate strategy. He has often quoted Gramsci’s aphorism ‘you should 
have pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the will’.22 Only the 
latter, Chomsky writes, protects you from the despair engendered by 
Trump’s policies on the environment, described as a ‘death knell for the 
human species’.23
Disseminating the truth
Value-oriented intellectuals wishing to speak the truth have greater 
difficulty than before in doing so in a way that can have any impact. 
There are several different issues at play.
Relativist views of truth
Since Chomsky wrote RoI there has been a rise within the academy of 
a kind of post-modernist relativism that questions whether there is an 
objective truth to be spoken (to power or otherwise), holding instead 
that different truths obtain for different groups.24 There are good reasons 
to reject post-modernist relativism (see e.g. the books on the subject 
by the philosophers Thomas Nagel and Paul Boghossian), as Chomsky 
himself clearly does (as demonstrated in the 1971 debate between 
Chomsky and Foucault).25 However its influence – and potentially its 
contribution to the current ‘post truth’ environment – cannot be ignored. 
While many who hold such views appear to be motivated (at least in 
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part) by a desire to ‘protect oppressed cultures from the charge of holding 
false or unjustified views’, as Boghossian puts it,26 such relativism is 
likely to inhibit criticism where criticism is due (e.g. the treatment of 
women in many Islamic states, or autocratic practices in non-western 
cultures). Moreover, it risks leaving the powerful immune to criticism: 
if the powerful can’t criticise the oppressed – because different truths 
apply to them – presumably the oppressed can’t criticise the powerful for 
the same reason. It is hard to gauge the significance of relativist views in 
this context but they may well have left some intellectuals disinclined to 
speak out and blunted the influence of those who have.
Such relativist views have plausibly also contributed to the rise of 
identity politics and the ‘political correctness’ that often accompanies 
them – including a disturbing increase in calls for ‘no-platforming’ at 
events held within academic institutions.27 While it is undoubtedly true 
that charges of political correctness have often been used by those on the 
political right to divert attention from discriminatory behaviour against 
disadvantaged groups by mocking left-wing concerns with the language 
used and the impact on oppressed groups, it is also true that many of the 
left’s behaviours have been counter-productive and have facilitated a 
rise in ‘right-wing political correctness’ which, as Paul Krugman pointed 
out,28 ‘unlike the liberal version – has lots of power and money behind it. 
And the goal is very much the kind of thing Orwell tried to convey with 
his notion of Newspeak: to make it impossible to talk, and possibly even 
think, about ideas that challenge the established order.’
Anti-intellectualism and distrust of experts
Even where intellectuals are prepared to speak out, the rise of anti- 
intellectualism makes it difficult for them to be heard.29 As discussed 
above, Chomsky often emphasises the ways in which the ‘political 
sciences’ are used to obfuscate discussion and suggest that issues need 
to be left to ‘the experts’, pointing out that ‘the cult of the experts is both 
self-serving, for those who propound it, and fraudulent’.30 However, as 
Nichols has forcefully discussed, there is danger in embracing ‘misguided 
intellectual egalitarianism’. ‘Stubborn ignorance’31 may result in 
countless deaths, as with the anti-vaccine campaign,32 or in unexpected 
and unwanted electoral results. Nichols cites Michael Gove’s interven-
tions in the UK Brexit campaign33 and Donald Trump’s success in the 
American presidential election.34
One interesting development over the past 50 years is that with 
many of the issues most critical for human survival (e.g. climate change, 
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nuclear proliferation, genetic engineering) the underlying moral and 
political issues are no more in need of ‘expertise’ than before. But there 
is now a ‘hard science’ dimension to understanding the issues and the 
options and a genuine need for people to understand some of the science. 
This has led to a situation where, deliberately or not, ‘hard scientists’ and 
not just ‘political scientists’ may use their expertise to exclude the general 
population from decision-making.
Take genetic engineering as an example. In evaluating whether 
to release a genetically modified organism it is obviously important to 
understand the science and the ‘technical’ risks in play. But it is also 
important to come back to the politics and economics as well. Many of 
those who oppose GM food, for example, do so not because they misun-
derstand the science but because they have concerns over the economics 
(where for example agribusinesses will hold patents over the GM seeds) 
or wider concerns over the political appropriateness of a technological 
solution at all. A more appropriate way of addressing the issue, one that 
leaves those most affected with control over their lives, might involve 
campaigning against the use of famine as a political tool, or working to 
eliminate waste in the supply chain.
Where Chomsky pointed to the fact that (policy) intellectuals liked 
their status as ‘technical experts’, there is a risk that hard scientists like 
their role in proposing technological solutions where these may not be 
what is politically or socially appropriate. The role of intellectuals in 
disentangling all this is more complicated now that it is not just a matter 
of seeing through the absurdities of political science but of patiently 
explaining the science one does need to know and its relevance to the 
moral and political issues. Intellectuals then need to show how those 
issues remain ones on which everyone (not just the experts) legiti-
mately has an opinion and a responsibility to act. Large swathes of the 
population, including in particular those who voted for Trump, and those 
influenced by Michael Gove in the UK, now distrust so-called ‘experts’, 
including in particular scientific experts. As Gove (then Secretary of 
State for Justice, one of several cabinet portfolios he has held) put it: ‘the 
people of this country have had enough of experts from organizations 
with acronyms saying that they know what is best’.35 The root of the 
problem is then confusion (possibly created deliberately by politicians) 
about the role of experts and of scientific evidence in setting policy. 
It is only ‘intellectuals’ who can stand up for science while for many 
non-intellectuals science itself has fallen into disrepute. The upshot is 
that distrust of experts and the anti-intellectualism that accompanies it 
is making it harder for intellectuals to make the truth accessible to the 
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powerless (because they won’t listen to them) and may make it easier for 
the powerful to dismiss what they say when they speak truth to power.
The issues become more complex when the genetic engineering 
pertains to humans and the elimination of disease. It may seem apodictic 
that preventing Down syndrome or autism in the population is desirable, 
and that if that aim can be fulfilled there should be no disagreement 
about the morality of using genetic engineering to effect that goal. 
But the possibility of eliminating such conditions may be incompat-
ible with maintaining due respect for people who have them. Many 
(high- functioning) autists consider autism to be not a disability but a 
difference to be celebrated. In that situation does the medical profession 
have the right to intervene? The same problem exists with greater clarity 
when it comes to eliminating deafness, as the Deaf community (with a 
capital D rather than lower-case d) is suspicious of or hostile to any such 
‘progress’.36 There is no obviously correct answer here, but the history 
of eugenics indicates both that the issue is not quite as new as it might 
appear and, more importantly, the necessity for scrupulous respect for 
the scientific truth and the need to expose misrepresentation.
Social media
There have been radical changes in the outlets for disseminating 
information, whether true or false. On the one hand, there is ever greater 
corporate control of the media, which makes it harder for value-oriented 
intellectuals to find a mainstream platform; on the other hand, there is 
the rise of the internet and the dramatic increase in the influence of social 
media, which at least have the potential to provide platforms outside 
corporate control. Social media in particular can raise public awareness 
quickly, give a voice to the excluded, facilitate the persuasive impact of 
word of mouth, communicate a sense of urgency, allow safe commu-
nication under oppressive regimes and allow a sense of individual 
engagement and identification with an issue or a movement.37 Despite 
this potential, the reality seems to be that for many people sources of 
news and opinion are getting narrower, with individuals retreating 
inside social media ‘bubbles’ where they are only fed news that reinforces 
their (establishment-influenced) beliefs and where the structure of news 
channels (tweets, Facebook feeds, etc.), with their emphasis on brevity, 
makes stepping outside the presuppositions of debate ever harder and 
providing historical context almost impossible.38
An important aspect of the rise of social media is the difficulty 
of knowing what lies are being propagated. Social media feeds can be 
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targeted so finely it is hard to know what is being said to whom – lies 
are no longer always ‘public’, and you can’t expose and correct what 
you don’t know is being said: ‘if you aren’t a member of the community 
being served the lies, you’re quite likely never to know that they are in 
circulation’, as John Lanchester remarked in a chilling analysis of the 
pernicious effect of Facebook: ‘in essence an advertising company which 
is indifferent to the content on its site’.39
Fake news
This issue is made more pressing by the vast increase in the number of 
ideologically motivated organisations deliberately promulgating what 
can only be termed ‘fake news’. This issue is insightfully dissected in Eric 
Alterman’s essay on think tanks.40 Here the appropriate conclusion to 
draw is perhaps that the rise of fake news and of ideologically motivated 
think tanks really point up a responsibility on intellectuals not so much to 
‘lift the veil of ideology’ as to teach people how to do this for themselves 
by showing them how to analyse and question the sources of news. As he 
says in the same paper, ‘The basis of democracy is not information but 
conversation’.
A further corollary of these developments is that speaking truth is 
not enough: you need to take steps to ensure that others hear the truth 
and can disentangle it from the sea of disinformation flooding the web. 
What do intellectuals now have to do to get the truth across and ensure 
that the general public (or the educated general public, or whoever the 
intended audience is) have some exposure to it? Are new responsibilities 
emerging not just to speak truth but to do so in particular ways, such as 
through social media, or particular channels, such as WikiTribune?
Making the truth actionable
Quoting Daniel Bell’s The End of Ideology, Chomsky talks in RoI of ‘the 
conversion of ideas into social levers’.41 If we take our responsibilities 
seriously we must talk sufficiently persuasively that those who hear us 
take action. As Nicholas Allott stresses in his contribution to this volume, 
this is not a simple thing to do. One problematic finding – the ‘backfire’ 
effect – is that facts that contradict political beliefs tend to reinforce 
rather than dispel those beliefs: we treat these facts with suspicion, 
while uncritically welcoming evidence that confirms our current view.42 
Shamefully, the same applies even in academe. A further problem is 
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that action is frequently not driven by evaluation of the consequences, 
as witness voting behaviour, which is typically neither a matter of 
selecting a party with policies that match preferences nor of rewarding 
or punishing incumbents for their actions. Voting patterns are strongly 
affected by natural events: incumbents have been punished for bad 
weather and shark attacks.43 So simply exposing facts is radically insuffi-
cient: we have at a minimum a responsibility to tell the truth in ways that 
make it likely to be grasped and acted upon. In a nutshell, intellectuals 
have a responsibility to ensure that the truth is accessible not just to other 
intellectuals but to the population at large.
In many areas where some progress is undeniable, economic class 
still impacts hugely upon the practical enjoyment of civil and political 
rights. The interest that western intellectuals have had in speaking truth 
to power has been greatest where it has influenced their own rights as 
opposed to those of an economic or political underclass.  A simple but 
topical example is the systematic distortion of debate around UK housing 
policy, where many intellectuals are happy to bemoan the lack of supply, 
which directly disadvantages them, but fewer discuss the changes to the 
benefit system and the powers of local authorities which have disenfran-
chised the poor; still less how the situation could be improved.44
Even-handed exposure of the truth as it affects all in society may not 
be sufficient. With many issues (climate change, migration, inequality) 
it is probable that significant numbers of people know the truth – but 
are unwilling to make the sacrifices required to rectify the situation.45 
To what extent do intellectuals have a responsibility to come up with 
solutions that show people how they can do the right thing without 
making sacrifices they’re just not prepared to make? Alternatively, to 
what extent do intellectuals have a responsibility to demonstrate by 
example that making the sacrifices is not as impossible as it seems and 
still leaves one with a worthwhile existence?
More challenging is how to determine what responsibilities 
 intellectuals face when speaking truth to power is insufficient and one 
needs to change the structures of power. Consider the case of women’s 
rights and the associated issue of women’s power in society. If we 
restrict attention to western Europe and north America, there has clearly 
been considerable progress, but it is significant that we still need to 
talk about women ‘breaking through the glass ceiling’. In a perceptive 
essay, Mary Beard observes that our ‘cultural template for a powerful 
person remains resolutely male’, talking of how this template ‘works 
to disempower women’ and noting that ‘You can’t easily fit women 
into a structure that is already coded as male; you have to change the 
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structure’.46 How far beyond merely pointing out these truths do an intel-
lectual’s responsibilities go?
As these examples make obvious, an element of activism is required 
over and above just speaking the truth, if that truth is to be actionable. 
Activism can take many forms, ranging from monumental linked 
movements exemplified by the ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Black Lives Matter’47 
to individual acts of raising awareness. Activism is often most powerful 
when it includes an element of demonstrating the art of the possible. 
It need not be focused on global issues to be valuable – innumerable 
issues are worth supporting and defending. To take one small example, 
consider Heineken’s WOBO – the brewer’s ‘World Bottle’. On a visit to 
the Caribbean, the brewing magnate Alfred Heineken identified two 
problems: bottles littering the beaches and a serious lack of building 
materials. He proposed solving both problems by inventing a bottle that 
could function as a brick. Sadly, the idea was a ‘failure’ in that it never 
took off; but it is an example of what individuals can do – and arguably 
intellectuals must now do. In his Requiem for the American Dream, 
Chomsky emphasises that ‘activists are the people who have created the 
rights that we enjoy’, and ends the book with Howard Zinn’s words ‘what 
matters is the countless small deeds of unknown people, who lay the 
basis for the significant events that enter history’.48
Broader issues
In RoI, Chomsky focused on the responsibility of individual intellectuals 
to speak the truth and expose lies. But if they are to be able to do that in a 
way that has an impact, there are perhaps prior responsibilities that need 
exploring.
‘Civic space’ and the infringement of liberties
Above we touched on changes to the academic environment that may 
discourage at least one set of intellectuals from speaking out. But there 
are much broader changes at play as well. ‘Civic space’ is the set of 
conditions that enable citizens to organise, participate and communicate 
without hindrance. Civic space is only secure when  a state protects 
its citizens and  ‘respects and facilitates their fundamental rights to 
associate, assemble peacefully and freely express views and opinions’.49
As the organisation Civicus demonstrates,50 there is ample evidence 
that civic space is under attack around the world, and that vulnerable 
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groups are discouraged from speaking out, often under the pretext that 
this is a necessary part of the counter-terrorism agenda. To take a simple 
example, as part of its attempt to stop ‘radicalisation’, the UK government 
instituted the ‘Prevent’ strategy.51 Among other measures this provision 
requires that social services, faith leaders, teachers, doctors and others 
refer those at risk of radicalisation to a local Prevent body, which then 
decides what to do. Among the signs that someone may warrant referral 
is ‘having a sense of grievance that is triggered by personal experience of 
racism or discrimination or aspects of government policy’.52
The Civicus Monitor goes on to point out how developments in the 
UK mirror more draconian actions elsewhere, making the obvious but 
helpful point that it is important for governments in the global north 
to practise what they preach if they are to have any credibility when 
criticising the actions of governments in the global south.
This suggests that there is a new responsibility on intellectuals: to 
defend the civic space that makes possible the exercise of the responsi-
bilities outlined in RoI, and to show solidarity with those human rights 
defenders globally trying to do the same.
Liberty
The changes in the powers of the UK government touched on above 
reflect ideologically motivated infringement of liberties more generally. 
This can be illustrated with a motion brought at the 2017 annual general 
meeting of the civil liberties and human rights charity Liberty, attacking 
aspects of the UK government’s regressive legislation:53
This AGM condemns the use of discrimination and destitution as 
public policy tools to discourage migration. This AGM resolves 
to fight to dismantle this deeply unethical strategy including 
campaigning against:
The requirement on schools to collect nationality and country 
of birth data on children;
Home Office agreements with the Department for Education 
and the NHS regarding data sharing for immigration purposes;
The requirement on landlords to check tenants’ rights to 
reside in the UK and associated penalties;
The requirement on banks and healthcare providers to check 
residency rights;
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The new criminal offences of ‘driving while illegal’ and 
‘working while illegal’; and … that no human being is ‘illegal’, 
such a concept is totally unacceptable.
The need for such a set of proposals is a harsh indictment of current 
ideology, where ‘ideology’ is described by Bell,54 in terms that Chomsky 
endorses, as ‘a mask for class interest’. The issue should serve as a rallying 
call for responsible intellectuals whose ‘role in the creation and analysis 
of ideology’ should be ‘our basic concern’.55
global domains
Individual intellectuals have a responsibility ‘to speak the truth and to 
expose lies’, and we have suggested above that they must undertake 
an element of activism if this is to have any impact. However, it is 
characteristic of many of the issues most critical for human survival 
(e.g.  climate change) that they quite clearly need a global response, 
including from countries such as China that are not western democracies. 
While Chomsky’s usual strictures about being responsible for the actions 
of one’s own country and the emptiness of attacking the actions of other 
countries still apply, it remains true that genuine progress on these issues 
will require international collaboration. Intellectuals, especially those 
with international networks, such as most academics, plausibly have a 
responsibility to foster such collaboration and to ensure that the truth 
they speak is accessible not just locally but globally. Chomsky’s own 
practice provides some clues as to what this might involve. He not only 
talks and writes fanatically hard (with a great deal of his work accessible 
on the internet), he has visited Turkey to support Fatih Tas; he went 
to Nicaragua to show solidarity with the Sandinistas; he went to North 
Vietnam to provide less biased reportage on the situation there;56 the 
list is almost endless. He is a paradigmatic example of an intellectual 
who has confronted the emerging responsibility to do more to spread the 
word and support activism on a global scale. Supporting the networks 
that make global action possible is perhaps another new responsibility 
for the value-oriented intellectual.
Conclusion
By exploring some of the developments that have occurred over the last 
50 years we have reinforced the conclusion that the responsibilities of 
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intellectuals that Chomsky set out in his paper still have their original 
force. There have been subtle changes concerning the ways in which 
speaking the truth and exposing lies have got harder. But public awareness 
of the needs is also greater, leaving room for modest optimism.
When he wrote RoI, Chomsky recognised that the responsibilities 
he discussed were just the start. As he wrote in response to a letter from 
George Steiner:
I do feel that the crucial question, unanswered in the article, is what 
the next paragraph should say. I’ve thought a good deal about this, 
without having reached any satisfying conclusions. I’ve tried various 
things – harassing congressmen, ‘lobbying’ in Washington, lecturing 
at town forums, working with student groups in preparation of 
public protests, demonstrations, teach-ins, and so on, in all of the 
ways that many others have adopted as well. The only respect in 
which I have personally gone any further is in refusal to pay half 
of my income tax … My own feeling is that one should refuse to 
participate in any activity that implements American aggression – 
thus tax refusal, draft refusal, avoidance of work that can be used by 
the agencies of militarism and repression, all seem to me essential. 
I can’t suggest a general formula. Detailed decisions have to be 
matters of personal judgement and conscience. I feel uncomfortable 
about suggesting draft refusal publicly, since it is a rather cheap 
proposal from someone of my age. But I think that tax refusal is an 
important gesture, both because it symbolizes a refusal to make 
a voluntary contribution to the war machine and also because it 
indicates a willingness, which should, I think, be indicated, to take 
illegal measures to oppose an indecent government.57
Now, 50 years on, the need for all of us to examine our consciences and 
decide ‘What have I done?’ and ‘What can I do?’ has never been greater.
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‘I don’t want no peace’ – a black, 
Jewish activist’s take on the 
responsibility of intellectuals
Jackie Walker
I don’t want no peace,
I need equal rights and justice.
– Peter Tosh, Equal Rights and Justice
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.
– Karl Marx, The German Ideology
Genocide
Professor Chomsky’s 1967 essay, ‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’, 
was written in the context of the ongoing American invasion of Vietnam. 
American post-Second World War optimism was fading as stories of defeat 
and American savagery and scenes of GIs on the rampage overlapped 
with homegrown footage of white barbarity waged against black fellow 
citizens. Some consider this a turning point in American consciousness.
For people of colour, forever excluded from the dream of America, 
this ‘fall from grace’ was no turning point. It was simply another encounter 
with the truth as they lived it, as victims, with the native peoples of America, 
of what Chomsky describes as ‘one of the two founding crimes of American 
society’, an America built on genocide, enslavement and oppression.1
What is due to Caesar?
Today, while Donald Trump’s election campaign suggested a desire for 
decreased US involvement overseas, his presidential rhetoric implies 
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a resurgence of crude nationalism. It suggests an America unwilling to 
accept limitations to its power, with calls for a fight to the finish with 
ISIS, assurances of increased support for Israel and an escalation of 
its nuclear arsenals. While this time round the bogey-man is terrorist 
Muslims rather than Communists, there’s a whiff of Senator McCarthy 
to Trumpism, an authoritarian politics backed by a good helping of the 
witch-hunt, fake news, smears and scapegoating.
Why worry, some say. After all, America is two thousand miles 
away and has long been our ally. What’s changed? Well, plenty is  the 
answer. As the UK moves towards an unknown post-Brexit situation, 
pressure to get closer to Uncle Sam will increase, whoever its president 
is, however crazed he may seem. Attacks on minorities are increasing 
and Chomsky’s assertion that intellectuals have a responsibility to speak 
truth feels ever more like a clarion call, whatever the colour of our 
skin.
Intellectuals, those who have the ability to reflect, comment and 
propose solutions on what they see, are not however a homogenous 
group, and it takes more than intelligence to see beyond the prevailing 
ideas of the ruling class in order, as Edward Said said, to ‘present 
alternative narratives and other perspectives’.2 And the truth is that 
many intellectuals promote, or turn a blind eye, to the oppressions of the 
establishment. Financial inducements increase this complicity.
The establishment’s control over university academics, along with 
other public servants and institutions, has if anything increased over 
recent years due to the pressures of cuts and job insecurity. All these are 
problematic, but I’m not concerned here with the ‘lackeys of the estab-
lishment’ whatever form they take. I’m interested in intellectuals who 
see their role as more than just suggesting solutions. It is to those people 
these remarks are addressed.
How far is it to the bottom?
The global economic crash, the long-term crisis of capitalism, has 
resulted in the rise of demagogic leaders. The forces of the right, aided by 
the mainstream media, first undermined the vocabulary of liberation as 
‘political correctness’ and then appropriated our hard-fought-for formu-
lations of identity, our histories of oppression, in order to enhance their 
reactionary narratives. We see this for example in an increasing tendency 
to normalise constructions of whites as a group under siege. Of course 
this crude populism, a reaching out to the ‘common man’ – very rarely the 
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‘common woman’ – reinforces the power of the establishment that these 
demagogues claim to challenge.
In Britain the left is now under sustained attack as a consequence 
of its success in knocking at the doors of power. It is no coincidence that 
among the tools used to undermine, fracture and attempt to defeat us is 
the appropriated language of liberation – in particular that of race. Since 
Jeremy Corbyn became leader of the Labour Party we’ve seen the most 
sustained attention on racism I’ve ever known, in an ongoing debate 
focused on antisemitism.
Of course, all racism, whether Islamophobia, antisemitism or any 
other type, is abhorrent. But the palatable nature of critiquing a racism 
decoupled from notions of power, or the lack of it, has proved a powerful 
tool with which the establishment can attack the left – and they have 
run with it. False allegations of antisemitism have proliferated. This 
whitewashed version of anti-racism is one wherein racists are not Tory 
ministers who ridicule the appearance of people of African descent, 
and it certainly isn’t those complaining about a Muslim woman reporter 
wearing a headscarf. Conveniently it’s the left who are the culprits in this 
new racism. And on the left, it’s our very commitment to anti-racism that 
is used against us, to undermine the unity we need so badly in order to 
resist this particular onslaught – as well, of course, as an inability to get 
reasonable access to the mainstream media, however much we have 
tried.
It is not a coincidence that the most oppressed minorities have 
barely registered in this dialogue – except as the accused; at best they 
have been called ignorant where racism is concerned. Black voices 
have yet again been effectively silenced, this time under a wave of self-
righteous indignation voiced by some of the most reactionary forces in 
and outside the media. This new anti-racism simply has the effect of 
continuing the oppression of minorities with which it pretends concern. 
The exclusion of working-class people, the exclusion of the left from 
power, by all means that can be mustered, adds to a growing sense of 
the divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The very few of ‘us’ who get any 
influence are speedily and easily incorporated or destroyed.
Who are the criminals?
We inhabit a world where politics increasingly appears like a fraud 
perpetrated by interest groups, backed by the power of an economic 
and political elite who control what is said and what you can say, and 
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who disseminate what they choose in order to keep control of what they 
increasingly have. This is the world as I have long lived it. For the truth is, 
while I do have a Jewish heritage, it is, in particular, my black voice that 
speaks in this essay, and as a black woman I inhabit a markedly different 
set of realities to fellow contributors to this collection of essays.
Fundamentally divorced from the structures of power, carrying 
the stigma of historical oppression on my skin, for me as a black woman 
even the concept of ‘the intellectual’ needs fundamental rethinking if it 
is not to be practically meaningless, simply another tool to exclude me. 
No post-war uplift has raised blacks from ghetto to power. Historical 
injustices against blacks remain barely acknowledged, let alone 
commemorated; it is with trepidation that people of colour lift their 
heads to speak truth to power on any issue, even those that relate to their 
own history and experience, for fear they find themselves derided at best, 
the subject of witch-hunts or threats of violence at the worst.
At this point, I should point out that in 2015 I became vice-chair 
of Momentum, the left-wing movement in the British Labour Party. 
Like Chomsky, I have been accused of antisemitism due both to my 
criticisms of Israeli policies and to perspectives I have voiced on some 
aspects of Jewish history – comments which have been quoted out of 
context and distorted for cynical reasons by the pro-Israel lobby and by 
opponents of Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership of the British Labour Party. In 
September 2016, a media campaign around my supposed antisemitism 
led to my provisional suspension from the Labour Party. Chomsky is 
one of several Jewish intellectuals to have lent public support to my 
campaign to be reinstated.
I am told, by people who should know, that the campaign against 
me – not just the online abuse, but the well-orchestrated attempts to have 
me excluded from speaking at meetings, to exclude me from political 
activity – is something people have not seen in Britain before. For to tell 
the truth, to disturb the ‘intentional ignorance’ of Euro-American society, 
is to infringe a taboo that is savagely policed and maintained.
Of course there are, and have been, individual black voices that 
have gained attention, but in Britain, black academics lack the numbers 
to be significant. The best universities and schools remain mostly closed 
to us. Except in popular culture, sport, prisons and arriving too early 
at the graveyard, people of colour continue to be excluded at all levels, 
including from left-wing politics, where too often we are used as tokens 
to decorate some faux liberal agenda, or moved like pawns to further 
other people’s careers, where we are repeatedly asked – or, in my most 
recent experience, ‘told’ – to stay silent: ‘let’s just get power first and we’ll 
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deal with you next’. Or even worse: ‘We know you’re right, but if we do 
anything, the media will rip us to shreds.’
Yet if it is our duty to speak truth to power, as black and oppressed 
peoples, as people who seek the liberation of humanity, those of us who 
heed that call must act on it, in whatever way we are able – and, let’s be 
clear, the cost can be high; it can be everything.
Give it up
It was this call that joined my black mother of Jewish descent and my 
Russian Jewish father – she a political activist, he a Communist – to 
attempt revolution and resistance against 1950s American culture. They 
risked their lives, were tortured, derided and disposed of. Their people 
were black and white, Jew and Gentile. Their concerns encompassed 
the  liberation of humankind. And so, as my mothers and fathers did 
before me, I fight for emancipation, refuting ideologies that put one 
people’s suffering, one people’s claim to nationhood, above any other, 
rejecting boundaries that separate, refusing to move to the back of 
the bus, to play the minstrel, to remain dumb and blinded because the 
media, or anyone else, says I should do so.
‘I don’t want no peace, I want equal rights and justice.’ This 
is the demand Peter Tosh speaks, or rather sings. He dances as he 
lays his challenge at the door of an establishment that presents itself 
as  valorising peace and quietude while simultaneously enforcing a 
violent and destructive status quo. Tosh’s speech is directed to the mass 
of the people, his ideas formulated in a genre that can be heard by any 
who choose to hear and take up its rhythms.
A development of Tosh’s words, ‘No justice, no peace’, has become 
the marching cry of black activists and protestors on both sides of the 
Atlantic. These are the intellectuals of our movement, the mothers and 
fathers, cooks and cleaners, the unemployed, fast-food workers, the 
office workers – all are our intellectuals, all who resist while standing 
witness to the truth.
Chomsky’s essay, the subject of this book, was a response to an 
earlier work, ‘The Responsibility of Peoples’, a collection of essays 
written by Dwight Macdonald. What is the responsibility of any intel-
lectual if it is not wedded to the interests of the people? And while 
separation from power is a particular and acute problem for black intel-
lectuals, it is a problem shared by all intellectuals, all people who seek 
global transformations.
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To take on the responsibility of the intellectual is to be part of a 
movement for change, discarding the trappings that separate thought 
from action, body from mind, that confine some of us to action in 
the classroom and others to the streets. Until the streets become the 
classrooms and the classrooms the streets our task as intellectuals will be 
incomplete. It is a necessary journey. It will be a long and perilous one.
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The responsibility of intellectuals in 
the era of bounded rationality and 
Democracy for Realists
Nicholas Allott
In his famous essay, Chomsky wrote: ‘It is the responsibility of intel-
lectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies. This, at least, may seem 
enough of a truism to pass over without comment.’1 One might ask what 
the source of this responsibility (henceforth RI) is. Chomsky notes that 
in western democracies, where there is ‘political liberty, … access to 
information and freedom of expression’ a ‘privileged minority’ (whom he 
refers to as ‘intellectuals’) also have
the leisure, the facilities, and the training to seek the truth lying 
hidden behind the veil of distortion and misrepresentation, 
ideology and class interest, through which the events of current 
history are presented to us.2
They therefore have responsibilities that go beyond those of others.
Agreeing with this, one might note that RI seems to presuppose that 
exposing political truths has a certain kind of instrumental value, namely 
that it will tend to make the world a better place by changing people’s 
political views.3 In fact, Chomsky’s position on this question is more 
nuanced. In an interview he said ‘I don’t have faith that the truth will 
prevail if it becomes known, but we have no alternative to proceeding on 
that assumption’, and he has often endorsed Gramsci’s ‘optimism of the 
will’ as a necessary corollary to pessimism of the intellect.4
I suggest that intellectuals and other privileged individuals have 
the responsibility not only to tell the truth and expose lies but to do so 
in ways that – in their best judgement – are most likely to be understood 
and to be effective. This is a fairly direct consequence of another claim 
that Chomsky has made many times: that people are responsible for the 
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foreseeable consequences of their actions. He calls this a truism, too, 
with some justification.
But why does the issue of effectiveness even arise? Isn’t it enough 
simply to get the truth out in some form or other? Perhaps no one has 
ever held such a naive view; in any case, recent findings in psychology 
and political science make the challenges it faces more obvious and 
specific. They suggest that the truth does not necessarily influence 
political behaviour even when it is available, and that exposure to the 
truth may entrench rather than overthrow erroneous opinions.
There is strong evidence that voting is not driven primarily by 
evaluation of the policies on offer. Recently, the political scientists 
Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels have argued that voting is not 
well explained as selection of a party with policies that match the 
voter’s preferences, nor as rewarding or punishing incumbents for their 
actions.5 Evidence includes the startling fact that votes are strongly 
affected by natural events. If Achen and Bartels are right, then there is a 
significant disconnection between widely available information and one 
of the central ways that citizens exert political power, and it is natural 
to suppose that the story is similar for other political behaviour besides 
voting. The challenge to RI from this research is that telling the truth and 
exposing lies may not make much difference.
A second problem is indicated by research on motivated reasoning 
and the ‘backfire effect’. Facts that contradict political beliefs or discredit 
voters’ preferred electoral candidates tend to reinforce rather than dispel 
those beliefs and allegiances.6 We have a strong tendency to treat such 
facts with suspicion, while uncritically welcoming evidence that confirms 
our current views. Clearly, the challenge to RI posed by this work is that 
telling the truth may be counterproductive and damaging.
In what follows, I first set out these research findings in a bit 
more  detail, then consider how troubling these results – if real and 
robust – are for RI. In my discussion, I briefly show that Achen and 
Bartels’ results are highly congruent with Chomsky’s views on the 
functioning of education systems, the mass media and representative 
democracy in the US and other modern democracies. It is plausible that 
deepening democracy so that it more closely matches the popular ideal 
will require considerable changes to education, the media and the 
democratic system itself.
If the backfire effect is dominant then RI will often be overridden by 
a responsibility to avoid harm. But the findings about the backfire effect 
need to be weighed up against other evidence that telling the truth can 
change opinions in positive ways.
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The problematic findings
democracy for Realists
In their recent book, Achen and Bartels claim that there is a dominant 
folk theory or popular ideal of democracy,7 which can be summarised in 
this way:
Ordinary people have preferences about what their government 
should do. They choose leaders who will do those things, or they 
enact their preferences directly in referendums. In either case, what 
the majority wants becomes government policy.8
Summarising a great deal of evidence, they argue that this theory is 
wrong:
The populist ideal of electoral democracy, for all its elegance and 
attractiveness, is largely irrelevant in practice, leaving elected 
officials mostly free to pursue their own notions of the public 
good or to respond to party and interest group pressures.9
A wealth of evidence suggests that votes are not cast on the basis of 
voters’ policy preferences, and unsurprisingly, therefore, there is often 
a poor match between those preferences and the policies of the parties 
voted for.10
Achen and Bartels also argue that electoral choices do not support 
the retrospective voting hypothesis: that voters assess the performance 
of elected representatives and officials and punish or reward them 
accordingly at subsequent elections. They identify two reasons. First, 
voters are not good at distinguishing the effects caused by government 
policies from other effects. Achen and Bartels demonstrate this by 
showing that voters punish politicians for outcomes that are clearly 
not under their control, including natural events such as shark attacks, 
droughts and floods. Second, voters are not very good at keeping track 
of changes, even those that impact upon their own welfare. Achen and 
Bartels show that while voters do vote on the basis of income growth, 
there is a recency bias: we tend to focus on income growth in the months 
immediately prior to the election, neglecting the overall record of the 
government.
They also argue that so-called ‘direct democracy’, where voters 
vote on issues rather than for representatives, does not brighten the 
picture, because there is evidence that the results of such referendums 
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and ballot initiatives reflect campaign spending by the wealthy more 
than the preferences of voters. In practice, Achen and Bartels argue – 
agreeing with work by David Broder – that the result of increased use 
of direct votes on issues, in the US at least, has largely been to empower 
the wealthy and well-organised ‘millionaires and interest groups that use 
their wealth to achieve their own policy goals’.11
The true picture, Achen and Bartels argue, is that most voters pay 
little attention to politics, and at elections their choices depend largely on 
recent developments in the economy and on political group loyalties that 
are typically held from childhood.12
The backfire effect 
A number of studies have found that evidence against a political or 
social belief may serve to strengthen that belief, and that negative 
information about a political candidate may increase the support she 
receives from those who already support her. Although these findings 
are striking, they should perhaps not be very surprising, given that there 
is a wealth of evidence from work over several decades in psychology 
and economics that human reasoning is prone to a wide variety of 
biases. We are very far from dispassionate, logical reasoners: our 
reasoning is often motivated, that is, slanted by our preconceptions and 
towards conclusions that we would prefer to be true, and much of it is 
performed by efficient but flawed heuristics rather than processes that 
respect laws of logic and statistical inference. What is more, we are not 
very reliable reporters of the way we reason. Introspection – that is, 
thinking about how one thinks – is not in general an accurate source of 
information.13 The work discussed in this section extends this picture to 
political science.
Psychologists Kari Edwards and Edward Smith have shown a 
disconfirmation bias in reasoning about political and social issues: people 
examine arguments for longer on average if they clash with a belief that 
they hold, and a consequence of this longer examination is that such 
arguments are judged weaker on average than those that are compatible 
with prior beliefs. They also showed that this bias is greater when the 
belief that clashes with the argument is held with emotional conviction.14 
In a series of papers, political scientists Milton Lodge and Charles 
Taber find similar effects in our processing of information relating to 
issues such as gun control and affirmative action. The typical reaction 
to an argument against a prior belief or commitment is to generate 
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counterarguments, whereas arguments that support prior beliefs are 
accepted uncritically.15
This tendency to generate counterarguments has a strikingly coun-
terintuitive result: negative information can lead to a strengthening, 
rather than a weakening, of the initial belief.16 This is the ‘backfire 
effect’,  a term coined by Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler.17 In their 
study, corrections of erroneous beliefs (e.g. that Iraq possessed weapons 
of mass destruction immediately before the US–UK invasion of 2003) led 
to reinforcement of the false belief.
Similar results emerge from work on (simulated) choice of political 
candidates. A study conducted by David Redlawsk found that voters took 
longer to process information that showed in a bad light a candidate whom 
the voter had already evaluated positively and information that showed in 
a good light a candidate already evaluated negatively, compared with 
information that fitted their expectations.18 The backfire effect exists here 
too: negative information about a positively evaluated candidate tended 
to make that candidate more positively evaluated, not less.
In a later paper, Redlawsk and his co-authors Andrew Civettini and 
Karen Emmerson suggest an explanation:
voters committed to a candidate may be motivated to discount 
incongruent information; they may mentally argue against it, 
bolstering their existing evaluation by recalling all the good things 
about a liked candidate even in the face of something negative.19
Taken together, this research suggests that we are very far from ideally 
rational, disinterested observers of the scene, updating our beliefs as 
warranted by new evidence. Under certain circumstances, we employ 
reasoning as a defence mechanism to bolster our prior convictions and 
choices against inconvenient truths.20
Discussion
How worried should a supporter of the responsibility of 
intellectuals be?
The Democracy for Realists findings are disturbing, but perhaps not as 
surprising for those on the left as they have been for some liberals and 
political scientists, since left-wingers of various persuasions have long 
argued that many people vote against their own interests (back at least 
to Engels’ invocation of ‘false consciousness’).21 In addition, Achen and 
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Bartels do not fully specify the mechanisms behind the effects they have 
discovered, leaving scope for supporters of RI to argue that part of the 
problem is that important truths are insufficiently well known and that 
lies go unchallenged. In that case, truth-telling by intellectuals could 
make a difference to how people vote. What is more, political change 
does not come about only, or even mainly, through choices at elections, 
and supporters of RI can argue that the responsibility to tell the truth is 
partly due to the effect a better-informed public may have in other ways, 
such as by improving the political culture.
The clash between the backfire effect and RI is harder to set aside. 
Revealing the truth about an issue, political party or candidate may have 
the opposite result to the one intended, entrenching opinions rather 
than changing them. To the extent that RI is motivated or justified by the 
expectation that exposing political truths will cause positive change, this 
is a fundamental challenge to the view. Happily, although the backfire 
effect is robust, there is convergent evidence that information can affect 
political views in non-perverse ways.
Bounded rationality 
Both sets of findings have been connected with the fact that human 
rationality is bounded in various ways: by time, attention span, processing 
power and the competing demands of life.22 We are finite beings, with 
only limited time and resources, and many other things to do besides 
keeping abreast of the activities of our governments; so, as Achen and 
Bartels write,
In the welter of political claims and counterclaims, most people 
simply lack the time and relevant experience to sort out difficult 
truths from appealing dreams. That is no less true for Ivy League 
and Oxbridge dons than it is for average citizens.23
Given that Achen and Bartels’ work does not specify in great detail the 
mechanisms that are responsible for their results,24 a proponent of RI 
could argue that part of the problem is that those who could speak out do 
not do so, and this increases the amounts of time and attention required 
to get at the truth by sifting through the lies and evasions of politicians, 
columnists and the like. As Chomsky noted in his essay:
The facts [about the US assault on Vietnam] are known to all who 
care to know. The press, foreign and domestic, has presented 
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documentation to refute each falsehood as it appears. But the power 
of the government’s propaganda apparatus is such that the citizen 
who does not undertake a research project on the subject can hardly 
hope to confront government pronouncements with fact.
This is work that those with research skills and free time can usefully 
do, thus lowering the barriers somewhat for those who do not, although 
they are left, unavoidably, with the second-order research projects of 
deciding what to read and whether to believe it. Finding out about and 
critically reading the work of (e.g.) Patrick Cockburn and Tanya Reinhart 
on western Asia or Dean Baker and Ha-Joon Chang on economics takes 
considerable time and effort, but doing the work for oneself would take 
several lifetimes.25
the role of the media
Most adults get most of their information about politics and current 
affairs  through the mass media. Obviously relevant, therefore,  is 
Chomsky’s work with Edward Herman on the ways that, in the formally 
free mass media in democratic societies, inconvenient facts are 
downplayed and debate is bounded by certain presuppositions that 
are neither questioned nor stated.26 This work is highly congruent with 
Achen and Bartels’ work; indeed it can be seen as suggesting mechanisms 
that help to cause the results they see:
By manufacturing consent, you can overcome the fact that formally a 
lot of people have the right to vote. We can make it irrelevant because 
we can manufacture consent and make sure that their choices and 
attitudes will be structured in such a way that they will always do 
what we tell them, even if they have a formal way to participate.27
Assuming this is correct, the impact on RI is not obvious. Knowing that 
certain truths are off limits for the mass media arguably makes it more 
imperative for those who can to speak out. But this responsibility comes 
with a heavy dose of realism about getting views that are outside of the 
mainstream heard and understood.
the role of a good education
There are a number of other similarities between the views of Chomsky 
and Achen and Bartels. Chomsky has frequently made the claim that 
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among the most thoroughly indoctrinated in modern democracies 
are the ‘well-educated’, that is, those who have spent longer than 
average in formal education, especially those who have attended elite 
institutions:
If you’ve gone to the best schools … you just have instilled into you 
the understanding that there are certain things that [it] wouldn’t 
do to say [a]nd, it wouldn’t even do to think.28
In a similar vein, Achen and Bartels write that:
Well-informed citizens[’] … well-organized ‘ideological’ thinking 
often turns out to be just a rather mechanical reflection of what 
their favorite group and party leaders have instructed them to 
think.29
Obviously the picture is complicated by the fact that elite education is 
also conducive to the possession of skills that are needed for independent 
research and to the leisure required to put them to use, as Chomsky 
pointed out in ‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’.
the role of the democratic system
We’ve seen that Chomsky suggests that the media and the education 
system structure our attitudes. This could explain some part of Achen 
and Bartels’ results. But, as discussed above, those results also show 
that people vote against their own preferences. Their explanation is that 
voting behaviour is better explained by the social group or groups to 
which a voter belongs.30
Another mechanism that very plausibly explains some of the 
mismatches between voter preferences and policy choices is the role 
of campaign finance. Thomas Ferguson’s investment theory of party 
competition, often cited by Chomsky, postulates that the need to raise 
campaign finance (‘the campaign cost condition’) reduces party politics 
to ‘competition between blocs of major investors’.31 This means that 
voters are offered a choice between organisations that represent and 
will implement the preferred policies of certain areas of business, none 
of which is likely to match closely the preferences of ordinary voters. As 
Chomsky has pointed out, for a long time universal healthcare was the 
preference of the majority of voters in the US, but neither major party 
offered it.
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It would seem that if one takes democracy seriously, one should 
work towards a system that is resilient against such distortions. Chomsky’s 
vision here is of a bottom-up, citizen-led democracy:
In a democratic system, what would happen [in the New Hampshire 
primary] is that the people in New Hampshire would get together 
in whatever organizations they have: town meetings, churches, 
unions, and work out what they want policy to be. Then, if some 
candidate wants to appeal to them, he could ask to be invited, and 
they would invite him to New Hampshire and tell him what they 
want. And, if they could get a commitment from him that they 
could believe in, they might decide to vote for him. That would be 
a democratic society.32
Assuming that Achen and Bartels are right, even if important truths 
become widely known in currently existing democracies, it is entirely 
possible that there will be little effect on how people vote. That is certainly 
chastening for supporters of RI, but in itself it is not enough to remove the 
responsibility, since it does not prove that telling the truth will not have 
an impact within the present system, and it shows little or nothing about 
whether it will aid in moving towards a more democratic society.
the backfire effect redux 
If the backfire effect were always operative and dominant, then a key 
motivation for telling the truth and exposing lies would disappear, since 
telling the truth would generally be counterproductive.33 But a moment’s 
thought establishes that this cannot be right. People do change their 
minds, and at least some of the time when they do so it is because they 
have been persuaded by evidence against their prior belief.
In experimental work investigating the backfire effect, Redlawsk, 
Civettini and Emmerson found that there is a ‘tipping point’ beyond 
which further negative evidence has a negative effect rather than a 
reinforcing one.34 As they say, this indicates that ‘voters are not immune 
to disconfirming information after all, even when initially acting as 
motivated reasoners’.35
Other research shows that exposure to modest amounts of 
information can shift opinions considerably and that it has some effect on 
policy preferences. One strand of this research has focused on attitudes 
to immigration. In western countries, most people significantly overesti-
mate the number of immigrants in their country, hold other inaccurate 
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opinions about immigrants and would like immigration reduced. A large 
study carried out across 13 countries found that telling participants the 
correct percentage of immigrants in their country made it less likely 
that they would say that there are too many. In two studies in which 
participants were told five pieces of information about immigrants, 
this improved their attitudes toward immigrants. This information did 
not significantly change policy preferences on average, but it did make 
self-identified right-wingers and Republicans more likely to support 
pro-immigration policies, the opposite to what one might expect if the 
backfire effect were operative.36 Similarly, a recent study carried out 
by Giovanni Facchini, Yotam Margalit and Hiroyuki Nakata in Japan – 
a country with very few immigrants and broad political opposition to 
immigration – found that hostility to increased immigration was consid-
erably decreased by the presentation of information about potential 
social and economic benefits.37
It is clear, therefore, that it can be effective to expose people to 
information that tends to undermine their beliefs. Obviously, it would be 
useful to know more about when telling the truth is effective and when 
it is counterproductive. It is very plausible that the way that information 
is presented matters, in ways that we still know too little about. The 
research mentioned above on heuristics and biases is obviously relevant. 
It may also matter whether information is openly stated, implied or 
somehow presupposed. Such questions are the province of pragmatics, 
the area of linguistics that studies how we communicate with each other 
in context.38 There is also a growing literature on the role of the salience 
of social group membership in receptiveness to information and argu-
mentation.39 As Alana Conner puts it: ‘One of the things we know from 
social psychology is when people feel threatened, they can’t change, they 
can’t listen.’40 In any case, the responsibility to tell the truth and expose 
lies remains, and is accompanied by a responsibility to do so effectively, 
which implies a further responsibility to keep abreast of research of the 
type discussed here as it develops.
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4
The propaganda model and 
the British nuclear weapons debate
Milan Rai 
Intellectuals are in a position to expose the lies of governments, to 
analyze actions according to their causes and motives and often 
hidden intentions. In the western world, at least, they have the 
power that comes from political liberty, from access to information 
and freedom of expression. For a privileged minority, western 
democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, and the training to 
seek the truth lying hidden behind the veil of distortion and misrep-
resentation, ideology and class interest, through which the events 
of current history are presented to us. The responsibilities of intel-
lectuals, then, are much deeper than what [Dwight] Macdonald 
calls the ‘responsibility of people,’ given the unique privileges that 
intellectuals enjoy.
– Noam Chomsky, ‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’, 1967
This essay applies the Chomsky–Herman propaganda model of the 
mass media to the debate around nuclear weapons, especially in 
Britain. According to the propaganda model, the ‘free press’ serves the 
societal purpose of ‘protecting privilege from the threat of public under-
standing and participation’.1 Chomsky and Edward Herman describe the 
propaganda system as ‘brainwashing under freedom’:
A totalitarian state can be satisfied with lesser degrees of allegiance 
to required truths. It is sufficient that people obey; what they think 
is a secondary concern. But in a democratic political order, there is 
always the danger that independent thought might be translated 
into political action, so it is important to eliminate the threat at its 
root.2
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Debate cannot be stilled, and indeed, in a properly functioning 
system of propaganda, it should not be, because it has a system-
reinforcing character if constrained within proper bounds. What 
is essential is to set the bounds firmly. Controversy may rage as 
long as it adheres to the presuppositions that define the consensus 
of elites, and it should furthermore be encouraged within these 
bounds, thus helping to establish these doctrines as the very 
condition of thinkable thought while reinforcing the belief that 
freedom reigns.3
Since 1945, there have been several periods of intense public controversy 
over British nuclear weapons. This mainstream debate has had a ‘system-
reinforcing character’ as it has kept to ‘proper bounds’. As Chomsky 
observes, in any state religion, there are at least two basic principles. 
First, the Holy State is good. Officials and ministers make mistakes, 
sometimes through lack of knowledge, sometimes through lack of intel-
ligence. Overall, though, the establishment is well-intentioned, despite 
the occasional bad apple. The second principle is that the Holy State is 
always acting defensively in nature.
How does this play out for the British nuclear weapons debate? 
According to these principles, Britain’s nuclear weapons are there to 
defend Britain and other countries from attack. Chomsky suggests: 
‘A useful rule of thumb is this: If you want to learn something about 
the propaganda system, have a close look at the critics and their tacit 
assumptions. These typically constitute the doctrines of the state 
religion.’4 If we look at the recent nuclear weapons debate in Britain, we 
find these kinds of remarks at the limits of ‘responsible opinion’.
An editorial in the Independent back in 2005 said that the collapse 
of the Soviet Union ‘has made the deterrence argument obsolete’. It 
went on: ‘During the Cold War, nuclear weapons acted as a deterrent to 
aggression by other states.’5 There was a similar critique from perhaps 
the most anti-militarist of the Guardian’s columnists. In 2013, Simon 
Jenkins said: ‘It [the British nuclear deterrent] made no sense.’ Keeping 
British nuclear weapons was ‘irrational’, ‘mad’, ‘hare-brained’, ‘hypo-
critical’, ‘an irrelevance’, ‘absurd’, and ‘nonsense’. Jenkins wrote that 
Britain’s nuclear weapons bore ‘no reference to any plausible threat to 
Britain that could possibly merit their use’.6
What are some of the assumptions made by these establishment 
critics? First, British nuclear weapons are solely about defending the 
territory of Britain. Second, they’re a defence against nuclear-armed 
enemies. Third, they are for retaliation after an attack on Britain (a threat 
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which is supposed to make such an attack less likely). Fourth, Britain has 
not used its nuclear weapons.
These four assumptions are what the public thinks of as ‘deterrence’. 
They have no basis in reality. In fact, Britain has used its nuclear weapons 
repeatedly.
Nuclear coercion
Daniel Ellsberg, the US military analyst who leaked the Pentagon’s secret 
internal history of the Vietnam War, the Pentagon Papers, wrote in 1981:
Again and again, generally in secret from the American public, US 
nuclear weapons have been used, for quite different purposes: in 
the precise way that a gun is used when you point it at someone’s 
head in a direct confrontation, whether or not the trigger is pulled.7
Britain has used its nuclear weapons in the same way, repeatedly. Iraq 
has been threatened with British nuclear weapons on at least three 
occasions. In 1961, Britain created a phoney crisis in the Persian Gulf 
and mobilised its military forces to intimidate Iraq and the region. 
One element was the deployment of nuclear-capable Scimitar aircraft 
to the Gulf.8 In Malta, British strategic nuclear bombers were placed 
on alert.9 A right-wing British historian with intelligence connections, 
Anthony Verrier, later described the incident as an ‘act of deterrence, 
in which the nuclear weapons system played a central, concealed 
role … directed against Nasser and, by extension, Russian ambitions in 
Arabia’.10 Gamal Abdel Nasser was the nationalist president of Egypt. 
‘Russian ambitions in Arabia’ is code for the forces of independent Arab 
nationalism generally, including in Iraq. Almost 30 years later, the US 
and British governments were determined to punish Iraq for invading 
Kuwait on 2 August 1990: eight days later, the British tabloid the Daily 
Star reported: ‘Whitehall sources made it clear that the multinational 
forces would be ready to hit back with every means at their disposal … 
[including] using tactical nuclear weapons against [Iraqi] troops and 
tanks on the battlefield.’
On 30 September 1990, a senior British army officer with 7th 
Armoured Brigade warned on the front page of the Observer that if 
there were Iraqi chemical attacks, British forces would ‘retaliate with 
battlefield nuclear forces’. On 26 October 1990, the Daily Mail reported: 
‘One senior minister said, “If we were prepared to use tactical nuclear 
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weapons against the Russians, I can’t see why we shouldn’t be prepared 
to use them against Iraq”.’ On 13 November 1990, the senior Guardian 
journalist Hugo Young reported in the paper that he had heard a minister 
say that the war against Iraq might have to be ended with ‘tactical nukes’. 
On 6 December 1990, the British Prime Minister, John Major, told 
television presenter David Frost that the use of nuclear weapons in the 
Gulf was ‘not likely, remotely’. However, Major did not rule out the use 
of British nuclear weapons: it was a live policy option.
There were more nuclear threats in the run-up to the 2003 attack 
on Iraq. Then British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon told the House of 
Commons Defence Select Committee on 20 March 2002 that states like 
Iraq ‘can be absolutely confident that in the right conditions we would 
be willing to use our nuclear weapons’.11 On 24 March 2002, Hoon told 
ITV’s Jonathan Dimbleby Show that the government ‘reserved the right’ 
to use nuclear weapons if Britain or British troops were threatened by 
chemical or biological weapons. Hoon was asked about these nuclear 
threats in a House of Commons debate on 29 April 2002. The Defence 
Secretary said: ‘ultimately, and in conditions of extreme self-defence, 
nuclear weapons would have to be used’. Hoon was pressed to explain 
but refused to clarify what this meant.
Other countries have also been subjected to British nuclear threats. 
In its early years, the British strategic nuclear force was airborne, carried 
by Valiant, Vulcan and Victor aircraft. These ‘V-bombers’ made hundreds 
of flights in the 1950s and 1960s across the British Empire. These global 
sorties were clearly not about ‘defending’ the homeland from being 
attacked by Russia.
In 1962, V-bombers attended independence ceremonies in Uganda 
and Jamaica.12 When three Victors were sent back to Jamaica in 1966, 
they had ‘more than decorative purposes’ according to Andrew Brookes, 
historian of the V-bomber force and himself a former Vulcan pilot.13 
Brookes records that the Vulcans at RAF Waddington were committed 
in 1963 to ‘dealing with conventional trouble in the Middle East’, while 
their sister Victors in Cottesmore and Honington ‘looked after the Far 
East’.14 While these V-bombers might have been only carrying conven-
tional weaponry in such conflicts, their deployment as strategic nuclear 
bombers outside Europe would have sent powerful and threatening 
nuclear signals to Britain’s enemies.
Victors from Bomber Command were deployed to Singapore 
in December 1963, during Britain’s ‘confrontation’ with Indonesia. 
According to Brookes, the nuclear bombers were kept in Singapore 
longer than usual, ‘positioned to be seen as ready to eliminate Indonesia 
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Air Force capabilities if they launched air attacks.’15 Brookes does 
not say  what kind of bombs might have been used to carry out this 
‘elimination’.
Air Chief Marshal Sir David Lee wrote later of the nuclear-capable 
Victors: ‘Their potential was well known to Indonesia and their presence 
did not go unnoticed.’ He added: ‘The knowledge of RAF strength and 
competence created a wholesome respect among Indonesia’s leaders, 
and the deterrent effect of RAF air defence fighters, light bombers and 
V-bombers on detachment from Bomber Command was absolute’.16 
When the first Victors arrived at RAF Tengah in Singapore at the end of 
1963, a storage unit had already been built at the base for 48 Red Beard 
nuclear bombs. The squadron then engaged in low-altitude nuclear 
bombing exercises.17
Here is the true meaning of deterrence. It is spelled out in the 
nuclear threats against Iraq, a non-nuclear weapon state in 1961, 1991 
and 2003; in the V-bomber deployments throughout the British Empire 
in the 1950s and 1960s; in the commitment of Vulcans and Victors to 
‘deal with’ the Middle East and the Far East (where there were no nuclear 
weapon states in 1963); and in the intimidation of Indonesia in the mid 
1960s.
Respecting Britain’s vital interests
Deterrence means cultivating a ‘wholesome respect’ for British violence 
in  the lesser races who might interfere with British domination. 
Deterrence means preventing non-nuclear weapon states from using 
weapons or launching attacks that might defeat British expeditionary 
forces sent out into the global south. Deterrence means, if necessary, 
keeping the option open to use nuclear weapons to crush non-nuclear 
weapon states too tough to defeat by conventional means.
In other words:
• British nuclear weapons have not just been about ‘defending Britain’; 
they have been ‘used’ right around the world.
• British nuclear weapons have been aimed at non-nuclear weapon 
states as well as nuclear-armed enemies.
• British nuclear weapons have been about nuclear intimidation and 
coercion as well as threatening nuclear retaliation.
• Britain has used its nuclear weapons – to threaten other countries 
during direct confrontations – and more widely.
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This has been part of British nuclear policy since the beginning. The 
1956 Defence White Paper, a public document, said: ‘we have to be 
prepared for the outbreak of localised conflicts on a scale short of global 
war. In such limited wars the possible use of nuclear weapons cannot be 
excluded.’ ‘Localised conflicts’ or ‘limited wars’ were wars in the global 
south, against opponents (either states or nationalist movements) who 
lacked nuclear weapons.
Nearly 40 years later, in November 1993, the then British Defence 
Secretary Malcolm Rifkind expressed the same view, with more cautious 
wording, again in a public speech:
The ability to undertake a massive strike with strategic systems is 
not enough to ensure deterrence. An aggressor might, in certain 
circumstances, gamble on a lack of will ultimately to resort to 
such dire action. It is therefore important for the credibility of our 
deterrent that the United Kingdom also possesses the capability to 
undertake a more limited nuclear strike in order to induce a political 
decision to halt aggression by delivering an unmistakable message 
of our willingness to defend our vital interests to the utmost.18
The 2010–15 Coalition government said: ‘The purpose of our nuclear 
weapons is to deter an attack on the UK, our vital interests or our 
allies’19  –  three distinct entities or concepts. Looking through the 
documentary record, it is clear that ‘vital interests’ relate to British 
financial and economic interests, critical raw materials and trade 
routes  – outside Europe.20 All of this is a matter of public record, and 
yet these important facts did not enter the fierce debates about British 
nuclear weapons possession in the 1980s, or more recently about the 
replacement of the Trident nuclear weapons system.
Propaganda and deterrence
Earlier, in relation to the 1991 nuclear threats against Iraq, I referred 
to a lot of material that appeared in British newspapers. How can 
the mainstream media really be a kind of propaganda system if such 
disturbing facts were reported, sometimes prominently, in mainstream 
newspapers? Herman and Chomsky comment:
That the media provide some information about an issue … proves 
absolutely nothing about the adequacy or accuracy of media 
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coverage. The media do in fact suppress a great deal of information, 
but even more important is the way they present a particular 
fact – its placement, tone, and frequency of repetition – and the 
framework of analysis in which it is placed.21
Chomsky explains that:
The enormous amount of material that is produced in the media 
and books makes it possible for a really assiduous and committed 
researcher to gain a fair picture of the real world by cutting through 
the mass of misrepresentation and fraud to the nuggets hidden 
within.22
That a careful reader, looking for a fact can sometimes find it, with 
diligence and a sceptical eye, tells us nothing about whether that 
fact received the attention and context it deserved, whether it was 
intelligible to most readers, or whether it was effectively distorted 
or suppressed.23
The debate over the morality of nuclear retaliation, a debate which raged 
fiercely during the upsurge of the 1980s, has been a damaging distraction 
from the real issues and the inconvenient truths of British nuclear history 
and policy. Much of the challenge from the peace movement has reinforced 
state propaganda by focusing on hypothetical retaliation in the future 
rather than actual nuclear intimidation and coercion in the past and the 
present. The heart of the matter is that British national security policy has 
not been driven by a concern for national security, but by a commitment 
to dominate, to control ‘vital interests’. In parallel, the engagement of the 
mainstream media with these issues has been driven not by a concern for 
truth but by a commitment to serve power and privilege.
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5
Speaking truth to power – from 
within the heart of the empire
Chris Knight
For over 50 years, Noam Chomsky has been speaking truth to power 
not from a safe distance – anyone can do that – but from right up close 
and personal within his own workplace, the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT). One of the intellectuals singled out by Chomsky 
in ‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’ was a professor from MIT, Walt 
Rostow. By the time Chomsky published his classic essay, Rostow had 
become national security adviser to President Lyndon Johnson. In the 
essay, Chomsky explicitly condemned his former MIT colleague as a 
principal architect of the ongoing ‘butchery in Vietnam’.1
Chomsky was certainly aware that MIT employed a range of other 
academics and intellectuals who were similarly implicated in the crimes 
of the US military. Although Chomsky tends to play down the internal 
conflicts and challenges at his university, the truth is that denouncing 
his fellow academics cannot have been straightforward or easy. In this 
contribution I will focus, in particular, on three especially powerful 
figures at MIT: Jerome Wiesner, John Deutch and James McCormack.
Jerome Wiesner and the Pentagon
To allow a full appreciation of Chomsky’s institutional position, let me 
take you back to his first job interview in 1955. It was for a post in a 
military lab at a time when the Cold War was at its height. The successful 
applicant would join a team at MIT’s Research Laboratory of Electronics 
(RLE) working on machine translation, a project heavily funded by the 
Pentagon with military applications in mind. The interviewer that day 
was Jerome Wiesner, then the director of the RLE and one of the most 
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influential military scientists in the country. Explaining his interest in the 
young linguist, Wiesner recalls: ‘Professor Bill Locke suggested we use 
computers to do automatic translation, so we hired Noam Chomsky and 
Yehoshua Bar-Hillel to work on it.’2 Illustrating his dry sense of humour, 
Chomsky recalls what he said to Wiesner in that interview:
I told him, I don’t think the project makes any sense. The only way 
to solve this problem is brute force. What’s going to be understood 
about language is not really going to help and I’m just not interested, 
so I’m not going to do it. He thought that was a pretty good answer. 
So he hired me on the machine translation project. But mainly to 
do what I felt like.3
We may regret that Chomsky never got to write a beginner’s manual for 
handling job interviews. ‘Always turn the tables’ might well have been 
his advice!
To savour the ironies of Chomsky’s employment at the Research 
Laboratory of Electronics, it helps to know more about Jerome Wiesner. 
In terms of US military policy, Chomsky remembers the RLE director as 
a dove: ‘He was on the extreme dovish side of the … Kennedy adminis-
tration. But he never really accepted the fact that the students and the 
activists considered him a kind of a collaborator.’4 This double-edged 
evaluation suggests to me that Chomsky knew from the outset about 
Wiesner’s collaboration with the Pentagon, but out of respect for his 
senior colleague left it to others to condemn him on those grounds.
A specialist in communications engineering, from 1952 to 1980 
Wiesner rose from director of the RLE to provost and then president of 
MIT, in effect making him Chomsky’s boss for over 20 years.5 Wiesner 
also played a leading role in setting up MIT’s linguistics programme. As 
Chomsky says: ‘Modern linguistics developed as part of what’s sometimes 
called the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s, actually to a large extent 
here [in the RLE], thanks initially to Jerry Wiesner’s initiatives.’6
It is easy to see why MIT’s students considered Wiesner ‘a kind of 
collaborator’. After all, it was Wiesner who, in the 1950s, had brought 
nuclear missile research to MIT.7 Wiesner, moreover, was openly proud 
of the fact that the RLE – centrally situated on MIT’s campus – had 
made ‘major scientific and technical contributions to the continuing 
and growing military technology of the United States.’8
In 1971, the US Army’s Office of the Chief of Research and 
Development published a list of what it called ‘just a few examples’ of the 
‘many RLE research contributions that have had military applications’. 
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The list included ‘beam-shaping antennas’, ‘helical antennas’, ‘microwave 
filters’, ‘ionospheric communication’, ‘missile guidance’, ‘atomic clocks’, 
‘signal detection’, ‘communication theory’, ‘information and coding 
theory’, ‘human sensor augmentation’ and ‘neuroelectric signals’.9 Given 
the military significance of all such projects, Chomsky would have had 
his work cut out disentangling his own theories about language from any 
possible military use.
Wiesner’s contribution to the US military, however, was far 
greater than his involvement with the RLE. One major achievement, he 
reminds us, was that he ‘helped get the United States ballistic missile 
program established in the face of strong opposition from the civilian 
and military leaders of the Air Force and Department of Defense’. 
He adds that he was also ‘a proponent of the Polaris missile system, the 
ballistic missile early warning system, and the satellite reconnaissance 
systems’.10 By 1961, Wiesner had become President Kennedy’s chief 
science adviser and it was from this influential position that he was 
able to insist that nuclear missile development and procurement ‘must 
all be accelerated’.11 To justify this military build-up, Kennedy invoked 
the myth of America’s military weakness compared with the Soviet 
Union – the total fiction of a ‘missile gap’ that, according to Wiesner’s 
own account, ‘I helped invent’.12
After Kennedy’s assassination, Wiesner’s power declined. However, 
he was still able to contribute to the US war machine by bringing together 
a team of leading scientists – including 11 from MIT – in a project to 
design and deploy a vast barrier of sensors, mines and cluster bombs 
along the border between North and South Vietnam, the so-called 
McNamara Line.13 Wiesner’s longstanding involvement with nuclear 
decision-making, and his consequent awareness of just how flawed 
and dishonest the whole process was, did lead him to criticise the unre-
strained stockpiling of nuclear missiles, particularly those equipped 
with multiple warheads. But this change of heart did not stop him from 
continuing to run laboratories at MIT dedicated to research on just such 
developments.14
Wiesner stepped down as MIT’s president in 1980, but what the 
university’s representatives call its ‘deep relationship’ with the Pentagon 
continues to this day.15 Since 1980, MIT’s on-campus research has 
included work on missiles, space defence, warships, nuclear submarines, 
IEDs, robots, drones and ‘battle suits’.16
So, the individual who gave Chomsky his first academic post, and 
who was his boss for over 20 years, was one of the chief designers of 
the military machine whose crimes Chomsky so eloquently condemned 
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in ‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’. The moment he accepted his 
position at MIT, therefore, Chomsky became immersed in a world 
whose primary technological mission he detested. And, as more and 
more students became politically radicalised during the 1960s, he 
would certainly have known about their attitude to MIT, which was 
succinctly expressed in this 1969 passage from the radical newspaper 
The Old Mole:
MIT isn’t a center for scientific and social research to serve 
humanity. It’s a part of the US war machine. Into MIT flow over 
$100 million a year in Pentagon research and development funds, 
making it the tenth largest Defense Department R&D contractor 
in the country. MIT’s purpose is to provide research, consulting 
services and trained personnel for the US government and the major 
 corporations – research, services, and personnel which enable them 
to maintain their control over the people of the world.17
John Deutch and the CIA
The second figure in my narrative is John Deutch who, as MIT’s provost, 
brought biological warfare research to the university in the 1980s.18 
Like Wiesner, Deutch’s influence ranged well beyond MIT. For example, 
he played a key role in the Pentagon’s chemical weapons strategy, in its 
deployment of MX missiles and in its 1994 Nuclear Posture Review.19 
Deutch’s passion for nuclear weaponry was neatly summed up by his 
wife, Patricia, when she explained: ‘John loves nukes’.20
By 1994, Deutch had failed in one of his ambitions – to become MIT 
president – but he had succeeded in becoming Deputy Defense Secretary. 
Then, in 1995, Bill Clinton made him Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency. Shortly afterwards, Chomsky was asked about his relationship 
with Deutch:
We were actually friends and got along fine, although we disagreed 
on about as many things as two human beings can disagree about. 
I liked him. We got along very well together. He’s very honest, very 
direct. You know where you stand with him. We talked to each 
other. When we had disagreements, they were open, sharp, clear, 
honestly dealt with. I found it fine. I had no problem with him. I 
was one of the very few people on the faculty, I’m told, who was 
supporting his candidacy for the President of MIT.21
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Before the 1990s, during the Cold War, the CIA had focused as much 
on political as on  military intelligence gathering. This was because 
using political  intelligence to avoid nuclear war with the Soviet Union 
was far preferable  to fighting such a war – a war that could only lead 
to disaster  for everyone. But US victory in the 1991 Gulf War showed 
that, with the end of the Cold War, conventional wars were once again 
winnable. The CIA now began working more closely with the Pentagon 
in order to help them fight wars in the Middle East and elsewhere. And, 
from 1995, Deutch’s new team at the agency emphasised what they 
called ‘Support for Military Operations’ and ‘Tactical Intelligence for the 
Warfighter’.22
Had Chomsky been able to converse with Deutch about this, there 
would undoubtedly have been still more ‘open, sharp, clear’ disagree-
ments between the two friends. But, as far as the readers of the New York 
Times were concerned, all they knew was what Chomsky said publicly – 
which was that Deutch ‘has more honesty and integrity than anyone 
I’ve ever met in academic life, or any other life. If somebody’s got to be 
running the CIA, I’m glad it’s him.’23
Despite these comments, I doubt that Chomsky was ever truly 
comfortable rubbing shoulders with Deutch, any more than with the 
numerous other war scientists conducting research at MIT. When anti-war 
student protests swept MIT in 1969, Chomsky took the opportunity to 
say what he really thought about some of his professional colleagues:
I think that MIT is going to have to take seriously something that 
it never has in the past, namely, the social, political, and historical 
context in which scientific and technical development takes place. 
It is appalling that a person can come through an MIT education 
and say the kinds of things that were quoted in the New York 
Times. … One student said, right along straight Nazi scientist lines: 
‘What I’m designing may one day be used to kill millions of people. 
I don’t care. That’s not my responsibility. I’m given an interesting 
technological problem and I get enjoyment out of solving it.’ You 
know perfectly well that we can name twenty faculty members 
who’ve said the same thing.24
In these words – at this time – Chomsky made abundantly clear what he 
thought: some of his colleagues, faculty members at MIT, were acting 
‘right along straight Nazi scientist lines’. The point was reinforced by 
Chomsky’s friend and political ally, the student leader Michael Albert, 
when he described the MIT campus on Boston’s Charles River as ‘Dachau 
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on the Charles’, adding that ‘MIT’s victims burned in the fields of 
Vietnam.’25
Such comments may seem extreme. But they are surely appropriate 
when we consider that during this period, MIT’s laboratories were 
researching helicopter design, radar, smart bombs and counter-insur-
gency techniques all intended to be used in a horrific war in Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia in which at least two million people died.26
James McCormack and the MITRE Corporation
Another important administrator at MIT was Air Force General James 
McCormack. Before coming to the university, McCormack had played 
a leading role in the creation of the US’ entire post-war nuclear arsenal, 
including the development of the hydrogen bomb. In 1949, McCormack 
saw almost no limit to this new weapon’s monstrous potential, telling his 
political masters in Washington that ‘if all of the theory turned out, you 
can have it any size up to the sun’.27
In 1958 McCormack became a vice-president at MIT, where 
he supervised various research projects, including the Center for 
Communication Studies, with which both Wiesner and Chomsky were 
involved.28 McCormack also played a key role in setting up an important 
offshoot of MIT called the MITRE Corporation.
It was this MITRE Corporation that went on to develop various 
lethal hi-tech devices for the McNamara Line in Vietnam and whose 
scientists (including a number of Chomsky’s students) tried hard to 
use Chomsky’s linguistics in their war-related research.29 One can only 
imagine how conflicted Chomsky must have felt when, from 1963 to 
1965, he found himself employed as a consultant to MITRE. Apparently, 
Chomsky’s role was to advise the corporation’s linguists on how to use his 
theories for a computer-based program ‘to establish natural language as 
an operational language for command and control’.30
One of Chomsky’s students at MITRE, Barbara Partee, has told 
me that this employment of linguists was justified to the Air Force on 
the grounds that ‘in the event of a nuclear war, the generals would be 
underground with some computers trying to manage things, and that it 
would probably be easier to teach computers to understand English than 
to teach the generals to program’.31 Partee says she is unsure whether 
anyone really believed this justification at the time yet recalls that the 
Air Force did need to be offered some plausible reason why they were 
spending so much money on Chomsky’s linguistics.
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In the end, the MITRE Corporation never did manage to make 
Chomsky’s theories work, as was admitted by former Air Force Colonel 
Anthony Debons in 1971:
Language is a direct concern to military command and control for 
several reasons. Understanding the structure of a language provides 
the means for developing a machine language which facilitates the 
man–machine interaction required in such systems. Much of the 
research conducted at MIT by Chomsky and his colleagues [has] 
direct application to the efforts undertaken by military scientists 
to develop such languages for computer operations in military 
command and control systems. By and large, the theoretical studies 
made in this area, however, have not as yet led to any appreciable 
success in the development of a natural language for computer 
applications.32
Clearly, Chomsky’s involvement with MITRE was bringing him 
dangerously close to direct collusion with the US military. While others 
may have experienced few moral qualms, Chomsky was different.
To appreciate his sensitivities, we need only recall his deep concern 
in 1959, when his wife, the linguist Carol Chomsky, began working on 
an air defense project at MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory. The project was 
intended to enable ‘the business executive, the military commander and 
the scientist’ to communicate with computers in ‘natural language’.33 
According to the project’s administrative head, Bert Green, ‘Noam was 
very nervous about our work, and met with me to voice his concerns. 
Since the work was being done at an Air Force lab, he believed that … 
we were really working on voice activated command and control 
systems.’34
In this particular case – at least for a while – Chomsky seems to 
have put any worries to one side and, when he first began working at 
MITRE, he doesn’t appear to have flagged up his political dissidence.35 
He must have continued to feel uneasy about the military, especially 
its role in Vietnam, but as he said to a TV interviewer in 1974: ‘I didn’t 
become really actively engaged in opposing the war until about 1964, 
1965.’36 In another interview, he said that by 1964 he had reached a 
point when:
I couldn’t keep quiet any longer, and I started to give talks [about 
Vietnam]. … It got so horrible over there that I couldn’t look at 
myself in the mirror anymore.37
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As he recalled, in yet another account of this period: ‘I was deeply 
immersed in the work I was doing. It was intellectually exciting, and all 
sorts of fascinating avenues of research were opening up.’ But, with what 
he called ‘considerable reluctance’, he now resolved to divert his energies 
into anti-war activism.38
By the autumn of 1965, Chomsky’s consultancy work for MITRE 
seems to have come to an end. Having already spoken at unofficial 
teach-ins during the summer, in a striking shift in his academic priorities, 
Chomsky now began running an official course at MIT called ‘Intellectuals 
and Social Change’. He also became an adviser to MIT’s anti-Vietnam 
War committee, although such activism only ever involved what he 
calls ‘a very small group of faculty’.39 This turn to activism meant that 
Chomsky began writing about topics which, previously, he says, ‘I never 
would have thought of writing about.’40 And in the spring of 1966, 
aged 37, he published what appears to have been his first political article 
since childhood, an early version of ‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’.41
In this and subsequent writings, Chomsky has never, to my 
knowledge, made any reference to his involvement with the MITRE 
Corporation. But, when referring to the military work of fellow professors 
at MIT, he has expressed concern that student protests against such work 
may be misdirected:
I think that a good deal of the energy of the student movement is 
flowing into irrelevant directions. There are tasks to which student 
agitation might be directed, such as formally severing relations with 
the IDA (Institute for Defense Analyses), or restructuring the univer-
sities, or putting people on committees, and even ending defense 
work. Many of these things could be undertaken without leading 
to any objective change in the character of the society and what 
it does. That worries me very much. You see, at a place like MIT 
people like the chairman of the political science department learned 
long ago that you don’t do your really unspeakable work in your 
capacity as a college professor. You do that work in your capacity as 
a member of a corporation which has been set up for that purpose.42
MITRE was, of course, a classic example of such a corporation. 
Chomsky has been very candid about his personal failure to act 
earlier to oppose the onslaught against Vietnam, openly referring to 
‘those of us who stood by in silence and apathy as this catastrophe 
slowly took shape.’43 In the 1969 introduction to his first political book, 
American Power and the New Mandarins, he wrote:
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No one who involved himself in anti-war activities as late as 1965, 
as I did, has any reason for pride or satisfaction. This opposition 
was ten or fifteen years too late.44
Despite these heartfelt regrets, Chomsky was determined to continue 
his linguistics research at MIT. But from this point on, he felt morally 
impelled to clarify that his work was restricted to pure science. His 
linguistic theories had always been highly abstract but he now needed 
to stress that if his military sponsors found his models to be unworkable, 
that did not bother him at all. He would press on with models of language 
so utterly abstract and ideal – so completely removed from social usage, 
communication or any kind of technological application – that they were 
never likely to work for weapons ‘command and control’ or indeed for 
any other military purpose.45
Noam Chomsky and responsibility
Chomsky was always a committed anti-militarist and, equally, a 
libertarian, which for him meant giving free rein to the conscience of 
each individual scientist to pursue their chosen path. Here, he adopted 
what he himself termed ‘a pretty extreme position’ – ‘one that might be 
hard to defend had anyone ever criticized it’.46 Chomsky even went so 
far as to say that he ‘supported the rights of American war criminals not 
only to speak and teach but also to conduct their research, on grounds of 
academic freedom, at a time when their work was being used to murder 
and destroy’.47
But wasn’t this position dangerously close to what Chomsky himself 
condemned as thinking ‘along straight Nazi scientist lines’? As if aware of 
the dilemma, he explained in 1983: ‘I would stop doing what I was doing 
if I discovered that I was engaged in an area of scientific research that I 
thought, under existing social conditions, would lead to, say, oppression, 
destruction, and pain.’48 Yet even on this point, he seemed unsure. 
Asked point-blank whether he might have conducted research in nuclear 
physics back in 1929 – when it was already clear that it might lead to an 
atomic bomb – Chomsky replied:
I don’t think a glib answer is possible. Still, if you ask me specifi-
cally, I’m sure that my answer would have been yes. I would have 
done the work just out of interest and curiosity and with the hope 
that things would somehow work out.49
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So, even where certain scientists are clearly criminals, explained 
Chomsky, this does not necessarily mean that they should be 
prevented from continuing their work. Rather than relying on the 
restrictions imposed by wider society, all of us should accept that 
‘people have a responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of their 
actions, and therefore have the responsibility of thinking about the 
research they undertake and what it might lead to under existing 
conditions’.50
Some critics of the Vietnam War did view Chomsky’s employment 
at MIT as weakening his moral standing. Having just read ‘The 
Responsibility of Intellectuals’, the philosopher and literary critic George 
Steiner wrote privately to its author with some difficult questions:
STEINER: Will Noam Chomsky announce that he will stop teaching 
at MIT or anywhere in this country so long as torture and napalm go 
on? … Will he even resign from a university very largely implicated 
in the kind of ‘strategic studies’ he so rightly scorns? The intellec-
tual is responsible. What then shall he do?
CHOMSKY: I have given a good bit of thought to the specific 
suggestions that you put forth … leaving the country or resigning 
from MIT, which is, more than any other university, associated 
with activities of the department of ‘defense.’ … Perhaps this is a 
rationalization, but my own conclusion is that it is, for the present, 
not improper for an anti-war American intellectual to stay here and 
oppose the government, in as outspoken a way as he can, inside 
the country, and within the universities that have accepted a large 
measure of complicity in war and repression. … As to MIT, I think 
that its involvement in the war effort is tragic and indefensible. 
One should, I feel, resist this subversion of the university in every 
possible way.51
However, when Steiner had this correspondence published in the New 
York Review of Books, Chomsky backed away from such outright public 
criticism of MIT. In a subsequent letter to the Review, published in 
April 1967, Chomsky decided to ‘reformulate’ his earlier criticism: ‘This 
statement is unfair, and needs clarification. As far as I know, MIT as an 
institution has no involvement in the war effort. Individuals at MIT, as 
elsewhere, have a direct involvement, and that is what I had in mind.’52 
It is relevant to note here that by this point, MIT’s managers had given 
Chomsky a named professorship which, as he recalls, ‘isolated me from 
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the alumni and government pressures.’ But, despite this, his retraction 
suggests that he was still facing pressure from somewhere, presumably 
from his own colleagues at MIT.53
When, in 1970, in the aftermath of student unrest, MIT held 
a major art symposium, one anti-war commentator dismissed the 
event as little more than ‘camouflage for the “military-industrial 
complex”’.54 MIT’s remarkable tolerance for Chomsky’s activism was, 
doubtless, yet another way for the Pentagon-sponsored university to 
‘camouflage’ its  real role in this complex. But that hardly means we 
should  therefore  dismiss  Chomsky’s decades of tireless anti-militarist 
activism.
Having said that, Chomsky himself is modest about this political 
work. Whereas his linguistic research could only have been pursued 
by a scientist with his specific capacities, he claims that his activist 
contributions are just common sense and could have been produced by 
almost anyone. He feels there is nothing intellectually exciting about, 
say, explaining the rise of Richard Nixon or Donald Trump. The reasons 
for such political developments are clear enough. Equally, it needs no 
great theoretical insight to conclude that killing civilians during wartime 
is morally wrong, or that prohibiting other countries from stockpiling 
nuclear weapons is richly ironic if you are doing precisely that yourself. 
Chomsky feels that such things should be obvious to anyone who is ready 
to think a little.
But if we accept this argument, it raises the question why so many 
people – including myself – find his political contributions so inspiring. 
My preferred explanation differs from Chomsky’s own.
Noam is by no means just another US citizen. The US military 
and foreign policy establishment is not known for its sensitive moral 
conscience. But insofar as that conscience has existed for the past half 
century, Noam Chomsky has been it. This is surely why he enjoys such 
immense moral standing.
Many of us try to speak the truth, but few of us can count among 
our friends or colleagues advisers to US presidents or a director of the 
CIA. Coming from within the belly of the beast, Chomsky’s words have 
special resonance. As both an insider and an outsider of the US military-
industrial complex, he knows what he is talking about. What he says 
may sometimes appear obvious – especially to those of us living outside 
the US – but the problem is that such things are rarely said by figures 
with such inside knowledge and corresponding authority. Chomsky 
breaks the mould by speaking truth to power even when denouncing the 
activities of his own colleagues and friends.
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5.2 Preparation for nuclear war: the SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground 
Environment) air defense system. In the 1960s, the Pentagon sponsored linguists 
in the hope of making such computer systems easier to use. (Photo: Andreas 
Feininger/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)
5.1 Jerome Wiesner (far left), the scientist who recruited Chomsky to MIT, with 
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Vice-President Lyndon Johnson in the 
White House, 1961. (Courtesy of White House Photographs. John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library and Museum, Boston. Photo: Abbie Rowe)
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5.3 Protesters demonstrate outside one of MIT’s nuclear missile laboratories, 
November 1969. (Courtesy of MIT Museum, Cambridge, MA)
5.4 Police disperse protesters, November 1969. (Courtesy of MIT Museum, 
Cambridge, MA)
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5.5 Building the US nuclear stockpile: General James McCormack (in uniform), 
a future vice-president at MIT, next to Robert Oppenheimer (second on the left), 
on the way to Los Alamos, 1947. (Photo: US Dept of Energy, Washington, DC)
5.6 Former MIT Provost, and future Director of the CIA, John Deutch at the 
Pentagon. (Photo: James E. Jackson, 12 April 1993. US Department of Defense, 
Washington, DC. The appearance of US Department of Defense (DoD) visual 
information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement)
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The abdication of responsibility
Craig Murray
Chomsky sets out a hard test at the end of his essay. He quotes Dwight 
Macdonald: ‘Only those who are willing to resist authority themselves 
when it conflicts too intolerably with their personal moral code, only 
they have the right to condemn the death-camp paymaster.’ 
I intend, as myself a whistleblower who paid the price with his 
career and livelihood, to claim that right. I take this as licence to be freely 
condemnatory in what follows!
Some historical perspective
After a brief period in the 1960s and 1970s when progress appeared to 
be made in western societies in personal freedoms, in social mobility and 
reduction of wealth inequality, things have now regressed. In the 1970s 
it was still possible to subscribe in essence to the Whig historical theory 
of progress, and indeed I did so.
We now live in darkened times. The surveillance state has become 
all pervasive. Obama’s persecution of whistleblowers should give pause 
to the many who seem to think intolerance was invented by Trump. 
The imperialist projection of American power has widened in scope and 
ambition since Chomsky wrote.
It is worth noting the clear-eyed recognition in Chomsky’s work that 
the Soviet Union was also a rival empire. Even while deploring irrational 
Russophobia and the continual threat posture of encirclement – which 
Chomsky also notes in his essay – I always find it is worth reminding 
people that Russia itself still is an empire. Much of its current land – and 
I mean Russia itself, not the former Soviet Republics – was acquired in 
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the nineteenth century by imperial conquest precisely contemporary 
with British acquisitions in India or indeed the westward expansion of 
the USA. These territories are majority Muslim. Russian imperialism is 
quite real.
Academic freedom
Chomsky’s essay refers to academics with influence in the public sphere, 
and I suspect in general that influence has reduced. But we must also 
mark that the scope of academic freedom has declined significantly in 
the last few decades.
Universities are now expected to function as corporations. The 
bottom line has become all important, and the notion of a democratic 
self-governing community has vanished after an onslaught of macho 
corporate governance culture, including the ludicrously high levels of 
remuneration for executives such a culture involves. Furthermore, the 
value of universities is frequently defined by government in terms of 
the commercially viable knowledge it can pass to the corporate sector, 
or the well-conditioned corporate labour it can churn out. Tenure is 
shrinking. Funding has become short term and dependent on continual 
measurement of research outputs, putting the funders in de facto 
academic and intellectual control.
I am afraid I suspect that junior faculty today organising teach-ins 
like those of 1967 to which Chomsky refers would have their careers 
substantially damaged. Indeed, I suspect a young Chomsky would be 
instructed to give up other interests and devote himself solely to a narrow 
definition of linguistics.
Public intellectuals
As a historian I enjoyed Chomsky’s castigation of some of that profession. 
It caused me to reflect on the ‘historians’ whose views on public policy are 
sought in the UK and who are called up by the media as commentators: 
Andrew Roberts, David Starkey, Niall Ferguson. All are on any analysis 
well to the right of the political spectrum. Ferguson has made a career of 
or regurgitating the nonsense which Chomsky derided in his essay.
Indeed, it is impossible now to imagine that the public intellectuals 
the BBC admired 50 years ago, such as Bertrand Russell and AJP Taylor, 
would ever be given significant air time now. Support for nuclear 
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disarmament or the nationalisation of major industries would put 
them way beyond the window of permitted thought. The vicious media 
assault  upon Jeremy Corbyn shows the reaction to even the mildest 
radicalism.
The media and the narrowing of political thought
This process of the narrowing of permitted political thought has taken 
place over the long term. In 1879, Gladstone – campaigning in an election 
that brought him to power for his second term as Prime Minister – stated 
in a major speech that Afghans fighting British troops were justified in 
doing so because Britain had invaded their country: ‘If they resisted, 
would not you have done the same’? Gladstone asked.1 It is a simple 
moral test. But who can doubt that in the UK or the US today, to say 
that anybody fighting ‘our’ troops might be justified would bring a 
unanimous hellstorm of media condemnation combining false patriotism 
with militarism?
Still less is there interest in the media in exposing the truth and 
holding the government to account. In the UK recently, the Attorney 
General gave a speech in defence of the UK’s drone policy, the assas-
sination of people – including British nationals – abroad. This execution 
without a hearing is based on several criteria, he reassured us. His 
speech was repeated slavishly in the British media. In fact, the Guardian 
newspaper simply republished the government press release absolutely 
verbatim, and stuck a reporter’s byline at the top.2
The media have no interest in a critical appraisal of the process 
by which the British government regularly executes without trial. Yet 
in fact it is extremely interesting. The genesis of the policy lay in the 
appointment of Daniel Bethlehem as the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office’s Chief Legal Adviser. Jack Straw made the appointment, and for 
the first time ever it was external, and not from the Foreign Office’s own 
large team of world-renowned international lawyers. The reason for 
that is not in dispute. Every single one of the FCO’s legal advisers had 
advised that the invasion of Iraq was illegal, and Straw wished to find 
a new head of the department more in tune with the neo-conservative 
world view.
Straw went to extremes. He appointed Daniel Bethlehem, the 
lawyer who provided the legal advice to Benjamin Netanyahu on the 
‘legality’ of building the great wall hemming in the Palestinians away 
from their land and water resources. 
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Bethlehem provided an opinion on the legality of drone strikes 
which is, to say the least, controversial. To give one example, Bethlehem 
accepts that established principles of international law dictate that 
lethal force may be used only to prevent an attack which is ‘imminent’. 
Bethlehem argues that for an attack to be ‘imminent’ does not require it 
to be ‘soon’. Indeed you can kill to avert an ‘imminent attack’ even if you 
have no information on when and where it will be. You can instead rely 
on your target’s ‘pattern of behaviour’; that is, if he has attacked before, 
it is reasonable to assume he will attack again and that such an attack is 
‘imminent’.3
There is a much deeper problem: that the evidence against the 
target is often extremely dubious. Yet even allowing the evidence to 
be perfect, it is beyond me that the state can kill in such circumstances 
without it being considered a death penalty imposed without trial for 
past crimes, rather than to frustrate another ‘imminent’ one.
You would think that background would make an interesting 
story. Yet the entire ‘serious’ British media published the government 
line, without a single journalist, not one, writing about the fact that 
Bethlehem’s proposed definition of ‘imminent’ has been widely rejected 
by the international law community. The public knows none of this. They 
just ‘know’ that drone strikes are keeping us safe from deadly attack by 
terrorists, because the government says so, and nobody has attempted to 
give them other information.
I think we can say, 50 years on, that as a general rule, the responsi-
bility of intellectuals to tell the truth has been well and truly abdicated. 
More than ever is truth telling at odds with career prospects, and most 
‘intellectuals’ care a great deal more about their careers than about the 
truth.
Notes
1  Speech given in Dalkeith on 26 November 1879. Paul Adelman, Gladstone, Disraeli and Later 
Victorian Politics (Harlow: Longman, 1970), 90.
2 Owen Boycott. ‘Attorney general calls for new legal basis for pre-emptive military strikes.’ The 
Guardian, 11 January 2017.
3  Daniel Bethlehem, ‘Principles relevant to the scope of a state’s right to self-defense against an 
imminent or actual armed attack by non-state actor,’ American Journal of International Law 
106 (2012).
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Replies and commentary
Noam Chomsky
Commentary on Walker
Jackie Walker’s eloquent call for intellectual activism raises fundamental 
questions about the very concept of ‘the intellectual’, which, she argues 
persuasively, ‘needs fundamental rethinking’. She is quite right to observe 
that the concept has been constructed to exclude those ‘divorced from 
the structures of power, carrying the stigma of historical oppression.’ 
Why should the concept exclude Peter Tosh and his message of liberation 
in song and dance ‘directed to the mass of the people … formulated in 
a genre that can be heard by any who choose to hear and take up its 
rhythms’? Why exclude ‘the intellectuals of our movement, the mothers 
and fathers, cooks and cleaners, the unemployed, fast-food workers, the 
office workers – all are our intellectuals, all who resist while standing 
witness to the truth’? Or to refer to the discussion at the UCL conference 
(p. 108), why exclude ‘Native Americans, black activists and others 
[who] have always been quite prominent in trying to break through these 
ugly and disgraceful misinterpretations’?
The concept of ‘intellectual’ is indeed a curious one. A Nobel laureate 
in physics who keeps to exploring the mysteries of quantum mechanics is 
not called an intellectual, nor is the janitor who cleans the labs and offices, 
who may have sharp insights into the nature of the society and deep 
understanding of it, as well as valuable ideas as to how to overcome the 
social pathologies to which Walker rightly directs our attention.
In common usage, as discussed at the conference (p. 119), the term 
‘intellectual’ is generally reserved for those with a degree of privilege 
who use their opportunities to become involved in the public arena. But 
that is a usage that merits challenge, as Walker discusses.
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Commentary on Smith and Smith
Restricting ourselves nevertheless to the common usage, let’s turn to the 
concept of ‘responsibility of intellectuals’ (RI). We see at once that it is 
ambiguous: there are distinct groups of intellectuals who see themselves 
as having very different responsibilities.
A useful distinction, which captures essential issues, is put forth 
by Neil and Amahl Smith in their ‘reflections’. They quote my ‘sardonic 
description’ of two categories of intellectuals: the ‘“technocratic and 
policy-oriented intellectuals” (the “good guys”, in the eyes of the estab-
lishment, who merely serve external power) and the “value-oriented 
intellectuals” (the “bad guys” … who engage in critical analysis and 
“delegitimation”)’.
My description was indeed sardonic, but I cannot claim originality 
for the characterisation of the two categories of intellectuals, which in 
the original was anything but sardonic. It was dead serious, a fact of no 
slight importance and with considerable bearing on RI. I was quoting 
from a revealing document, the first – and I think most significant – 
publication of the Trilateral Commission, The Crisis of Democracy.1 The 
Commission consisted largely of liberal internationalists from the three 
centres of capitalist democracy: the US, Europe and Japan. Its general 
political orientation is illustrated by the fact that almost the entirety of 
the Carter administration – indeed Carter himself – was drawn from its 
ranks.
The report of the Commission praises the ‘technocratic and policy-
oriented intellectuals’ as serious and honourable, fulfilling their respon-
sibilities to design and implement policy soberly and responsibly (one 
concept of RI). It sharply criticises the ‘value-oriented intellectuals’ who 
see their responsibility differently. In the eyes of the Commission, such 
intellectuals are sentimental and emotional (or with more insidious 
designs). They promote disorder and corrupt the youth, helping bring 
about the ‘crisis of democracy’.
The concept of ‘technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals’ was 
captured succinctly by Henry Kissinger at the time when he was angling 
for a position in the incoming administration. One qualifies as an ‘expert’, 
Kissinger explained, by ‘elaborating and defining’ the consensus of one’s 
constituency ‘at a high level’. In short: providing expert services to the 
powerful.2
The ‘crisis of democracy’ that concerned the Trilateral intellectuals 
was the ‘excessive democracy’ that disfigured the 1960s, ‘the time of 
troubles’, as it is often called – or, from a different point of view, the 
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time when the country was considerably civilised. The crisis was brought 
about when normally passive parts of the population – the young, 
the old, women, minorities, workers, farmers and those from other 
such sectors – sought to enter the political arena to advocate for their 
interests, imposing too much of a burden on the state and rendering 
the country ungovernable. Rejecting the common idea that the cure for 
democracy’s ills is more democracy, the Trilateral intellectuals called for 
more ‘moderation in democracy’, a return to passivity and conformity. 
The American rapporteur Samuel Huntington, Harvard Professor of 
the Science of Government, recalled earlier years when ‘Truman had 
been able to govern the country with the cooperation of a relatively 
small number of Wall Street lawyers and bankers’, so that democracy 
functioned smoothly, with no unsupportable burden on the state, and 
no crisis.
In passing we should note that there was nothing new about 
the Trilateralist concern over the insubordination of the ‘ignorant and 
meddlesome outsiders’, the general public, which must be ‘put in its 
place’ so that the ‘responsible men’ may ‘live free of the trampling and the 
roar of a bewildered herd’ as they conduct affairs of state responsibly, to 
borrow the words of America’s leading twentieth-century liberal intellec-
tual, Walter Lippmann, in what his editors call a ‘political philosophy for 
liberal democracy’. Such fears can be traced back to the earliest modern 
democratic revolution in seventeenth-century England, when the ‘giddy 
multitude of beasts in men’s shapes’, as they were called by the self-
described ‘men of best quality’, rejected the basic framework of the civil 
conflict raging in England between king and parliament, and called for 
government ‘by countrymen like ourselves, that know our wants’, not by 
‘knights and gentlemen that make us laws, that are chosen for fear and do 
but oppress us, and do not know the people’s sores’.3 The concern of the 
men of best quality has not abated since.
As I mentioned, the Trilateral Commission concerns are voiced 
from the liberal end of the mainstream spectrum. At about the same time, 
a counterpart appears from the opposite end, the ‘Powell memorandum’ 
sent by corporate lobbyist (later Supreme Court Justice) Lewis Powell to 
the Chamber of Commerce, the major business association.4 Powell too 
perceived a crisis, one of utmost severity. His memorandum called upon 
the business community to rise up to defend itself against the assault 
on freedom led by Ralph Nader, Herbert Marcuse and other miscreants 
who had taken over the universities, the media and the government 
and were destroying the foundations of our free society. The rhetoric 
is as interesting as the contents, reflecting the perceptions of Powell’s 
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audience, desperate about the slight diminution in their overwhelming 
power – rather like a spoiled three-year-old who has a piece of candy 
taken away. The memorandum was influential in circles that matter for 
policy formation.
Returning to the liberal concerns, the Commission warned that 
the ‘value-oriented intellectuals’ contribute to the crisis by ‘devot[ing] 
themselves to the derogation of leadership, the challenging of authority, 
and the unmasking and delegitimation of established institutions’. 
Particularly dangerous is their role in undermining the institutions 
responsible for ‘the indoctrination of the young’ – schools, universi-
ties, churches. They also infected the media, which, under their baleful 
influence, had become so extreme in their attacks on good order that 
the government might have to intervene to curb their excesses, the 
Trilateralists warned.
While the absurdity of the picture does not approach that of the 
Powell Memorandum, at the core it reflects the same fears that the 
‘bewildered herd’ might be chipping away at the edifice of elite control.
At the height of the ‘time of troubles’, in 1968, the Kennedy–
Johnson National Security adviser and former Harvard Dean McGeorge 
Bundy went even beyond the Commission in condemning the value-
oriented intellectuals. They are ‘wild men in the wings’, who not only 
criticise the judgements and actions of our leaders, but even question 
their motives! And still worse, one might add, they do so by citing their 
own pronouncements in internal documents and reporting the actions 
that conform to them. The style of the charges carries us back to the 
earliest use of the term ‘intellectual’ in the modern sense, at the time of 
the Dreyfus trial (p. 102). Plus ça change …
These familiar charges bring to mind another term which, like the 
concept ‘intellectual’, has a curious modern usage: the term ‘dissident 
intellectual’. Overwhelmingly it has been used to refer to dissidents 
in Russia and its domains, virtually never to refer to those in the US 
and Latin America. A look at the rather odd collection of ‘dissidents’ in 
Wikipedia (including Hitler, David Duke – and me) gives a general sense: 
overwhelmingly Russian. In light of both fact and elementary principle, 
that usage is of some interest.
As for facts, from 1960 to 
the Soviet collapse in 1990, the numbers of political prisoners, 
torture victims, and executions of non-violent political dissenters 
in Latin America vastly exceeded those in the Soviet Union and its 
East European satellites. In other words, from 1960 to 1990, the 
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Soviet bloc as a whole was less repressive, measured in terms of 
human victims, than many individual Latin American countries5 
– a toll that included many religious martyrs, and mass slaughter as well, 
consistently supported or even initiated in Washington.
Nevertheless, the victims in US domains are not ‘dissidents’, not even 
the six prominent Latin American intellectuals, Jesuit priests, murdered 
in November 1989 by the elite Atlacatl brigade of the Salvadoran army, 
fresh from renewed US training and acting on the explicit orders of the 
high command, which was never distant from the American embassy.6
In the US the incident is scarcely known, though outside of western 
intellectual circles such matters are readily understood, of course in 
the countries directly targeted by US-backed state terrorism. Thus the 
journal Proceso of the Jesuit university in El Salvador observed:
If Lech Walesa had been doing his organising work in El Salvador, 
he would have already entered into the ranks of the disappeared – at 
the hands of ‘heavily armed men dressed in civilian clothes’; or have 
been blown to pieces in a dynamite attack on his union headquar-
ters. If Alexander Dubcˇek were a politician in our country, he would 
have been assassinated like Héctor Oquelí [the social democratic 
leader assassinated in Guatemala, apparently by Salvadoran death 
squads]. If Andrei Sakharov had worked here in favor of human 
rights, he would have met the same fate as Herbert Anaya [one of 
the many murdered leaders of the independent Salvadoran Human 
Rights Commission CDHES]. If Ota-Sik or Vaclav Havel had been 
carrying out their intellectual work in El Salvador, they would have 
wound up one sinister morning, lying on the patio of a university 
campus with their heads destroyed by the bullets of an elite army 
battalion.7
Moving from fact to principle, what should be the operative principle 
is clear enough: our prime concern should be the crimes for which we 
share responsibility and that we can do something about, that we can 
mitigate or terminate. We understand this truism well enough in the case 
of official enemies. It was of little moment what intellectuals in the USSR 
said about US domains, but we care a great deal about what they said 
about Russia. We honour the Russian dissidents who lay bare the faults 
of their own societies, and dismiss, with contempt, the apparatchiks who 
repeat patriotic pieties.
At home, the judgements and values are reversed. Those who assure 
us that US intents are benign, however mistaken, are the ‘responsible 
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men’, while those who question the pieties are ‘wild men in the wings’ 
who can be ignored or ridiculed. As the acerbic American commentator 
HL Mencken once wrote, referring to an Irish-American writer who 
was in and out of jail on trivial charges, ‘If [he] were a Russian, read in 
translation, all the professors would be hymning him’.8
Such distinctions often come to the fore with considerable clarity. 
One such moment was the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Putting 
aside the wild men in the wings, reactions were roughly divided between 
hawks and doves. The former argued that with determination we could 
have won, sometimes adding ‘stab-in-the-back’ recriminations. The 
doves, at the extreme end, held that:
The early American decisions on Indochina can be regarded as 
blundering efforts to do good. But by 1969 it was clear to most of the 
world – and most Americans – that the intervention had  been  a 
disastrous mistake … The argument [against the war] was that the 
United States had misunderstood the cultural and political forces 
at work in Indochina – that it was in a position where it could not 
impose a solution except at a price too costly to itself.9
There was also a different view, but it did not enter the debate: that the 
war was ‘fundamentally wrong and immoral’, not ‘a mistake’. Though 
that position didn’t make it into the mainstream hawk–dove debate, 
it was in fact held: namely, by a large majority of the public, as was 
found in the investigations of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 
which conducts regular studies of popular attitudes on a wide range of 
issues. The figures held steady until 1999, after which it seems that the 
question was dropped. These are quite astonishing figures for an open 
question, particularly when respondents are drawing the conclusion in 
virtual isolation, the conception being inexpressible and unthinkable in 
mainstream discussion. One can only guess what the figures would be if 
the rigid doctrinal framework were penetrable.
There are, of course, questions about just what people meant when 
they took this position. Reviewing the data of two decades in 1999, the 
director of the studies, political scientist John Rielly, concludes that the 
responses show a ‘preference to avoid undertaking major burdens in 
foreign interventions’. Possibly. Or possibly they show that the public 
agrees with the wild men in the wings. It wouldn’t have been hard to 
determine the answer, but apparently the inquiry was never undertaken. 
Similar questions arise about a great many issues, a matter that merits 
much more attention than it receives.
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Commentary on Allott
These considerations bring us to some serious questions raised by 
Nicholas Allott about the validity of the apparent RI truism that intel-
lectuals should seek to speak the truth. Allott raises two issues: (1) doing 
so may be irrelevant to voters, because ‘There is strong evidence that 
voting is not primarily driven by evaluation of the policies on offer … The 
challenge to RI from this research is that telling the truth and exposing 
lies may not make much difference’; (2) telling the truth may be counter-
productive because of the ‘backfire effect’; doing so may simply reinforce 
refuted beliefs in reaction.
Allott provides reasons why the RI truism should withstand these 
objections. On (2) he writes that the idea that the effect is ‘always 
operative and dominant … cannot be right. People do change their 
minds, and at least some of the time when they do so it is because they 
have been persuaded by evidence against their prior belief.’ On (1), 
he quotes my comment that ‘Being alone, you can’t do anything – But 
if you join with other people you can make changes’, and he observes 
that ‘deepening democracy so that it more closely matches the popular 
ideal will require considerable changes to education, the media and the 
democratic system itself’. Both observations seem to me to point in the 
right direction.
On people changing their minds, that’s a common experience in 
activism. One striking example, discussed earlier, pp. 5–6, is the rapid 
change in popular attitudes about the Vietnam War from 1965/6 to 
late 1967. It was not the result of some dramatic new event but rather 
of several years of education and organisation under difficult circum-
stances, which finally led to a breakthrough. The change was very 
dramatic where I was at MIT (pp. 115–6), which was in the forefront 
in this regard in the northeastern US (and unusual if not unique in 
the country, particularly with regard to academic participation in war 
resistance). But it was far more widespread.
There are other cases where it took far longer to break through 
the barriers of evasion and deceit. One highly significant case, which 
happened to be a personal obsession of mine for many years, is what is 
arguably the closest approximation to true genocide in the post-war era, 
the western-backed Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975.10 Finally, 
after literally decades of dedicated work on the part of a very few people, 
mostly young – notably the unsung hero Arnold Kohen – enough public 
pressure developed for President Clinton to call off the slaughter and 
open the way for survival and independence, as could have been done 
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from the start. But minds were changed – or more accurately, opened, 
at least among large parts of the general public if not intellectual elites, 
which continue, routinely, to ignore or simply deny the facts.11
There are many other cases, and they deserve careful scrutiny, 
because what actually happened – often known primarily to  participants – 
is commonly reshaped to satisfy the needs of power and doctrine.
More generally, the two challenges to RI that Allott discusses appear 
to have a common root: recognition on the part of the public that they are 
simply not represented in the political system – as is in fact substantially 
the case. Careful studies comparing political preferences with decisions 
of elected representatives show that a large majority of voters are literally 
disenfranchised: their own representatives disregard their opinions and 
listen to other voices, those of the concentrated economic powers that 
substantially determine electoral outcomes by campaign spending, that 
provide the overwhelming majority of influential lobbyists who often 
virtually write legislation, and that shape politics in other familiar 
ways.12 Furthermore, citizens appear to be quite aware that they are 
disenfranchised. Allott cites polls that consistently, at least since the 
Reagan years, show that – often by overwhelming majorities – the public 
believe that ‘the government is pretty much run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves’, contrary to endless propaganda in media 
and journals of opinion, schools and universities.
People do not have to read academic political science to know that 
their preferences are ignored on a wide range of issues on which extensive 
polling shows sharp divergence of public opinion from policy, and to 
realise that ‘I don’t vote because my vote don’t count anyway’, thanks to 
radical gerrymandering and voter suppression measures, honed to a high 
art by the Republican party (not without predecessors) and supported by 
the most reactionary Supreme Court in living memory.13
The press often helps by suppressing (or even deriding) the facts. 
For example, the Economist assures us that the ‘grim, mirthless’ Bernie 
Sanders with his ‘crotchety-great-uncle charisma’ is an ‘indulgence’ that 
Democrats can ‘ill afford’, and that fortunately, silly season ‘has probably 
passed’. After all, we are instructed, his main ideas ‘have little support 
within [the Democratic] party, let alone America’: only the support of 
75 per cent of Democrats, 59 per cent of the general public (national health 
care, ‘Medicare-for-all’) and of 80 per cent of Clinton voters, 45 per cent of 
Trump voters (tuition-free college). Facts that readers are spared.14
To cite one of many examples from US media, striking though less 
egregious, polls on taxes over 40 years show that the public consistently 
wants lower taxes for themselves and higher taxes on business and the 
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wealthy. The former result is reported regularly, not the latter. Policy 
moves in the opposite direction, to a ridiculous extreme under the Trump 
tax scam.15
During the neoliberal period, policies have been designed and 
implemented that predictably lead to the sharp concentration of wealth 
while the majority of the public face stagnation or decline, in the US 
continuing to the time of writing (August 2018) – facts that are not 
entirely suppressed. Thus an upbeat lead story in the New York Times 
lauding the amazing successes of the economy does inform the reader, 
in paragraph 31 of the continuation page, that real wages continue their 
decline.16
By a natural and familiar process, concentration of wealth leads to 
increased concentration of political power and increased marginalisation 
of the public.17 This is in accord with the guiding principle enunciated by 
Margaret Thatcher: ‘there is no such thing as society’. We should not turn 
to government to solve our problems; rather, each of us must ‘take respon-
sibility for ourselves’ and individually help ‘those who are unfortunate’.18
Unwittingly no doubt, Thatcher was paraphrasing Marx’s bitter 
condemnation of the autocratic governments that sought to turn society 
into a ‘sack of potatoes’: isolated individuals, lacking organisation and 
supportive institutions. They must then face the problems of life on their 
own – and in the neoliberal period, with ‘growing worker insecurity’ in 
‘flexible labor markets’ – Alan Greenspan’s explanation for the health of 
the economy he was running while he was still lauded as ‘St Alan’, before 
the 2007 crash.
A sack of potatoes can be expected to yield the kind of results found 
in the studies that Allott cites, though it would likely be quite different 
in periods when militant labour activism and flourishing popular 
movements have been able to influence political choices, not simply to 
observe in mounting disillusionment.
The happy days when private power can rampage freely may not 
last too long, however. Much to the consternation of elite opinion, the 
sack of potatoes has not settled into passivity, in the US or elsewhere. 
The Economist does recognise unhappily that the ‘grim, mirthless’ Bernie 
Sanders is the most popular political figure in the country. And despite 
efforts to keep him in the shadows, the popular movement he organised 
is far from having ‘berned out’, the fond hope of the Economist editors. It 
is active and growing, along with others.
It’s also worth remembering that the most remarkable fact about 
the 2016 election was not the election of a billionaire with huge financial 
and media support. Rather, it was the Sanders campaign, which broke 
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with over a century of elections in which outcomes are predictable with 
remarkable accuracy, both for president and Congress, from the single 
variable of campaign spending. That could turn out to be a significant 
turning point in American politics, just as the Corbyn movement might 
be in England and DiEM25 and others on the continent. The growing 
popular bitterness about the consequences of the neoliberal assault of 
the past generation can bring forth ugly reactions, as we see everywhere, 
but there are positive signs as well.
Antonio Gramsci’s comment from his prison cell is once again all 
too apt: ‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and 
the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid 
symptoms appear’ – but hopeful signs as well.
Commentary on Rai
Also all too apt, regrettably, is Milan Rai’s harrowing review of how 
Britain has used nuclear weapons, along with his explanation of the real 
meaning of deterrence and his analysis of how media coverage, while 
providing information, has framed the issues in ways that implicitly 
entrench doctrines of the propaganda system that distort reality.19 Daniel 
Ellsberg’s observation about the regular use of nuclear weapons, which 
Rai quotes, is entirely accurate. In his recent book Doomsday Machine – 
essential reading – Ellsberg identifies no fewer than 25 occasions when 
the US has employed nuclear weapons in the manner that Rai reviews.20
It is quite important to add the little-known fact that Ellsberg’s 
observation is, in fact, official US policy, outlined in a very important 
document that has not received the attention it deserves: a Clinton-era 
study by the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which controls 
nuclear weapons command and control, military operations in space, 
missile defence and related matters.21 The central conclusion of the 
STRATCOM study is that the reliance on nuclear weapons is to remain 
fundamentally unchanged after the end of the Cold War, except that 
the scope of potential targets extends beyond Cold War enemies to 
‘rogue’ states – in practice, those that are disobedient. Adopting Ellsberg’s 
principle, the document states that ‘Although we are not likely [sic] to use 
nuclear weapons in less than matters of the greatest national importance, 
or in less than extreme circumstances, nuclear weapons always cast a 
shadow over any crisis or conflict’. And, in this sense, are constantly used.
Extending the principle, STRATCOM stresses the need for 
credibility: Washington’s strategy must be ‘convincing [and] immediately 
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discernible’. The US should have available ‘the full range of responses’, 
but nuclear weapons are the most important of these, because ‘Unlike 
chemical or biological weapons, the extreme destruction from a nuclear 
explosion is immediate, with few if any palliatives to reduce its effect’.
One section, headed: ‘Maintaining Ambiguity’, explains that it is 
important that ‘planners should not be too rational about determining … 
what the opponent values the most’, all of which must be targeted. 
Furthermore, ‘it hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational and 
cool-headed … That the US may become irrational and vindictive if its 
vital interests are attacked should be a part of the national persona we 
project’. It is ‘beneficial’ for our strategic posture if ‘some elements may 
appear to be potentially “out of control”’ – chilling words at any time, but 
particularly in Trumpland.
Note that the document establishes the ‘madman theory’ that 
was attributed to Richard Nixon in a memoir by his chief of staff, HR 
Haldeman, and bitterly condemned. Under Clinton, however, it was 
formulated as official doctrine.
Nuclear weapons ‘seem destined to be the centerpiece of US 
strategic deterrence for the foreseeable future’, the STRATCOM report 
concludes. We should therefore reject a ‘no first use policy’, even against 
non-nuclear states, and should make it clear to adversaries that our 
‘reaction’ may ‘either be response or preemptive’, hence in violation of 
the UN Charter, the ‘supreme law of the land’ under the US Constitution, 
were anyone to care. Also dismissed is the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
except when it can be used as a pretext for threatening, perhaps attacking, 
official enemies.
Occasionally the same prevailing doctrine breaks through 
the ge n e ral silence, though not to the general public, or even the 
scholarly  comm unity, with rare exceptions. Thus Carter’s Defense 
Secretary Harold Brown called on Congress to fund strategic nuclear 
capabilities because with them, ‘our other forces become meaningful 
instruments of military and political power’.22 This is the STRATCOM 
principle enunciated in Essentials.
Possibly in reaction to this document, the former head of 
STRATCOM, General Lee Butler, wrote that throughout his long profes-
sional military career he had been ‘among the most avid of these keepers 
of the faith in nuclear weapons’, but felt that in his judgement ‘they 
served us extremely ill’, for reasons he outlines. He asks 
By what authority do succeeding generations of leaders in the 
nuclear-weapons states usurp the power to dictate the odds 
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of continued life on our planet? Most urgently, why does such 
breathtaking audacity persist at a moment when we should stand 
trembling in the face of our folly and united in our commitment to 
abolish its most deadly manifestations?23
A good question.
A review of the record provides ample support for General Butler’s 
plea for sanity. The record reveals that it is a near miracle that humans 
have survived the nuclear age. Repeatedly, terminal disaster has 
come very close, usually by accident (equipment failure and the like), 
sometimes by reckless acts of leaders. And we can hardly have faith that 
miracles will persist.
In 1947, at the dawn of the nuclear age, the Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists established its Doomsday Clock. Each year, scientists and 
political analysts set the minute hand a certain distance from midnight: 
terminal disaster. In 1947 it was set at 7 minutes to midnight, halcyon 
days by our standards. Over the years it has oscillated, depending on 
world circumstances. Once, in 1953, it reached 2 minutes to midnight 
after the US and then the USSR exploded thermonuclear weapons, 
revealing that human intelligence had gained the capacity to destroy 
everything. In 2016, the hand was moved to 3 minutes to midnight, now 
taking into account failure to deal with global warming. When Trump 
took office, it was moved forward to 2½ minutes to midnight, and a year 
later, moved again to 2 minutes to midnight, as close as it has been to the 
end during the nuclear age. Not attractive prospects, unless the nuclear 
powers can come to their senses.
Commentary on Murray
Craig Murray’s sober reflections on the current scene also do not 
offer attractive prospects. They are particularly compelling in the light 
of his deep knowledge and personal experience, including his courageous 
exposure of awful atrocities in Uzbekistan, which infuriated the British 
Foreign Office and the US embassy (the exposures, that is, not the 
atrocities) and cost him his diplomatic career, propelling him to a life of 
activism. Again, his reflections are reminiscent of Gramsci’s observations 
from Mussolini’s prison cells on the current scene of his day.
The ‘morbid symptoms’ are surely real enough, but I still feel that 
the prospects are not as grim as his portrayal suggests: in part, because 
I think his account underestimates the civilising effect of the activism of 
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the 60s – the famous ‘time of troubles’ in elite perception – and its conse-
quences to the present.
One illustration is opposition to aggression. In remarks earlier 
(pp. 5–6), I described briefly the context in which my 1966 talk on RI 
was given at Harvard, in one of the outposts of liberalism and higher 
education in the US. It took many years of intense effort, briefly 
mentioned above (pp. 5–6) – talks, meetings, demonstrations, protests, 
resistance – to bring about the great changes in popular conscious-
ness that finally took place by late 1967, when major protests erupted 
against the US wars in Indochina. I might have added that by then 
South Vietnam, the main target of the attacks, was utterly devastated. 
In 1967 the highly respected and bitterly anti-Communist military 
historian and Indochina specialist Bernard Fall warned that ‘Vietnam as 
a cultural and historic entity … is threatened with extinction … [as] the 
countryside literally dies under the blows of the largest military machine 
ever unleashed on an area of this size’, referring primarily to South 
Vietnam where attacks were uninhibited by concerns about interna-
tional reaction. That was the state of the victims when the tide of public 
opinion began to turn significantly.
Let’s move on to the Reagan administration, which came into office 
in 1981. Its highest international priority was to escalate the US wars in 
Central America. The process began by duplicating closely Kennedy’s 
steps 20 years earlier when he escalated the Vietnam War: a White Paper 
denouncing Communist crimes, a major propaganda campaign about 
international terrorism directed by the standard enemies, etc. The popular 
reaction was immediate. The White Paper was quickly exposed as a fraud 
and there were major protests – right away, not six years later. Reagan 
backed off and instead launched a campaign of international terrorism 
throughout the region, relying on clandestine operations and a network 
of compliant states to support local state terror: Taiwan, Israel, Argentine 
neo-Nazis (until the overthrow of the military junta in 1983). The 
consequences were horrendous enough, but nothing like the saturation 
bombing of heavily populated areas by B-52s, massive chemical warfare 
and the other atrocities of Vietnam, then all of Indochina.
There is more, of considerable importance. For the first time in 
history, to my knowledge, citizens of the aggressor not only protested 
the crimes, but went to live with the victims, often in endangered 
areas, both to lend assistance and to provide whatever protection is 
afforded by a white face. In substantial numbers. No one ever thought 
of going to live in a Vietnamese village. They were coming mostly from 
middle America, often church groups. I well remember giving talks and 
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attending meetings in the rural south and midwest where people had 
intimate knowledge of Central America from direct experience, their 
own and friends and families. And many stayed on. Unsung, of course. 
But quite real.
Fast forward to 2003, when the US and UK invaded Iraq, the 
worst crime of this century. For the first time in history, there were huge 
protests against imperial aggression even before the attack was officially 
launched. Again, the consequences have been horrendous, but nothing 
like what they would have been had the aggressors been free to use 
Vietnam tactics for years. Contrary to common claims, the protests were 
a success, limited and bitter but real.
The differences over the years reflect the growing awareness and 
opposition to imperial aggression and terror, one of many significant 
changes in western culture since the 1960s – nowhere near enough, that 
much is surely clear, but not insignificant either.
We see the same in other domains. Murray brings up Daniel 
Bethlehem’s ‘opinion on the legality of drone strikes which is, to say the 
least, controversial’ – to put it mildly. In the early 1960s, the resort to 
drone warfare would scarcely have been noticed. Even when Kennedy 
sent the US Air Force to bomb the South Vietnamese countryside the 
fact was barely mentioned in the press and protest was undetectable. 
Speaking personally, the most I was able to do in the early 60s was give 
talks in someone’s living room or a virtually empty church. Efforts to 
organise public protests in the Boston area (usually at MIT) had to bring 
together half-a-dozen issues to include Kennedy’s escalation in Vietnam.
Today it is very different. There were immediate large-scale protests 
against the drone assassination programme, including books and even 
law school articles concluding that the use of combat drones ‘appears 
to fall far short of meeting the international law rules governing resort 
to armed force and the conduct of armed force’.24 There was nothing 
comparable regarding the vastly worse war crimes that threatened 
‘Vietnam as a cultural and historic entity … with extinction.’
We might remember as well that as late as the 1960s, the most 
prominent scholars assured us that when Columbus discovered America 
(in the terminology of the day), there were only about one million people 
in the hemisphere, most of which was wild and uncultivated, particularly 
North America. The figure is off by about 80 million, so it was discovered 
when the doctrinal walls crumbled. There were advanced civilisations, 
large cities, sophisticated agricultural projects, extensive commerce – 
destroyed with particular savagery by British invaders in North America. 
The perpetrators knew well what they were doing, but it is only recently 
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that their words have reached beyond arcane scholarship. For example, 
the words of General Henry Knox, the first Secretary of War in the newly 
liberated American colonies, who described ‘the utter extirpation of 
all the Indians in most populous parts of the Union [by means] more 
destructive to the Indian natives than the conduct of the conquerors 
of Mexico and Peru’, and warned that ‘a future historian may mark the 
causes of this destruction of the human race in sable colors’. That did 
begin to happen by the 1970s, thanks to 60s activism. There had been 
some earlier efforts, notably Helen Hunt Jackson’s outstanding study 
A Century of Dishonor (1881), ignored or ridiculed, finally reprinted in 
1964 (2,000 copies) as the time of troubles began to gain force, now 
finally recognised as a classic.
In the 1960s, I doubt that a prominent British historian would have 
written in the Times Literary Supplement that ‘it looks almost plausible’ 
that when the facts are in, ‘the rulers of the British Empire will … be 
perceived to rank with the dictators of the twentieth century as the 
authors of crimes against humanity on an infamous scale’.25 
What we were in fact reading at the time, from the liberal extreme 
of mainstream commentary – the highly regarded liberal columnist of the 
New York Times, James Reston – was that the US was acting in Indochina 
‘on the principle that military power shall not compel South Vietnam 
to do what it does not want to do’, out of our loyalty to ‘the deepest 
conviction of Western civilization’, namely, that ‘the individual belongs 
not to the state but to his Creator’ and thus has rights that ‘no magistrate 
or political force may violate’.26
This was November 1967, well after the Pentagon demonstrations 
and the rising resistance movements revealed that anti-war sentiment 
had gained real traction among the unwashed masses, if not the liberal 
intellectual elite.
It would be all too easy to continue with the useful exercise of 
recalling what media commentary was like before the ‘time of troubles’ 
had its impact.
The same is true on many other issues. Until the late 1960s, the 
US had anti-miscegenation laws so severe that the Nazis, searching for 
precedents, considered US laws but rejected their severity. We may also 
recall that Britain murdered one of the greatest mathematicians of the 
century, Alan Turing, also a war hero who helped break German codes, 
while seeking to cure him of the disease of homosexuality (though he did 
receive a Royal Pardon for the crime – in 2013). On women’s rights, the 
progress has been radical. Same in many other areas – not enough to be 
sure, with plenty of challenges ahead, but we should also recognise that 
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dedicated activism has had real effects, and there’s no reason to think 
that those days have ended.
By the 1970s, there was a harsh reaction to the civilising impact of 
the activism of the 60s – in the eyes of liberal internationalist elites, the 
‘crisis of democracy’ that led to ‘the challenging of authority, and 
the unmasking and delegitimation of established institutions’, even 
those  institutions responsible for ‘the indoctrination of the young’, a 
dangerous assault led by ‘wild men in the wings’. The neoliberal reaction 
that took off with Reagan and Thatcher has quite definitely contributed 
to the undermining of academic life that Murray describes, imposing a 
stultifying business model on universities with a proliferation of admin-
istrators and demands for ‘commercially viable knowledge it can pass 
to the corporate sector’, a radical increase in tuition fees that has no 
economic justification, attacks on tenure and all the rest.
All true, but at the same time there has also been liberation from 
stultifying doctrine, along with quite effective ‘unmasking and delegiti-
mation’ of what not long ago were virtually sacred dogmas. I don’t quite 
agree with Murray’s judgement that faculty today organising 1967-style 
teach-ins ‘would have their careers substantially damaged’ (p. 72), at 
least not because of the substance of their activities and concerns – 
though they might suffer from the more general maladies of the imposed 
business models and the shaping of career choices.
And though I understand and sympathise with the perceptions, 
I’m not persuaded that ‘as a general rule, the responsibility of intel-
lectuals to tell the truth has been well and truly abdicated’. It seems to 
me that horizons have been considerably broadened and that free and 
independent thought and inquiry have made significant gains, not as a 
gift from above but, as always, thanks to dedicated efforts – the kind of 
efforts of which Craig Murray provides an honourable model.
Appendix
I’ve skipped Chris Knight’s contribution, which has no place in a serious 
discussion of ‘RoI’, except, perhaps, as an indication of how some intel-
lectuals perceive their responsibility. With considerable distaste, I’ll go 
through some of its highlights.
Knight’s essay is another exercise in an intensive campaign he has 
been waging for several years to establish the thesis that I concocted some 
exotic form of linguistics, unique in history, to assuage my guilt for my 
work for the US military machine at ‘the heart of the empire’ – in his words, 
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my design of approaches to language that are ‘so asocial, apolitical and 
devoid of practical application that I can only assume Chomsky favoured 
them to keep his conscience clear: he needed them to ensure that his 
militarily funded linguistics couldn’t possibly have any military use’.27
As he amplifies here, despite what he sees as Chomsky’s ‘heartfelt 
regrets’ at not having involved himself in anti-war activities in 1950 or 
1955, this tormented creature was
determined to continue his linguistics research at MIT. But from 
this point on [1965], he felt morally impelled to clarify that his 
work was restricted to pure science. His linguistic theories had 
always been highly abstract but he now needed to stress that if 
his military sponsors found his models to be unworkable, that did 
not bother him at all. He would press on with models of language 
so utterly abstract and ideal – so completely removed from social 
usage, communication or any kind of technological application  – 
that they were never likely to work for weapons ‘command and 
control’ or indeed for any other military purpose. (p. 61)
Let’s take this apart step by step. First, just who devoted themselves to 
work against the Vietnam War in the early 1950s? Answer, essentially 
no one. My ‘heartfelt regrets’ were over my failure to depart from the 
universal norm. And what happened in 1965? Knight knows very well. In 
1965 I expanded my anti-war activities from giving talks and organising 
meetings to direct resistance, initiatives based right at the ‘heart of 
empire’, at a time when even in liberal Boston support for the war was 
so extreme that it was scarcely possible even to organise public events 
without violent disruption (see pp. 5–6). And I moved very soon on to 
more direct resistance, as discussed earlier.
So, yes, I was determined to continue my work in a lively and 
flourishing research environment that also happened to be the main 
academic centre of anti-war activism. So were the rest of the malefactors 
in the den of iniquity.
Let’s turn then to his main thesis, which he elaborates extensively 
in the book of his to which he refers: my design of linguistic work ‘so 
asocial, apolitical and devoid of practical application’ that Knight ‘can 
only assume’ that I undertook it to make sure it could not be used for any 
military purpose.
For several years, I avoided responding to Knight’s charges, but 
when they appeared (twice) in a widely read journal, I did respond,28 
pointing out that his charges are instantly refuted by the fact that I 
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had been doing this work for years before I had any thought of an 
appointment at ‘the heart of the empire’, in fact, as an undergraduate at 
the University of Pennsylvania in the 1940s and then in graduate work at 
Harvard in the early 1950s.29 And that I simply carried the work further 
after my appointment at MIT in 1955. End of story, at least in a universe 
where facts matter.
Knight’s response to this total refutation of his primary thesis was 
to evade it and amplify the charges – see note 28 – proceeding to do so 
again here. He could hardly be more explicit in informing us about the 
true nature of the campaign he is conducting.
Since that refutation was more than enough, I did not go on to point 
out what is obvious to anyone with the slightest familiarity with the study 
of language. But since he amplifies the refuted claim here, perhaps a few 
words are in order.
The approach that is so ‘asocial, apolitical and devoid of practical 
application’ that it must have been devised to avoid exploitation by the 
US military has been the core of the inquiry into language for millennia, 
since classical Greece and India, through the medieval Arab and Hebrew 
grammarians (whom I happened to be studying at U. Penn when I began 
this work), on to the rich tradition of ‘rational and universal grammar’ 
founded in the seventeenth century, including the great achievements of 
comparative and historical Indo-European grammar, and then twentieth-
century structural and anthropological linguistics. And the approach 
has been adopted without question for very good reasons. It was always 
understood that the task posed by Aristotle of discovering the relation of 
sound and meaning poses some of the deepest problems of science and 
the humanities: to discover the uniquely human capacity to construct 
in our minds an unbounded array of thoughts that are used in creative 
and innovative ways, sometimes externalised in sound or some other 
medium, the core of our cognitive nature, with no analogue elsewhere in 
the organic world.
These are matters that I discussed extensively from the early 60s 
at the ‘heart of the empire’ while studying precedents for contemporary 
generative grammar, which addresses these tasks directly.30
Furthermore, simple logic suffices to show that the traditional 
concerns, pursued further in the contemporary work that Knight finds 
incomprehensible, are also the prerequisite for any serious investigation 
of the social, political and practical applications of language to which he 
confines his interests. All of this has of course been well understood by 
the great anthropological linguists, Boas, Sapir and others, as is evident 
from their linguistic work.
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So much for Knight’s primary thesis.
In his present amplification of his thesis, Knight focuses on my 
malevolent contributions to the imperial military machine, so let’s have 
a look at these.
Knight’s pièce de résistance is my consultantship at the MITRE 
Corporation, which brought me ‘dangerously close to direct collusion 
with the US military’. MITRE does in fact do military work along 
with much else; it is, for example, famous for its early work on global 
warming, brought to high levels of the US government in 1979 by the 
leader of the project, conscientious objector and Vietnam War protestor 
Gordon MacDonald.31 In the early 60s it also had a small language 
project, where several MIT linguistics students were able to obtain 
summer jobs. Knight carried out extensive interviews with them in his 
effort to try to establish my involvement in US militarism, and that of our 
MIT programme in linguistics more generally. And he is kind enough to 
cite what he discovered (p. 69, note 31). If we take the trouble to look at 
the interviews he cites, we instantly discover that they flatly refute all of 
his claims.
From what he calls ‘the most informative’ of his interviews, Knight 
learned that ‘Chomsky definitely did come out and consult with us at 
least once’ (since the students were unable to come to my office for 
their regular appointments), to discuss some technical problems of 
linguistics (in particular, about adjunction). ‘We had total freedom. 
Everybody could choose their own topic [but] dear Don [the linguist 
head of the project] realized that he’d have to get us to work collectively 
on producing a grammar and a parser [that is, standard linguistics, 
everywhere] in order to convince the generals that it was valuable to hire 
us …’, though we made it clear that any imaginable military application 
would be far in the remote future.
Others added that ‘I must also say that I never had any whiff of 
military work at MITRE. Maybe we had to wear badges, I have no recol-
lection of that, but what we talked about had nothing at all to do with 
command and control or Air Force or anything similar. Our talk was 
about syntax and confusions about semantics … I do not recall any time 
when [Chomsky] was cooperating with the Air Force on anything related 
to the US war effort anywhere … From the viewpoint of the grad students 
who were [at MITRE], it was an interesting and well paid adventure. We 
were given total freedom’ … We ‘had a lot of interesting conversations 
with Noam. But they were all about linguistics’. Another said that though 
I never talked politics in my linguistics classes, students did learn about 
my attitudes (with astonishment, because they were so rare in those 
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days), and he ‘became an anti-Vietnam protestor’. At MITRE, he added, it 
was ‘colonels we had to impress, not generals’.
Knight does mention one of these high officers they had to impress, 
the man he calls ‘Colonel Jay Keyser’ – in the real world, Lieutenant 
Samuel Jay Keyser, well known to linguists, who had joined the Reserve 
Officers Training Corps (ROTC) in 1952, a standard alternative to the 
draft for students. Knight avoids telling us how the insidious ‘Colonel 
Keyser’32 was instructing his troops while he was working at MITRE, 
though he knows the answers from his interviews: Keyser was working 
‘on Old English metrics’ – more accurately on Chaucer, continuing the 
studies of Middle English for which he is well known in the field.
Keyser told Knight that he could not recall any discussions about 
‘taking military funding [which was] how the government supported 
higher education back then’. In fact, as is familiar, in those years 
US industrial and educational policy was largely funded under the 
general rubric of ‘defence’, including the great expansion of institu-
tions of higher education; development of computers, the internet and 
indeed the basis for most of today’s high-tech economy; the national 
interstate highway system (formally, the ‘National System of Interstate 
and Defense Highways’); and much else. The pretext was so thin that by 
1970, when public concern was growing, Congress passed laws limiting 
military funding to research with some potential relationship to military 
functions, while still permitting rather lax application.33
As much of the public was coming to understand by the late 60s, 
the process of funding economic development and university expansion 
under a defence pretext raises many serious questions about functioning 
democracy, questions that many of us had been raising for years but that 
are of no interest to Knight, who ignores them completely, even after all 
of this has been patiently explained to him.
That was my consultancy at MITRE, my main contribution to 
the military machine, which ‘was bringing [me] dangerously close to 
direct collusion with the US military’ – an ‘involvement with the MITRE 
Corporation’ to which I never ‘made any reference’ in my writings. What 
a strange evasion.
The tale continues. On departing from my (non-existent) 
consultancy for the military machine at MITRE, Knight reports, I ‘became 
an adviser to MIT’s anti-Vietnam War committee, although such activism 
only ever involved what [Chomsky] calls “a very small group of faculty”’, 
underscoring its insignificance.
Decoding this concoction, the ‘very small group of faculty’ 
was not an anti-Vietnam War committee but rather the Boston Area 
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Faculty Group on Public Issues (BAFGOPI), centred at MIT, as most 
regional peace activism was (see pp. 114–5), at the outset devoted 
to disarmament  issues. I did not become ‘an adviser’, and in fact had 
joined it years earlier, as soon as it was founded by my close friend 
and fellow activist biologist (Nobel laureate) Salvador Luria. And it 
was indeed small, as one would expect of a regional faculty peace 
group, and as is surely true of others (if there were any like it at the 
time; not to my knowledge). Its activism extended to many protests it 
organised nationwide. But the major anti-war activism on campus was 
not BAFGOPI, but what I described earlier (pp. 5–6).
Let us put these fantasies aside and turn to the den of iniquity 
itself: the Research Lab of Electronics (RLE) in the famous Building 
20, well known as a rich and lively interdisciplinary centre from which 
several departments developed – linguistics, philosophy, psychology and 
others – as MIT was making the transition from an engineering school 
to a science-based university with distinguished departments in the 
humanities and social sciences. RLE housed a small project on machine 
translation (MT), to which I was appointed in 1955, along with several 
other linguists. Following his consistent practice, Knight once again scru-
pulously ignores what is plainly the most relevant evidence relating to his 
charges: what were they actually doing? So I will fill in the gaps.
The project was headed by physicist Victor Yngve, who was 
genuinely interested in MT, as was a regular visitor, Israeli philosopher-
logician Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, who published widely on the topic. Neither 
had a thought of any military application, nor did anyone else on the 
project, and in retrospect, it is uncontroversial that there never was any.
Knight concedes that I had no interest in MT; rather, I continued the 
work I had been doing since my undergraduate years. The other linguists 
on the project were GH Matthews (working on the first large-scale 
generative grammar, of the Amerindian language Hidatsa), RB Lees 
(studying Turkish nominalisations, his PhD dissertation, the first in our 
programme) and F Lukoff (grammar of Korean). All of us were also 
continuing our work on linguistic theory and the structure of English. 
Several of us also worked closely with the other linguist at RLE, Morris 
Halle, who was pursuing his investigations of acoustic phonetics and 
Russian phonology, often in collaboration with Roman Jakobson, who 
came to MIT after retiring from Harvard in 1967. In the early 60s, 
we were joined by John Viertel, who was engaged in translation and 
analysis of classic work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, and shortly after 
by the remarkable linguist and cultural anthropologist Kenneth Hale, 
under whose leadership our programme became a leading international 
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centre for the study of Australian, Native American and other indigenous 
languages, along with work on indigenous land rights, establishing 
cultural centres, bringing students from indigenous communities to study 
at MIT, etc. Other faculty also joined, working on a wide range of similar 
topics, as can easily be determined by the publications that Knight avoids.
Military significance? Zero. Social and political consequences? 
Actually quite a lot. Small wonder that Knight ignores it all, just as he 
completely evades the fact, discussed earlier, that RLE, along with MIT 
generally, was the regional centre of Vietnam War protest and, from 1965, 
direct resistance (academics among the founders and board members of 
the national organisation RESIST, for example, were primarily from MIT, 
particularly RLE).
The pattern continues, sometimes with deceit so petty that one can 
only gasp in disbelief. Take for example his discussion of the important issue 
of the two military labs that were formally administered by MIT, though 
separate from the academic programme. As discussed at the conference 
(pp. 115–6), as activism developed in the late 60s, two positions emerged 
on how to deal with the labs: roughly, the ‘left-wing position’ (me and a 
few others) that the formal relation should be maintained, for the reasons 
discussed at the conference; and the ‘right-wing position’ that they should 
be formally separated – Knight’s position.34
In his heroic effort to confuse the issue, Knight reports (page 67, 
note 7) that ‘Chomsky was well aware of what was going on at his 
university. As he said, “I’m at MIT, so I’m always talking to the scientists 
who work on missiles for the Pentagon.” Or again: “There was extensive 
weapons research on the MIT campus. … In fact, a good deal of the 
[nuclear] missile guidance technology was developed right on the MIT 
campus and in laboratories run by the university”’.
Damning no doubt, until we check his source and once again find 
carefully contrived deceit. The taped conversation that he unearthed 
with considerable effort is not about MIT itself, but about the military lab 
near the campus, the I-Lab (now Draper Laboratory). It was ‘run by the 
university’ in the manner I discussed: under joint administration, while 
entirely separate from the academic programme, where there was no 
classified work at all. The phrase ‘MIT campus’ is used here informally, 
as was standard, to include the military labs that were separate from the 
actual campus.
A major theme of Knight’s tale, here and in earlier publications, is 
that I was facing incredible pressures from the directors and inhabitants 
of the den of iniquity at the ‘heart of the empire’, and he praises me 
effusively for my courage in somehow managing to resist it while 
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contriving my exotic brand of linguistics to assuage my conscience for 
working for the American military machine.
He provides not a particle of evidence about the pressures, and, 
as usual, provides us with the refutation of his claims, this time in the 
actual text, not just in footnotes that we have to investigate to reveal 
the conscious deceit. By 1967, he writes, ‘MIT’s managers had given 
Chomsky a named professorship which, as he recalls, “isolated me from 
the alumni and government pressures”’. This was after I had – very 
publicly – moved from my active involvement in anti-war protest in 
earlier years to direct resistance – for which I was in fact facing a federal 
trial. Though of course one could not publicly go into detail on these 
matters, I did give some indication of the range of resistance activities 
in which I and others were involved in a 1967 essay (‘On Resistance’), 
reprinted in a collection that includes ‘RoI’ and others from the same 
time or before, and dedicated to ‘the brave young men who refuse to 
serve in a criminal war’.35
I could go on to detail how supportive ‘MIT’s managers’ were not 
only of me personally, but of the department generally, including all of 
us who were intensively engaged in political action, including very public 
resistance activities. Same throughout the Institute. Another pillar of 
Knight’s construction crumbles, this time on minimal inspection.36
There should be no need to proceed to dismantle further the web of 
deceit and misinformation that Knight spins, though at least a few words 
are necessary about the two individuals he specifically maligns, the 
two figures whose photos he selected to post. One is John Deutch, who 
‘brought biological warfare research to the university in the 1980s’, and 
may have even gone ‘so far as to pressure junior faculty into performing 
this research “on campus”’37. Very serious charges, certainly. Checking 
Knight’s footnote, we find that his sole source is an unsourced statement 
in an underground newspaper that he mis-describes as ‘the student 
newspaper.’ More impressive scholarship.
His second example, Jerome Wiesner, is far more important. 
Wiesner was director of RLE, then became John F. Kennedy’s science 
adviser, then returned to MIT as provost and later president. So he was 
my ‘boss’ for several decades, Knight declares. Knight seems to know 
as little about research institutions and universities as, it seems, about 
political activism. The director of a lab, or the provost and president of 
a university, is not the ‘boss’ of anyone. That’s not how the institutions 
work. There should be no need to elaborate.
Once again, Knight’s footnotes provide ample material to flatly 
refute the defamatory tale he spins of a leading warmonger.
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Opening Knight’s primary source on Wiesner,38 we discover a 
highly knowledgeable account of his actual activities both at MIT and in 
the government – an account from the left, by physicist Philip Morrison, 
a McCarthy target who was forced to curtail his non-academic activities39 
and then came to MIT, where he was free to pursue them. Morrison 
describes Wiesner as
one of MIT’s most effective reforming presidents. The years of his 
presidency yielded lasting student diversity (women now comprise 
more than 40 percent of undergraduates [there were virtually 
none before]) and a widened range of opportunities for creative 
teaching and research, reaching the arts, spanning the humanities, 
and including the serious study of science and technology in their 
relation to society.40
Morrison also reviews Wiesner’s leading role, while in the government, 
in bringing about the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which ‘stopped the rapid 
and disastrous trend while levels [of fallout] were still tolerable’, though 
it did not ‘end the arms race – as Jerry, I, and others had hoped’.41 The 
same source, which Knight was again kind enough to cite, provides 
ample evidence of Wiesner’s initiatives on disarmament and arms control 
from the 50s and, as Kennedy’s science adviser, and on to later years, all 
work for which he is quite well known.
And all ignored by Knight, who instead concocts a fairy tale 
about Wiesner’s role in creating the missile gap. In fact, Wiesner’s 
role was so  slight that he is not even mentioned in authoritative 
insider accounts of the missile gap.42 He was one of the scientists who 
investigated Air Force  intelligence that did indeed indicate that there 
was a  missile gap. But – crucially – he was the first to bring to the 
attention of Defence Secretary Robert McNamara that the intelligence 
was  flawed,  leading McNamara to recognise that ‘There is no missile 
gap’.43
To support his charges, Knight cites Wiesner’s report to incoming 
President Kennedy on 10 January 1961, in which he reviewed the 
consensus of all of the scientists that there was a missile gap, also calling 
for peaceful exploration of space. But the actual facts, mentioned above, 
he totally conceals. Again, Knight’s prize charge collapses as soon as we 
look at his own sources.
Knight posts a photo he found of Wiesner in 1961, when he 
was Kennedy’s science adviser, standing next to Defence Secretary 
McNamara, the implication being ‘you know what that means’. And, 
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revealingly, he omits Wiesner’s crucial communication to McNamara 
explaining that there was no missile gap, his one significant contribution 
on this matter.
What is striking is the unfailing regularity with which Knight’s 
vulgar exercises of defamation crash to the ground on a moment’s inquiry, 
typically into the sources he provides. I can only assume that Knight 
provided these extensive sources in a show of scholarship, assuming that 
few would actually look into them. What precedes illustrates the pattern 
very clearly.
So it continues, paragraph after paragraph. It is unpleasant to 
permit the defamation and deceit to stand without comment. But 
perhaps this is enough to reveal the character of what Knight is doing. 
If any reader is interested in what I’ve put to the side here, I’ll be glad to 
discuss it. And meanwhile I apologise for wasting time and space on this 
performance.
A detailed reply entitled ‘My Response to Chomsky’s Extraordinary 
Accusations’ is available on Chris Knight’s website,  www.scienceandrevo 
lution.org
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Conference Q&A
Noam Chomsky
This question-and-answer session is from the conference held at UCL 
on 25 February 2017, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the 
publication of ‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’.
CHAIR (CHRIS KNIGHT): Could you comment on the responsibility of 
intellectuals in the light of Donald Trump and the contemporary political 
scene?
NOAM CHOMSKY: Well the problems are the same, and pretty much 
have been ever since the term ‘intellectual’ came to be used in its contem-
porary sense. About the time of the Dreyfus trial, there was a small group 
of Dreyfusards who defended Dreyfus. Émile Zola was the most famous. 
As usual, they were bitterly condemned by the intellectual elites, by the 
great figures of the Académie Française and by others. How dare these 
writers and journalists condemn the great institutions of our society – the 
state, the army! Émile Zola had to in fact flee France to avoid prosecution. 
That’s the pretty general story.
A couple of years later came the First World War. When the war broke out, 
on all sides intellectuals enthusiastically supported the war effort of their 
own country. The famous declaration of, I think, about 90 leading German 
intellectuals explaining to the intellectual community of the world the 
nobility of the course that Germany was following, citing great figures – 
Kant, Beethoven, and so on. Same in every other country. In England and 
the United States, the intellectuals enthusiastically rallied to the cause.
In the United States, the most enthusiastic supporters were the 
liberal intellectuals of the John Dewey circles. To his credit, I should say, 
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Dewey years later did change his position but at that time, again enthu-
siastic support for the war. Woodrow Wilson had won the election in 
1916 on the slogan of ‘Peace without victory,’ but immediately dedicated 
himself to victory without peace, and it was necessary to carry out a 
huge propaganda campaign to drive a basically pacifist population to 
war fever. And the intellectuals were in the lead championing the cause 
of war. Dewey and others wrote at the time that this is the first time in 
history in the United States that a war had been called not by militarists 
and business circles but by the leading thinkers in the country who 
had made a deliberate, careful decision that this was the most rational 
direction to pursue and so on.
There were dissidents. So Bertrand Russell in England, Karl 
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in Germany, Eugene Debs in the United 
States. They were in jail. Randolph Bourne, another anti-war intellectual, 
wasn’t actually jailed in the United States but he was excluded from the 
liberal journals. That’s the general pattern. It goes on right up through 
much of history. We can go back further, go back to classical Greece. 
The person who drank the hemlock was the one who was corrupting the 
youth of Athens by asking too many questions. And that’s pretty much 
the standard throughout history and that remains the case now, but to a 
lesser extent actually.
It’s important to recognise that the activism of the 1960s did have 
a civilising effect on society in many respects. A lot of institutional 
regression, but cultural progress. And by now the status and ability 
of dissidents to reach a broader audience has indeed improved from 
what it was in the early 1960s, the mid 1960s and back through history, 
though it still remains pretty marginal now. Donald Trump himself is 
kind of carrying out a very carefully calculated war against what are 
called the liberal media. As you probably heard, he excluded the New 
York Times and CNN from the latest press conference. The Washington 
Post – the other national newspaper – in protest refused to even send a 
reporter.
This is all throwing red meat to his constituency, trying to keep 
them fired up with the idea that they’re somehow under attack by liberal 
elites, while he himself and his administration are slavishly following 
the demands of extreme wealth and power and organising programmes 
that will be extremely harmful to their own constituency and indeed to 
much of the country and the world. So in that context, the role of intel-
lectuals, of people who are in a position to articulate publicly a position 
and point of view, of course that changes. But fundamentally, I think this 
picture runs pretty much through history – deviations here and there, 
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changes in many ways, relaxation in more recent years, largely the result 
of the civilising effect of the 1960s which was considerable.
CHAIR: You have recently said that Donald Trump’s tearing up of 
the climate science agreements may be ‘the death knell of the human 
species’. In that context, what do you think is the responsibility of the 
climate scientists around the world who know very well what horrendous 
dangers are involved in reaching a tipping point with global warming, 
perhaps at some point even the possibility of the Amazon rainforest 
catching fire and the whole planet becoming pretty much uninhabitable. 
What is the responsibility of scientists? Should they get self-organised 
and resist?
NOAM CHOMSKY: There had been of course Pugwash, which was 
concerned with nuclear weapons. That goes back to the early days of 
the nuclear age. But in general scientists had been pretty passive and 
quiet. Starting in the late 1960s, mainly, in fact at first at MIT and then 
elsewhere, organisations of scientists did form which became more 
active in the general public domain, trying to reach the public with 
important issues of scientific significance.
The main one, the Union of Concerned Scientists, was the direct 
outgrowth of the protests at MIT, student and faculty protests in 1968/69. 
And climate scientists understood by the early 1970s that we were facing 
a pretty serious problem. In fact I can remember very well, back in the 
early 1970s, being told privately by two personal friends – one of them 
the head of earth sciences at Harvard, the other the head of meteorology 
at MIT – that recent information that they’d got was pretty dire. That 
was the early 1970s. By the 1980s there were the beginnings of more 
organised protest, by now quite a lot. And climate scientists, and in fact 
scientists generally, certainly have a responsibility to make the public 
aware as much as they can of the significance of scientific results. But it’s 
not just their responsibility. It’s everybody’s responsibility. We are now 
facing a real existential crisis. The possibility that organised human life 
may continue on anything like the scale that we now know is very much 
threatened.
Maybe people think that there’s a refugee problem now. That’s 
nothing like what it’ll be when, say, the sea level rises enough so that 
the coastal plains of Bangladesh will be flooded and tens of millions, if 
not hundreds of millions of people will be fleeing. The glaciers in the 
Himalayas may melt and threaten the water supply of South Asia. It 
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could be a horrendous outcome – even possibly a nuclear war arising 
between two nuclear-armed states who’ll be struggling to control their 
diminishing water supplies.
The effects of climate change have already been playing quite a 
significant role in exacerbating some of the major conflicts in the world. 
The atrocities in Darfur were to a substantial extent a result of the extreme 
drought which was driving nomadic groups into agricultural areas leading 
to major conflicts and the terribly atrocities there. Or take the Syrian war, 
one of the worst modern catastrophes. Part of the background was an 
unprecedented drought, not known for thousands of years of history, 
which simply decimated Syrian agriculture growth, drove peasants into 
urban slums, set the basis for tension and conflict, which erupted when 
the flame was lit, and this is going to happen more and more. Meanwhile, 
coastal cities are threatened, the effects of the environmental changes are 
going to be drastic, and not in the far distance.
So what’s the responsibility of everyone? Well, to try to avert this 
catastrophe. We know of ways to mitigate it, maybe reverse it, and some 
steps are being taken, nowhere near enough, but at least some. However, 
there is an extremely serious danger. Let’s go back to 8 November, when 
several important events took place.
One was not only the election of Donald Trump but the takeover of 
all three branches of government by the Republican Party, which I have 
called – and I will repeat – the most dangerous organisation in human 
history, and I think that’s regarded as an outrageous statement but it is 
in fact quite accurate. They are dedicated to racing as quickly as possible 
towards the precipice. And there was a second event on 8 November, 
more important than the election I think.
There was an international UN-sponsored conference, COP22, 
in Marrakesh, Morocco. Its mission was to try to put some teeth into 
the Paris negotiations of a year earlier, COP21. The Paris negotiations 
had not been able to a reach a verifiable treaty, for a simple reason: 
the Republican Congress would not approve it, so it therefore was left 
with voluntary agreements. COP22 in Morocco was going to try to 
spell out the results. The conference proceeded until 8 November. On 
8 November the conference pretty much stopped, and the rest of it was 
devoted to trying to face the fact that the most powerful, wealthy country 
in world history was now withdrawing, formally, from the effort to try to 
deal with climate change.
That’s a huge problem for everyone – not just for Americans, but 
for everyone else. So the task that is faced is not simply for climate 
scientists  – their job is to present to the public the information that’s 
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available – but for everyone else to try to stop this race to disaster, which 
is not very far off in the distance.
QUESTIONER 1: Your idea of the doctrine of good intentions states 
that anything that the West engages in, in a military sense, is done 
from a position of a moral, noble stance, inherently. What would you 
recommend are the best methods of countering this kind of founda-
tional propaganda that provides, in effect, moral cover for extreme and 
horrendous crimes?
NOAM CHOMSKY: To qualify slightly, it’s not just the West. It’s every 
powerful force in history. So take, say, Japan during its conquests in 
mainland Asia and east Asia in the 1930s and the 1940s. The Japanese 
were carrying out horrendous atrocities. The rape of Nanking, all sorts 
of massacres, torture and destruction. But we have internal documents 
from Japan, released by US intelligence back in the 1960s, which are 
their internal discussions of what they’re doing, not propaganda. And 
the rhetoric is so uplifting it brings tears to your eyes. They’re engaged 
in trying to bring about an ‘earthly paradise’ – that’s the phrase that 
was used – to protect the people of China from the Chinese bandits who 
were trying to prevent Japan from bringing its magnificent technological 
achievements and advances to the backward people of Asia, and so on. 
That’s fascist Japan.
When Hitler took over the Sudetenland, same story. He was going to 
end ethnic conflicts, bring to the people the benefits of superior German 
civilisation, and so on. In fact, I think it’d be hard to find a case in history 
when some powerful, dominant group did not construct an ideological 
framework to justify what it was doing as pure benevolence in the 
interests of the people who were being saved. And this is true, even of the 
most respected, advanced thinkers.
Take, say, John Stuart Mill. Hard to find a person in modern history 
who was more thoughtful, intelligent, progressive and so on. But read his 
article on intervention, famous article on intervention, which is actually 
taught in law schools and others. It’s considered an anti-interventionist 
article. But when you read it, it’s a little different. What he said is England 
is an unusual, a unique power. It’s kind of an angelic power, there’s been 
nothing like it in history. In fact England is so angelic that others don’t 
understand us. When we carry out our actions abroad, we are subjected 
to obloquy and continental commentators accuse us of base motives 
because they can’t appreciate how magnificent we are.
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He was focusing on India at the time. The question was should 
England intervene in India? And he gave measured arguments one way 
or another and finally concluded that even though we will be denounced 
for having base intentions by people who can’t understand our nobility, 
nevertheless we must intervene in India and continue the conquest of 
India. That was essentially the message.
Take a look at the time. It was 1859, right after the Indian uprising, 
called in England the ‘Indian mutiny’, which was suppressed with 
extreme violence and brutality by the British forces. It was not a secret 
matter, it was discussed openly in Parliament, and liberals like Richard 
Cobden bitterly condemned it, but mainly it was supported. And John 
Stuart Mill was a functionary of the East India Company, he knew exactly 
what was going on. The reason for the continued conquest of India was 
not to protect the barbarians and provide them with a superior civilisa-
tion, it was an effort to try and gain control of – if possible – a monopoly 
of the opium trade so that Britain could force its way into China. The 
Second Opium War was taking place by means of guns and drugs, the 
only method England had to break into China and compel them to take 
British manufactures.
Well, that was the context, and that’s one of the most impressive 
intellectual figures you can think of in the modern period. So it’s very 
broad, this phenomenon. How do you deal with it? By trying to expose it. 
By bringing out the actual facts. And to an extent that’s been done.
Go back to the 1960s again and take the case you mentioned, 
the conquest of the Americas. It was the general view in the 1960s – 
among scholars, incidentally, great anthropologists and others – that 
in the western hemisphere there were maybe a million people, hunter-
gatherers, straggling around a backward area and, first the Spanish, 
and then the English invaders – not invaders, liberators – were bringing 
 civilisation, order and progress to this fundamentally empty territory. 
It’s true that some of the people there suffered from it, but it was partly a 
result of their own savagery.
If you read the US Declaration of Independence, for example, 
written by Thomas Jefferson – again, one of the leading Enlightenment 
figures – one of the accusations, there was a litany of accusations 
against King George III, and one of them, recited piously every year on 
4 July, is that the King of England unleashed against us the merciless 
Indian savages whose known way of warfare is torture and violence – 
and of course we had to defend ourselves. Jefferson was right there 
on the scene. He knew perfectly well, at least in a corner of his mind, 
that it was the merciless English savages whose known way of warfare 
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was violence and brutality and were conquering and destroying the 
country.
That was pretty much the picture in the 1960s. If you took a course 
at a university that’s what you learned. In more recent years that’s been 
changed. Scholarship now recognises, and much of the public now 
understands, that the picture is radically false. There weren’t a million 
hunter-gatherers straggling around. There were maybe 80 million 
people with advanced civilisations, in many respects more advanced 
than Europe, complex agricultural developments, big cities, lots of trade 
between south and north, careful nurturing and control of what was 
called a wilderness and was anything but. And what actually happened 
was the worst genocide in human history, very quickly.
So consciousness has to a large extent been changed by a lot of 
activist work. It didn’t happen just by some miracle. There were some 
scholars, many activists, native Americans and many others who finally 
brought about a substantial – not complete – change in understanding.
And to go back to your question, that’s the way it has to be done on 
every single issue. And it’s pretty striking that in quite recent years there 
has been a real awakening on the two major crimes of the European colo-
nisation and British colonisation of the Americas: the virtual extermina-
tion of the indigenous populations and the most vicious system of slavery 
that was ever created – which is in fact the source of a lot of the wealth 
of Britain, the United States and, indirectly, the continent. Of course 
cotton was the fuel of the early industrial revolution and the hideous 
plantation system of the South, which was economically pretty efficient, 
was supplying this source of manufacturing, finance, commerce, retail, 
particularly in England and the United States but elsewhere as well.
This is beginning, finally, to be understood, and a lot of it is the 
work of intellectuals and much is the work of activists and organisers. 
People try to bring this kind of understanding to the general public, 
including the victims: Native Americans, black activists and others have 
always been quite prominent in trying to break through these ugly and 
disgraceful misinterpretations, and the same is true on other issues. So 
we know how to proceed, the question is organising the energy to be able 
to carry it out.
QUESTIONER 2 (JACKIE WALKER): You very kindly sent me a message 
of support because of the campaign of vilification that I’ve had in terms 
of being a supporter of Palestinian rights, and I thank you very much 
for doing that. I want to ask you about what I see as a real threat to our 
democracy, certainly in the UK, through a couple of things. One is the 
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monoculture and the laziness of our media, which tends to only tell one 
story, and one very controlled story, and the second is the apparently 
increasingly corrupt political system we have, where we only seem to 
have the choice given to us by the people who actually do the choosing of 
how we should live and what we should say.
NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, again, nothing new about this. I mentioned 
the reaction of the liberal Boston Globe to the first anti-war demonstra-
tions in the Boston area, and this is a pattern that goes through a long 
period of history. There are changes and modifications. The same is 
true of the political system. There’s a constant struggle to try to open up 
the institutions of the society, whether media or government, to more 
direct responsiveness to the needs and goals of the general population. 
Sometimes there are successes, sometimes there are failures, there’s 
regression and progress.
In the case of the political system, actually Britain is somewhat more 
progressive than the United States is. In Britain, it is possible to be a 
member of the Labour Party and to play some kind of role in the shaping 
of the positions and so on. In the United States there are no political 
parties of that kind. You can’t be a member of the Democratic Party, 
you can’t be a participant in setting up its positions and so on. The 
parties have evolved since the nineteenth century as basically candidate-
producing organisations in which you can push a lever once every four 
years. But the effort to create real, popular-based parties in which people 
create, construct the programmes and decisions – beginning on the local 
level all the way up – that’s a major task. And there is some progress in 
that respect.
So, one pretty striking development in the United States, just in the 
last election, was the remarkable achievements of the Bernie Sanders 
campaign. In the United States – not all that different from elsewhere but 
a more extreme case – elections are basically bought. Political scientists 
have shown you can predict the outcome of an election with remarkable 
precision simply by looking at campaign spending – and by the same 
factor, campaign spending is highly determinative of the policies that 
are pursued. Sanders broke this pattern for the first time in well over a 
century.
Here’s somebody, an unknown figure (a senator, but few people 
knew him), calling himself a socialist (which used to be a scare word 
in the United States; still is to a large extent), basically calling for New 
Deal policies, a big change from the neoliberal repression since Reagan 
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and Thatcher: no corporate funding, no business funding, no funding 
from the wealthy, no media support. He would have won the Democratic 
nomination if it hadn’t been for shenanigans internal to the party system. 
Among younger people, so-called millennials, he was overwhelmingly 
favoured.
This is a remarkable achievement, and it gives an indication of 
what can be done to develop authentic politics. As far as the media are 
concerned, it’s a complex story but in many ways I think the media are 
somewhat more open to critical and independent discussion than they 
were 40 or 50 years ago. On the other hand, there’s been a monopolisa-
tion and a narrowing of media sources, which goes in the other direction. 
But there are other forms of media available now, through the internet 
which gives an opportunity for many independent voices. And I think 
there are plenty of opportunities to pursue, to deal with the very real and 
significant questions and issues that you bring up.
QUESTIONER 3: Around the early 1990s we saw a sudden relaxation of 
the atmosphere after the Thatcher–Reagan stranglehold on any kind of 
thinking, when the intelligentsia moved – with a few notable exceptions 
of course – to the right and all the wonderful free radical spirits of the 
1960s and 1970s suddenly became born-again free marketeers. And I 
think that when Clinton arrived it captured the mood, although it took 
five years in the UK for the Labour Party to arrive, there was certainly a 
relaxation of the atmosphere, even if they still went around thumping 
Third World countries.
Now I see that there is a resurgence of that kind of feeling and it is 
worrying me very greatly in the sense that it’s perfectly alright to make 
prejudiced comments, to say something which is racist, anti-immigrant. 
And you can tell that this is not something that is true but it is sort of 
simply like a factoid is being created. And if we look to countries like 
India – a few countries where you thought that there was something 
like an independent democratic process – the legislators are trying to 
out-Trump Trump and saying if there are refugees then we won’t take 
them if they’re of a certain religion unless they meet certain criteria. 
So, wherever we look in the world, there is the right-wing being on the 
ascendancy in a very aggressive way. Where’s it all going to end, and why 
is it so hard to make liberal and progressive values stick?
NOAM CHOMSKY: Well first of all, I have a considerably less rosy 
view of the 1990s, both in England and the United States. Putting 
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that aside, you’re quite right that there is an outburst in much of the 
world now of extreme, very dangerous, far-right, racist, xenophobic 
and other tendencies. In many ways, I think it’s more threatening and 
dangerous  in  Europe, especially continental Europe, than it is in the 
United States. It’s bad enough in the United States, but take continental 
Europe:
In the last Austrian election, a figure who comes out of a neo-Nazi 
background came very close to winning the presidential election, 
missed by a hair. That’s Austria, where we have some memories about 
Nazism. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany, the right-wing 
alternative to the conservative Merkel government is gaining significant 
power, and we have some memories about Germany too. I’m old enough 
to remember listening to Hitler’s speeches over the radio in the 1930s, 
not understanding the words as a child, but couldn’t miss the thrust and 
the massive popular support, and so on. That’s threatening.
Take a look at France. The next election that’s coming in France 
will end up with two candidates: one, again an outgrowth of a neo-Nazi 
party, a neo-fascist party who has the most popularity in the country, 
the second was banned by the courts for various corruption charges. But 
assuming he runs, it’s xenophobic, ultra-conservative reactionary. Those 
are the two choices in France. India is pretty much the same, and yes 
there’s that phenomenon all over the world.
I think a lot of it can be traced back to the extremely harmful 
effects on most of the population of the world of the neoliberal policies 
that were in fact instituted, carried forward by Reagan and Thatcher and 
by their followers – that includes Clinton and Blair through the 1990s. 
And for much of the population this has been really harmful.
So, for example, in the United States, real wages for working 
people, in 2007, right before the crash – the peak of the so-called 
economic miracle – were lower than they were in 1979, literally lower 
than at the point when the neoliberal experiment began. Real wages 
for male workers in the United States are about in the 1960s. The black 
population has suffered immensely. About ten years ago, average wealth 
for the black population, which is pretty meagre, was about one tenth of 
the white population, now it’s about one twentieth. What wealth there 
was virtually wiped out by the 2008 recession.
Plenty of things like that happen all over. I think a lot of them can 
be traced to the effect of the neoliberal policies that were instituted 
beginning, a little bit in the late 1970s, taking off under Reagan, 
Thatcher and others around the world. The so-called Washington 
Consensus imposed on much of the Third World was devastating. Latin 
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America lost decades of growth and development. But there is a reaction 
to it, there’s a strong reaction and it’s not just on the right. There’s a 
progressive reaction too. So Podemos in Spain, the Sanders phenomenon 
in the United States, others elsewhere. Varoufakis’ DiEM25 movement 
in continental Europe. These things exist and I think they’re quite 
significant and have some hope for the future. The same is happening in 
India. It’s a battle, a constant struggle all through history, ebbs and flows, 
forward and backward. And overall, in time, I think, to borrow Martin 
Luther King’s famous phrase, ‘the moral arc of history does somewhat 
bend towards justice’, but not by itself. Only when it’s pushed in that 
direction by dedicated, committed effort. And I think that’s true right 
now, as it always has been.
QUESTIONER 4: This question is about your concept from five decades 
ago – ‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’ – by which you meant respon-
sibility to the public good. And that seminal article has generated crucial 
debate over these five decades on how this should be done, and how it 
isn’t done, how intellectuals in many cases are silenced by fear or even 
corrupted by rewards.
But responsibility has just the opposite meaning as well. Earlier today we 
heard a talk about how MIT academics initiated the proposal for whole 
new weapons systems, supposedly in the name of defence, and somehow 
persuaded the Pentagon to spend enormous amounts of money on this 
with them as the chief experts, even contrary to the advice of military 
leaders. And this seems to be an extreme case of an insight you brought, 
namely that intellectuals identify with state power, especially with an 
oppressive state power. And earlier in your talk today you gave examples 
throughout history of how intellectuals not only identified with the 
problems of the powerful, but creatively expanded on those problems, 
in order to provide ambitious, creative solutions with them as the chief 
experts. So there’s an impulse to become close to power, which is about 
something more than simply material rewards.
So I want to ask a question from your long experience of being 
both close and distant to such people who have served power, especially 
through systems of mass murder, since you got to know some of these 
people over several decades, what is the source of intellectuals’ vicarious 
identification with oppressive power? What drives this identification and 
how can we draw on those insights to undermine such impulses to serve 
an oppressive power?
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NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, as you mentioned and as I kind of indicated, 
there’s a long history of this, going back as far as we’d like to go. I 
mentioned classical Greece. I could mention the Biblical record at 
roughly the same time.
There were in the Biblical record a group of people who we call 
‘prophets’. It’s actually a dubious translation of an obscure Hebrew 
word, it didn’t have much to do with prophesying. What were they 
saying? These were people giving critical geopolitical analysis, warning 
that the actions of the King were going to lead to disaster. They were 
calling for mercy for widows and orphans. They were pretty much what 
we would nowadays call dissident intellectuals in many respects. How 
were they treated? They were imprisoned, driven into the desert. The 
prophet Elijah was brought to King Ahab, the most vicious of the kings. 
The King denounced him as a hater of Israel because he was criticising 
the acts of the evil King. There were others at the same time who, 
centuries later, were called false prophets. They were the flatterers of 
the court. They were the privileged group, the ones who had access 
to power and privilege, wealth and so on. Many centuries later, the 
values were reversed. You honour the prophets, you condemn the false 
prophets. But that’s centuries later.
Well that pattern, both in the Biblical record and classical Greece, 
goes right through history. I gave modern examples, and it’s not hard 
to think of the reasons. I mean, if you’re a scientist or a professor at a 
university or a student or a lawyer or whatever, you have choices. You 
can serve the interests of power and wealth and gain the same amenities 
yourself, gain privilege, gain respectability, all sorts of doors are open 
to you. Or you can be a critical dissident. In which case, you’re likely 
to suffer one or another form of oppression. What kind depends on the 
country. So in the United States and England, you’re not sent to a torture 
chamber. You’re not sent to the gulag. But other things happen that 
kind of marginalise you in many ways. Your articles don’t get published, 
you get condemned in public, you’re kind of pushed aside, maybe you 
don’t get a good job and that kind of thing. So the pressures are pretty 
obvious.
Support for power and privilege brings rewards, naturally. If you’re 
a lawyer, you can be a public interest lawyer, work 70 hours a week 
trying to protect people who are vulnerable and in need and live on a 
pittance. Or you can join a corporate law firm and become quite wealthy 
and privileged and so on and so forth. Those are the kinds of choices that 
faced people all through history. So it’s not all that surprising to see that, 
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by and large – quite overwhelmingly, in fact – people of some education, 
privilege, the kind we call ‘intellectuals’, tend, by no means a hundred 
per cent, to be supportive of power and privilege.
It’s also intellectually much easier to accept the common sense of 
the day, the common beliefs and doctrines, and not question them, than 
it is to expose them to critical examination. Easier in many ways. So 
for example, to be quite simple, if I were to say ‘Al-Qaeda is a terrorist 
organisation’, I don’t even need any evidence. Just say it, it’s fine, go 
ahead. Suppose I say that the United States is the leading terrorist power 
in the world. Well, it sounds kind of surprising. I’ve got to have evidence, 
and furthermore I have to have evidence at the level of physics, not just 
history. It’s not that hard to show. But the task is incomparably more 
difficult than just playing along with the flow of doctrine and standard 
beliefs.
So for many reasons it’s not hard to see why you find the tendencies 
that you do find. As I said, during the First World War, to take another 
example, if you were cheering patriotically for your own country, that 
was fine. If you decided to criticise it, say the way Bertrand Russell did 
or Rosa Luxemburg or Eugene Debs, you ended up in jail. OK, not too 
surprising to see which way things go. How do you combat it? The same 
way you combat other injustices, violence and repression in the society. 
By constant, dedicated work.
CHAIR: One of the intellectuals that you attacked very strongly in 
your article ‘The Responsibility of Intellectuals’, of course, was the MIT 
economic historian Walt Rostow. In the discussion this afternoon, other 
names came up: Jerome Wiesner, John Deutch. The previous question 
was driving at whether you had any personal experience of some of 
these people very close to power, advisers of, at that point, Lyndon 
Johnson.
NOAM CHOMSKY: Actually, I have very little experience with those 
groups. They are there, but the people at MIT who I knew most, who 
I knew well and worked with, were the ones on the opposite side, the 
dissidents and the critics. So for example, when Walt Rostow went to 
Washington to serve the administration, there was a Boston area faculty 
peace group which was centred at MIT. That was the centre of the most of 
the faculty anti-war activity. And the people involved were quite distin-
guished scientists. People like a very close friend, Salvador Luria, Nobel 
laureate in biology, others like that. That’s the kind of circles in which I 
was. And the same with the student body.
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The student body was quite conservative until the late 1960s. But there 
was a small group of students who were organising among the student 
body, a very small group. Those were the young people I was quite close 
to. They finally succeeded in pretty much taking over the university. 
What I described, the change in 1966, 1967, 1968, was largely the result 
of groups like these. And it became quite substantial. I mentioned that 
the resistance organisations – not just the protests, but the resistance 
organisations, which were a serious matter – were facing federal trials 
and so on; insofar as there was an academic contribution it was mostly 
coming from MIT.
By 1968, a small group of MIT students organised a sanctuary for a 
marine deserter; a couple of faculty were involved too, me as well. This 
literally shut down the campus for about two weeks. The campus was 
almost totally focused on protecting this marine deserter. In the student 
centre there were 24-hour seminars, music, all the kinds of 1960s 
activities. And it had a big impact. It led to the first serious discussion 
of the responsibility of technologists and scientists about the conse-
quences of what they were doing. And there were outgrowths, like say 
the Union of Concerned Scientists and others, which changed the culture 
of the university. So inside the university, as elsewhere, there’s constant 
struggle going on, and MIT was a particularly striking place.
Actually, contrary to what was often believed, MIT itself did 
not have war work, war-related work, on the campus. On the campus 
itself, there was a commission in 1969, the Pounds Commission, which 
reviewed this quite closely. There was no classified work on campus. 
There was no directly war-oriented work. Of course, anything that’s done 
has some possible military applications. So work in anthropology, for 
example, was picked up by the military for counter-insurgency and so on.
MIT did administer two military laboratories, the Lincoln Lab and 
what was then called the I-Lab, now the Draper Lab working on counter-
insurgency, on the guidance systems for intercontinental missiles and so 
on. They were administered by MIT but they were not on campus and 
there was a major struggle about it.
By the time the campus got politicised by the late 1960s, there 
was significant debate and struggle about the military labs and there 
were basically two positions. For convenience, the right-wing position 
was to keep, to move the labs, to break the relation, the formal relation, 
between MIT and the labs. That’s the position that actually won.
The left position, of which I was a part in a small group of students, 
was to keep the labs connected to campus. We wanted them to retain the 
formal relationship. And the reason was very simple. If they were moved 
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off campus formally, everything would proceed exactly as before without 
visibility. If they were formally connected to the campus, to the academic 
programme, there would be a constant source of educational activity, 
protest, activism to try to end their activities. Well, that was basically the 
struggle; the right-wing position won. Now they’re formally separated 
from the campus.
But MIT itself doesn’t have war work. In fact the only exception 
was at that time the political science department, which did have direct 
involvement in counterinsurgency activity in Vietnam. But that’s the kind 
of struggle that goes on at MIT. It was quite an interesting place in that 
respect.
QUESTIONER 5: I mean to ask you about Trump and Cuba. When 
Obama did a deal with Cuba, you mentioned the real reasons behind the 
deal. And if Trump pulls out of the deal and changes his policies, do you 
think they will isolate the United States from it and that we’ll have some 
of the Latin American countries stop being the dog working for the US?
NOAM CHOMSKY: Well that’s an interesting question and the answer 
is, for the moment, unknown. He hasn’t said anything. To go into the 
background a little bit: the United States has of course been totally 
isolated in the world on the harsh embargo against Cuba. There were 
major terrorist attacks against Cuba, primarily during the Kennedy 
administration, and then continued, and these have been kind of margin-
alised in history. You have to really work to find out about them. They’re 
a large part of the reason for the Cuban missile crisis, in fact. But, take a 
look at the votes at the United Nations on the US embargo. It’s practically 
unanimous, by now actually unanimous against the United States, apart 
from Israel. But, more significantly, inside the hemisphere the United 
States was becoming isolated.
As the countries of mainly South America, but to some extent Central 
America, started to extricate themselves from the neoliberal disaster 
and from the traditional control of the imperial powers – in the last 
century, the United States – they began to take quite an independent 
course. There are no US military bases left in South America. The 
International Monetary Fund, which is basically an agency of the US 
Treasury Department, has been expelled from South America. It works 
in Europe, not in South America. And the new hemispheric organisa-
tions that were being founded were beginning to exclude the United 
States.
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CELAC [The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States] 
includes the entire hemisphere apart from the United States and Canada. 
And there are regular hemispheric summit meetings. At the last one, in 
Cartagena, the United States and Canada were isolated totally from the 
rest of the hemisphere, primarily on the issue of admitting Cuba into the 
hemispheric system. The next meeting was coming up in 2015 in Panama 
and it was pretty clear that the United States might simply be expelled 
from the hemisphere if the US persisted in its attacks on Cuba. So Obama 
made the sensible move of beginning to normalise relations with, of 
course, the usual rhetoric of how we’re doing this for the benefit of the 
Cuban people and so on and so forth. But the motivation and policies 
were not that obscure, kept quiet by the media and commentary, but 
anybody who wanted to think about it could see it.
Well, what is Trump going to do? We don’t know. There’s been no 
comment or discussion so far. And I think it’s not so clear. He’s a very 
unpredictable figure. The Republican Party is a very strange organisa-
tion, it’s mostly a kind of wrecking ball. We don’t know what they’re 
going to do next. But for the moment, at least, they have not indicated 
any particular policy decisions with regard to Cuba.
QUESTIONER 6: What is your perspective on the Palestinians’ BDS 
[Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions] movement, and in particular what is 
the responsibility of the intellectuals and academics in respect to that 
particular movement?
NOAM CHOMSKY: First off, it’s really BD. There are no sanctions at the 
moment. It may come to that, but at the moment there are no sanctions in 
prospect. The boycott and divestment proposals and the effort to initiate 
such policies was developed at first by an Israeli group, Gush Shalom. 
Uri Avnery is the leading figure. In 1997, they organised a campaign to 
boycott any products, any activities having to do with the settlements in 
the occupied territories. It continued from then. By the early 2000s, there 
were a number of such efforts, I was involved in them and others think it’s 
a very good tactic. The BDS movement itself was founded later, around 
2005, and has its own programme and objectives. There are several 
distinct strands as to how to proceed with these efforts. One of them is 
like the Gush Shalom proposals, aimed at the occupied territories, and 
it’s been quite successful.
So in the United States, some of the major church groups, like the 
Presbyterian Church, have taken quite a strong stand calling for complete 
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boycott not only of, say, products from the settlements but of any 
institution connected with the settlements, including US  multinationals – 
and that’s an important part – that are involved in providing aid 
and assistance and development for the occupied territories, where 
everything that’s going on is completely illegal of course.
The European Union has taken some steps towards boycott 
and divestment of the settlements. They at least have formal policies 
barring direct engagement with anything connected with the occupied 
territories. The major human rights groups like Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International have also called for strong actions directed 
against the settlements and occupation. And these activities I think have 
been substantial, successful and could be carried forward.
My own view is that, especially in the United States, but also in 
England, there should be efforts to try to block all military aid to Israel. 
In the United States, the military aid to Israel happens to be technically 
illegal, in violation of a law called the Leahy Law, which bans any 
military aid to any military units or organisations which are involved in 
systematic human rights abuses. And there’s no question whatsoever that 
the IDF – the Israeli army – is involved in extreme human rights abuses in 
Gaza and the West Bank. So a campaign to try to press the US government 
to terminate military aid has I think a possible substantial basis. And, in 
my view, one of the faults of the popular solidarity movements, including 
the BDS movements, is not to press forward with this effort. Well, that’s a 
range of, I think, quite effective BDS-style activities.
There’s another strain which is directed against Israel itself. So, not 
attending academic conferences, boycotting Israeli universities, blocking 
cultural contacts and so on. In my opinion that’s more dubious. For 
one thing, there’s a strong and obvious taint of hypocrisy. So, if we’re 
boycotting Tel Aviv University, why not boycott Harvard and Oxford, let’s 
say, which are involved in much more serious crime? That immediately 
arises. And there are possible answers to that but you have to set the 
stage for understanding where such answers might be admissible, and 
the same across the board.
It has to be recognised that BDS is a tactic, it’s not a policy. And 
tactics have to be evaluated in terms of their likely consequences. 
You can’t say ‘I just like the tactic, it makes me feel good’. You have 
to ask:  what are the consequences of the tactic for the victims? And 
in general my own experience with this, and feeling about it, is that 
those tactical choices that have been directed against the occupation 
have been quite successful, whereas those directed against Israel itself 
have been pretty much unsuccessful. And, in fact, have also often been 
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negative because they’ve elicited a backlash which is based on the kinds 
of considerations I just mentioned, which ended up being harmful to the 
Palestinian cause. Those are the questions you have to raise seriously 
when any tactical decision is made, whether it’s BDS or civil disobedi-
ence or anything else. You have to ask yourself, primarily, what are the 
consequences for the victims?
QUESTIONER 7: We’ve been talking about a specific kind of power 
until now, which is governmental power. Another kind of power is the 
internet and social media. What is your opinion of how these platforms 
alter the responsibility of intellectuals? As an undergraduate student and 
potentially an intellectual – someday – how do we carry out our respon-
sibilities on these platforms?
NOAM CHOMSKY: By using technologies such as the internet and social 
media? I think it’s the same, just a different variant of the question of 
how we carry out our responsibilities with regard to the other kinds of 
privileges that come along with being what’s called an intellectual.
Intellectual is kind of a strange category. It doesn’t really, necessarily, 
correlate with your insight or understanding or anything else. But being 
what’s called an intellectual presupposes a certain amount of privilege. 
Privilege confers obligations and responsibility, automatically. So those 
of us who are privileged enough to fall within the category of intellec-
tuals have the responsibility to use that privilege in ways that, to go back 
to Martin Luther King again, ‘bend the arc of history towards justice’. 
Well, you can do that with print media, you can do it with talks, you 
can do it with organising like, for example, organising the resistance 
organisations that I mentioned. Intellectuals played a significant part in 
that. The same is true of the internet and social media. You can use them 
constructively or they can be used harmfully. There are big struggles 
going on about the nature of these media right now.
A crucial question is what’s called net neutrality. The internet was 
originally created in places like MIT, in fact, right at the lab where I was 
working back in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the intention of 
the early engineers, scientists and others who were working on it was 
to create something that would be an open, free medium of interchange 
and expression. The internet was finally privatised in the mid 1990s, 
and since then it’s been under substantial corporate and advertising 
influence, partial control. And now there’s a struggle going on – primarily 
in the United States – as to whether to preserve or even develop further 
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the internet as a medium of free interchange, exchange and expression 
of opinion, and so on, or whether to divide it, to segment it into rapid 
access and slow, difficult access; and of course the rapid access will be 
for business and power systems and so on, and the rest of it for the less 
privileged. And that’s a major struggle going on right now in the Trump 
administration.
The officials who have been brought to the head of the relevant 
commissions in the Trump administration are opposed to net neutrality 
and they’re trying to move towards corporate, business and government 
control. That’s something that has to be struggled against. But for 
individuals, as the questioner mentioned, the choice is the usual one. How 
do you want to use your privilege? Do you want to use it in dedication to 
the needs of people who are being oppressed, who are suffering, who 
need help and assistance? Or do you want to use it to support your own 
privilege and advance it and advance the interest of those with power 
and wealth in the society? The usual question. It’s different because these 
are different media, but otherwise it’s the same question.
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